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Abstract
Land titling is a popular development intervention to secure the housing tenure of
residents across cities of the global south. This thesis contributes to our
understanding of city-wide titling by examining the World Bank’s Land
Management and Administration Project (LMAP) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. It
draws on archival sources, interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaire
surveys in three field sites.
The thesis finds that LMAP has enabled some historically marginalised communities
to secure their property rights. Others have been excluded from legal ownership as
their lands have been transferred to an elite group of developers. At the household
level, titles have resulted in a range of outcomes. In general, recipients have accessed
larger formal sector loans and invested more in income-generating activity and
housing improvements than non-recipients. Titles have, however, exposed some to
increased credit-related risks of displacement.
The thesis contributes to debates about titling in several ways. First, it provides a
household-level analysis of a city-wide project in a post-socialist city. Most studies
of titling have focused on unplanned settlements in cities where formally-recorded
ownership is the norm. The reorganisation of property rights associated with city-
wide projects may produce different outcomes, as it affects both unplanned and
established urban areas. Second, it adds to debates about access to credit by
examining titling in the context of a booming microfinance industry and other forms
of lending emerging in the global south. Third, it provides evidence of the diverse
mechanisms by which city-wide titling influences both small-scale housing
investments and large-scale redevelopment projects. Fourth, it ties into debates about
the political economy of international development, highlighting the intended and
unintended consequences of donor-funded titling for the social, economic and-
political processes of urban change.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Prologue
This thesis emerged from my experiences working with low-income communities
suffering tenure insecurity in Phnom Penh. I arrived in the city in 2009, having just
completed a Masters course on urbanisation and development and keen to find work
in the urban development sector. At the time, the national media was awash with
coverage of a land conflict centred on an urban lake with a number of low-income
communities on its banks. The Boeung Kak lake area was slated for development
and authorities had served an eviction notice to residents in what the press were
describing as Cambodia’s largest post-war population displacement – over 4,000
households were to be relocated. During the dispute, I worked with a coalition of
civil society organisations representing the community.
The coalition’s strategy to support the community centred on a World Bank-funded
land titling project being implemented in the city, the Land Management and
Administration Project (LMAP). According to the coalition, the government had
illegally prevented community members from obtaining titles under the project as
part of a plan to evict them. Campaigners urged the Bank to ensure that their project
was implemented according to the law and that members of the threatened
community were protected from eviction and provided with legal ownership
documents. The coalition submitted a complaint to the World Bank’s independent
Inspection Panel on behalf of the community, which eventually led to some
households receiving titles to the disputed land. This action was too late for the
majority of residents who had already been evicted from the area, while some of the
remaining households continued to be excluded from titling under a new agreement
offered by the government. In total, around 800 residents’ plots were titled in the
Boeung Kak area.
The experience of working on the Boeung Kak case highlighted a number of points
about land governance in Phnom Penh that I thought important from a policy
perspective. First, it was clear that tenure insecurity was an urgent problem for tens
2of thousands of people living in unplanned settlements across the city. Second, it was
also evident that civil society organisations believed the World Bank titling project
could potentially change this situation by providing titles to those in unplanned
areas. Third, it was clear that more research was needed to establish why certain
areas had been excluded from the project in order to better support such
communities.
In addition to these policy-related questions, I found myself thinking more critical
thoughts about titling stemming from my recently-completed Masters studies. I was
aware that titling was not the only policy intervention proposed as a means to secure
the tenure of marginalised urban communities. Moreover, it was often argued that
titling projects did not result in increased tenure security for low-income groups.
Indeed, in some cases, titling was thought to have increased tenure insecurity. I also
knew that a range of other issues were linked to titling, including housing investment
and access to credit.
It struck me that discussions in the academic literature were poorly connected to the
activities of groups working on land titling in Phnom Penh. NGO practitioners were
not familiar with the academic studies of titling that had been conducted across cities
of the global south, and the implications of such studies in relation to tenure
insecurity in Phnom Penh. Linking key debates in the literature to the experience of
Phnom Penh’s titling project, I believed, might widen understanding of the city’s
tenure problems. An extended research project would provide a unique opportunity
to explore Phnom Penh’s titling project in depth and could also potentially provide a
means for the experiences of the city’s residents to inform debates in the academic
literature. I proposed the idea of titling and urban transition as a PhD research project
to a local policy research institute, the Cambodia Development Resource Institute
(CDRI), which agreed that the issue of urban titling was a key policy area where
further research was required. They agreed to act as partner for the PhD project and
produce a series of policy briefs in Khmer, distilling the findings of the thesis for a
Cambodian audience.
31.2 City-wide titling: a contentious policy framework
Land titling is a popular policy response to perceived weaknesses of land markets in
economies of the global south. In many contexts, it is argued, inefficient institutions
for formally registering property ownership render the process costly, complicated
and beyond the reach of many low-income property owners (De Soto, 2000). Those
who are locked out of formal ownership rely instead on informal mechanisms,
including verbal contracts or documents issued at the local level. As informal
ownership is not recognised by the state, the property rights associated with it are not
legally protected, rendering property at risk of appropriation. The risk associated
with informal tenure discourages property transactions and investment, limits access
to formal sector credit and, ultimately, contributes to poverty and constrains growth
(Deininger, 2003; De Soto, 2000; Werlin, 1999). Deficient property registration
mechanisms are also thought to discourage large-scale investments, particularly from
overseas, because investors cannot be sure that their investment will be safe (World
Bank, 2002a).
Nation- and city-wide titling projects aim to correct inefficient land markets by
developing strong institutional frameworks to enforce property rights in a
standardised and predictable manner for all property owners. Planners predict a
number of positive outcomes for title recipients, including increased tenure security,
safer property transactions, higher rates of investment and better access to formal
credit and services (Brandao and Feder, 1995). These benefits are expected to
extend across economies, benefitting everyone, from the richest recipient to the
poorest, and fostering a process of inclusive growth (Deininger, 2003).
The emergence of titling as the Bank’s best-practice land policy mirrors a shift
towards institution building and good governance that has occurred in mainstream
development economics since the mid-1990s. The mantra of market primacy and
state contraction associated with policies of the 1980s and early 1990s has been
replaced by a focus on building global-standard institutions and promoting good
governance (Rodrik, 2006; Rodrik et al., 2002; Stiglitz, 2001). Land titling is the
policy outcome of the institutional economics school of thought applied to land
markets: to secure property universally by building the capacity of institutions
tasked with enforcing rights (Besley, 1995). Titling as a best-practice tenure reform
4gained increased policy traction in the 2000s with the publication of Hernando De
Soto’s much-lauded The Mystery of Capital. The book, which became an
international bestseller, argued that legally securing the ownership rights of the poor
in the global south could result in the end of global poverty by unleashing the latent
power of land markets and formal-sector investment.
The popularity of the titling thesis with the global policy-making elite has translated
into policy action across the globe. Titling has become one the World Bank’s most
replicated interventions, accounting for a significant portion of its lending over the
past two decades. According to Conning et al. (2007: 1) the World Bank lent nearly
1 billion USD on such projects in the fiscal year of 2004 alone. The policy has also
received support from a variety of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and has
been implemented in a range of settings across the globe , including Eastern Europe,
the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia (Gilbert, 2002; Hall et al., 2011;
Holstein, 1996; Markussen, 2008). In the Southeast Asian region two of Cambodia’s
three neighbours, Lao PDR and Thailand, received World Bank loans to implement
country-wide land titling during the 1990s; in the early 2000s, Cambodia joined this
growing global trend.
Many commentators have, however, been highly critical of the World Bank’s brand
of best-practice programming. A common criticism is that globally replicated
policies serve the interests of global capitalism rather than those they purport to help:
at best they provide no benefit to the poor and at worst further entrench inequality
(Escobar, 2011; Ferguson, 1990; Power, 2004).The Bank’s recent policy turn to
institution building embeds these neoliberal principles more deeply in the
governance apparatus of host economies (Fine 2001; Li, 2007). In this vein, city-
wide property formalisation has been criticised for allowing World Bank-sponsored
neoliberalism to reconfigure state-citizen relations along the lines of economic
theory (Goldman, 2011). Though poverty reduction is the stated aim of such
programmes, it is argued that their outcome for marginalised communities is
increased tenure insecurity as urban areas become highly commodified and
globalised spaces (Goldman, 2011; McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2005).
In the main, debates about city-wide titling have been conducted at the global,
national and municipal scales, and tend to be centred on the ideological battle ground
5of development policy formulation. Proponents have focused on the theoretical
arguments of institutional economics to predict positive outcomes of titling, while
critics have characterised reforms as neoliberal impositions that harm low-income
groups. To uncover the household-level impacts of titling, however, one must look to
an earlier literature, which provides case study accounts of titling in relation to
unplanned settlements (Angel, 1983; Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; Varley, 1987). This
body of work provides detailed analysis of titling in relation to tenure security,
access to credit and housing improvements using surveys, focus groups and/or other
household-based methodologies. Some of these studies have emphasised the
importance of titles in increasing tenure security and housing investment in
unplanned areas (Field, 2005;Van Gelder, 2010); others have disputed these links
(Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al., 2009). This literature has focused on project-based
titling, where planners have targeted unplanned areas and extended the rules of an
existing formal sector to them. It does not, however, engage with city-wide titling
programmes, which are broader in scope as they involve the reform of institutions
and the reorganisation of property rights at the city scale.
What is missing, then, is empirical exploration of the impacts of city-wide titling
projects at the household level. There have been no studies, for example, that shed
light on how titling may have affected populations that have not been dispossessed
during the implementation of a city-wide project, or that investigate the variety of
household-level outcomes that may be associated with titling, such as housing
investment and credit behaviour. Another aspect of city-wide titling that has not
received attention in the literature is the effect of such projects for the majority of
urban residents that do not live in unplanned areas.
This thesis, therefore, aims to contribute to debates on titling by presenting an
integrated city-wide and household-level analysis. I seek to identify the issues
associated with implementing a city-wide project and the effect of the project on
processes of urban change at the city-wide scale. At the household level, I aim to
assess the effects of titling on those who have received titles and those who have not
in relation to tenure security, housing investment and access to credit.
61.3 Land policy and urban development in Phnom Penh
Phnom Penh is the capital of the Southeast Asian nation of Cambodia. Its population
at the last official count in 2012 was 1.2 million, although there are thought to be
many more undocumented and/or transient residents. The city is perhaps best known
as the capital of the genocidal Khmer Rouge and the enforced exodus inflicted on
residents in 1975, which resulted in the deaths of the majority of the city’s
population (Khemro and Payne, 2004; Kiernan, 1996). Today, peace and stability
have returned and the city, which has enjoyed high rates of GDP growth over the
past two decades (World Bank, 2016).
Despite the city’s rapid development, Phnom Penh is defined by many stark
inequalities between rich and poor – inequalities that are readily apparent in patterns
of land ownership and property investment. At one end of the spectrum, Phnom Penh
boasts one of the most buoyant real-estate markets in Southeast Asia, with average
property prices reaching 5,000 USD per m2 in some prime locations (VTRUST,
2014). The city has witnessed a construction boom, with hundreds of millions of
dollars of investment reported each year by the Council for the Development of
Cambodia (CDC), as domestic and international investors pour money into large-
scale commercial and residential redevelopments. At the other end of the spectrum, a
significant proportion of Phnom Penh’s residents live in unplanned settlements,
usually in former greenfield areas, close to bodies of water or public infrastructure,
in predominantly self-built housing. A recent government report estimated that 25
per cent of the city’s population lived in such areas, many with substandard
accommodation made from poor-quality materials, where they are exposed to
hazards such as floods, storms and fires (Phnom Penh Municipality, 2012). Between
these two extremes lie the bulk of Phnom Penh’s residents, whose land ownership
and associated characteristics have largely been neglected in academic research.
The global policy shift toward institutional economics during the late 1990s has had
a significant impact on Phnom Penh’s land markets. In the early 2000s, the World
Bank asserted that the lack of a unified tenure system constituted the ‘overriding
problem [for the country] and the one with the greatest contribution to poverty’, as
well as one of the main constraints to small-, medium- and large-scale industrial
investment (World Bank, 2002a: 4). On the back of a revised land law, the flagship
7land titling intervention, the Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP),
was implemented by the land ministry in 2002, with funding from the Bank and the
governments of Canada, Germany and Finland. This project’s aim was to formalise
all parcels of land in the city and increase the capacity of the land ministry to enforce
property rights.
While the LMAP and associated reforms coincided with a period of rapid economic
growth and investment in Phnom Penh, inequality and the evictions of low-income
residents in unplanned areas persisted. This trend of exclusion became acutely
apparent in 2009, when the eviction of urban poor communities, whose tenure the
project was meant to secure, led to the World Bank stepping back from the project.
The trigger for the Bank’s disengagement was the previously noted Boeung Kak
dispute. Residents’ groups claimed to the Bank’s Inspection Panel that they had
been unfairly excluded from the land titling process. The Inspection Panel agreed,
noting that the LMAP had not been implemented correctly, and that the community
in question had been unfairly excluded from the adjudication process (World Bank,
2010). An intense dispute between the Bank and the government ensued,
culminating in the suspension of all World Bank financing to Cambodia. Eventually
the government backed down and some residents in Boeung Kak received land title
(although many others had long since accepted below-market compensation
settlements and moved away or been evicted).
After the withdrawal of the World Bank, titling was pursued by the Cambodian
government, with funding and technical assistance coming mostly from GIZ, the
German state’s bilateral aid agency. In 2016, the German government too withdrew
funding from Cambodia’s land sector because of the government’s failure to provide
titles to residents in unplanned areas. As of 2016, the government is still committed
titling, and there are rumours that future financial and technical support for the
project may come from the Chinese government.
The brief narrative of city-wide titling in Phnom Penh provided above hints at the
difficulties and complexities tied up with implementing such a wide-reaching project
as the LMAP. In particular, it illustrates the divergent interests attempting to steer
the project towards achieving their own aims, from communities and civil society
groups attempting to secure titles for those in unplanned areas to elites trying to
8prevent such groups from doing so. Understanding how the LMAP has intersected
with these varied interests in relation to land tenure is an important policy issue for
those who wish to promote equitable land governance in Phnom Penh. Through my
exploration of the LMAP, therefore, I hope to contribute to academic and policy
debates in the Cambodian studies literature relating to urban development and land
governance, and identify ways to improve outcomes from low-income, marginalised
groups.
To date, there have been several studies of titling in Cambodia that provide valuable
critiques of the policy and governance aspects of such land reforms (Biddulph,
2011; Springer, 2013; Un and So, 2011). While most studies have focused on rural
areas (Biddulph, 2011; Dwyer, 2015; Hirsch, 2011; So, 2010), there have been a few
that have also considered the outcomes of titling in Phnom Penh. Simon Springer
(2013) provides a strong critique of the LMAP, drawing on the experiences of low-
income urban communities that have been dispossessed of their land and homes.
Other studies have looked at the consequences of eviction, for those that have
suffered or are under threat of it, although not specifically in relation to the LMAP
(Brickell, 2014; McGinn, 2013). In addition to the academic literature there are at
least two high-quality reports commissioned by NGOs that have evaluated the
implementation of titling in Phnom Penh (Grimsditch et al., 2012; Grimsditch and
Henderson, 2009). This thesis aims to build on and contribute to these debates.
1.4 Research questions
The LMAP has been designed to increase the efficiency of Phnom Penh as a growth
driver for the Cambodian economy by promoting increased and diversified small-,
medium- and large-scale urban investment. It has also aimed to promote equitable
economic development by extending the benefits of secure, standardised tenure
across the city’s diverse population. The aim of this thesis is to assess how
successful the LMAP has been in achieving these aims and whether it has
contributed to inclusive urban development. To achieve this, I view the LMAP at
two scales.
9First, I explore the LMAP as a policy intervention with city-wide implications. In
this regard, I assess the scope and nature of institutional and regulatory reform that
the project has entailed and provide an assessment of its mass land titling
component. I assess how the LMAP has permitted access to different segments of the
city’s population, identifying groups that have been included (received titles) and
excluded (have not received titles). I also explore how the city-wide distribution of
titles has intersected with other changes in Phnom Penh’s land sector, particularly in
relation to the removal of low-income groups from central urban areas, the increase
in foreign investment and the proliferation of large-scale redevelopment projects.
Second, I explore the household-level outcomes of the LMAP at the city-wide scale.
I assess changes in tenure security, investment behaviour and access to credit in
households across a range of population sub-groups in order to capture the variety of
impacts associated with the LMAP. To this end, I have conducted in-depth
household-based research in three contrasting survey sites. Site 1 is a planned
residential area typical of Phnom Penh, where some residents have received titles
and others are yet to receive them because of bureaucratic constraints (see Chapter 4
for details). Site 2 is an unplanned settlement where some residents have received
titles but others have not yet done so, again because of bureaucratic constraints. Site
3 is an unplanned settlement that has been excluded from the project – no residents
of the settlement have received titles.
To explore titling at these two scales, I have used a variety of research methods,
drawing on a range of sources during a data collection period lasting over a year. I
have sourced and analysed a large number of legal and policy documents, conducted
archival research on land disputes, and used a variety of online data sources,
including the WikiLeaks US embassy cables database. I have conducted key
informant interviews and participated in focus groups with a wide variety of
stakeholders, from private sector developers, to government officials to community
activists. I have also drawn on responses from over 200 household questionnaires
implemented across the three survey sites selected for study in this research. Finally,
my experiences as a development worker in Phnom Penh’s land sector has also
contributed to the analysis of the LMAP included in this thesis.
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The fieldwork and analysis discussed in this thesis has been guided by three research
questions:
1. Which type of areas have been titled and which have been excluded from
titling and why?
The LMAP has aimed to standardise tenure systems in the city, extending legal
ownership across the population. I assess how effective the project has been in
realising this aim. I investigate the allocation of titles, identifying the characteristics
of areas and populations that have and that have not received title. I ask why and
how the implementation of the project resulted in the formalisation of the property
rights of certain groups to the exclusion of others’, and which aspects of the LMAP’s
implementation have promoted or hindered the inclusion of lower-income
populations.
2. What difference have titles made to recipients?
I ask to what extent formalised property rights have translated into changes in tenure
security, investment in housing and access to formal-sector credit. I do so by
comparing key socioeconomic characteristics and behaviours of households that
have received titles against those that have not. I explore how the experiences of
recipient and non-recipients may differ based on their household’s socioeconomic
characteristics.
3. How has titling contributed to the broader process of urban transition?
I ask how the distribution of titles and the outcomes of titling for recipient and non-
recipient households have contributed to Phnom Penh’s transition, drawing on both
city-wide and household-level processes of change. I examine the drivers of land use
and socioeconomic change, including land transactions, investments and evictions,
and highlight the role titles play in these processes.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
Following this introduction, in Chapter 2 I review the two main strands of debate on
titling in the literature. The first views titling in informal or unplanned settlements
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and discusses the pros and cons of property formalisation for title recipients and non-
recipients. The second looks at titling as city- and country-wide property rights
interventions supported by international aid organisations. I discuss the implications
of debates in the academic literature for my analysis and detail the analytical
approach of this thesis. In Chapter 3, I present a brief history of land reform and
urban transition in Cambodia to provide the historical background to the LMAP,
from the beginnings of urbanism and property ownership in the ancient city of
Angkor to more-recent donor-funded interventions. I draw out themes that have
repeatedly characterised land governance in urban areas, including patronage
politics, foreign intervention and the exclusion of groups not considered to be
legitimate citizens by the state.
In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed description of the methodological approach of this
thesis. I frame the study in the political economy tradition of land market analysis,
present the range of data collection methods deployed in the field and the process of
data analysis, and provide details about the survey sites and populations. I also
include an assessment of the limitations of the methods and an appraisal of the
ethical aspects of the research.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I present a city-wide analysis, looking at the distribution of
ownership documents in pre-LMAP and post-LMAP Phnom Penh. In Chapter 5, I
look at the distribution of titles in Phnom Penh between 1989, when property
ownership was reintroduced, and 2001, when a new donor-supported land law was
promulgated. I provide an analysis of the 1989 sub-decrees and 1992 Land Law that
legalised ownership, detailing how this legislation excluded the residents of
unplanned areas. Drawing on archival sources, I then provide case studies of land
disputes in this period, illustrating how and for what purposes dispossession was
actioned by elites. In Chapter 6, I examine how the distribution of ownership
documents has changed as a result of the LMAP, the associated 2001 Land Law and
other donor-related legal reforms. I note that in many cases unplanned areas have
continued to suffer exclusion because of entrenched patronage networks that the
LMAP has been unable to counter. In other cases, however, previously excluded
unplanned settlements have received titles through the project. There is also evidence
that the LMAP has provided new policy spaces in which excluded communities can
assert their rights: as a donor-funded project, the LMAP has provided recourse for
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excluded communities to appeal to the World Bank with their grievances, which in
turn has increased pressure on the government to provide titles to excluded
claimants.
In Chapters 7 and 8, I look at the household impacts of titling, drawing on survey
data from Sites 1 to 3. Chapter 7 explores titling, tenure security and housing
investment. I begin by discussing how the city-wide LMAP fits with the literature on
titling and housing consolidation, which focuses on projects targeted at unplanned
settlements, and discuss what this difference may mean in relation to how titling
affects people’s investment decisions. In Chapter 8, I explore titling and credit
activity. I note that credit markets found in the survey sites differ from conventional
representations of titling and credit in the literature because of the presence of poorly
regulated microfinance institutions. In this context, I assess the relationship between
credit activity and titling by different population sub-groups, finding that the impact
of titles on household borrowing is closely related to their socioeconomic
characteristics.
In Chapter 9, I draw on both city-wide analysis and household survey data to assess
how titling has contributed to a process of urban change in Phnom Penh. First I
present a case study of titling and urban transition in the commune of Tonle Bassac,
highlighting how the exclusion of residents of unplanned settlements from titling has
intersected with social and economic change in the rapidly developing area. I shift
scales to the community level, tracing how titling has contributed to changes in
property prices and transactions in survey Sites 1 and 2, where residents have
received titles. I then look at urban change in areas where residents did not receive
titles, but instead were subject to alternative interventions to secure their tenure.
Finally, I explore the social and cultural dimensions of the LMAP in relation to
recipients’ and non-recipients’ perceptions of tenure security.
I conclude the thesis in Chapter 10, where I detail the principal findings, their
theoretical implications and the policy implications that have emerged. Finally, I
suggest avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2: Land Titling and Tenure Security: an Overview
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I locate Cambodia’s titling project in relation to two strands of
scholarship. The first views titling as a targeted development intervention to
improve the lot of those living in unplanned settlements – areas of self-built housing
where residents lack documents proving ownership. Contributions to such debates
argue for or against the allocation of titles to unplanned settlements. Arguments for
titling – typically associated with the work of Hernando de Soto (2000) – equate
titles with increased tenure security, investment in property, utilities and
infrastructure and access to credit. Arguments against dispute the supposed benefits
of titling and highlight the risk of increased tenure insecurity for low-income groups
resulting from market-induced displacement (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009;
Payne et al., 2009).
The second strand of literature views titling as a city-wide intervention intended to
stimulate the urban economy. Arguments advocating city-wide titling are usually
made by institutional economists and associated with the World Bank (Deininger,
2003; Feder and Nishio, 1998). Using the same reasoning as De Soto, these
economists assert that systematically titling urban areas promotes universal tenure
security and creates efficient and equitable land markets (Brandao and Feder, 1995).
Critics of city-wide titling, on the other hand, see the policy as part of a broader
process of neoliberal governance promoted across cities of the global South by the
international financial institutions (The World Bank, IMF and others), and usually
associated with negative outcomes for low-income communities (Goldman, 2011;
Roy, 2005).
In this chapter, I explore the questions emerging from the literature in relation to
Cambodia’s titling project, and identify key issues and debates that I will address in
later chapters. Finally, I provide an overview of the conceptual approach of this
thesis, based on my interpretation of the literature and its relevance to titling in
Phnom Penh.
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2.2 Targeted titling
In this section, I review arguments for and against titling as an upgrading policy tool
implemented in unplanned settlements. I then explore how Cambodia’s titling
project fits into these debates.
2.2.1 Titling and unplanned settlements
The role of property formalisation in the development of squatter settlements has
been a central question for policy makers for nearly four decades. The roots of this
literature can be traced to the late 1960s, when squatter settlements began to be
viewed not as a cause of poverty but as part of a solution to the question of housing
low-income urban residents (Doebele, 1987). Prior to this shift in thought, urban
housing policy generally involved the demolition of squatter settlements and the
moving of residents into purpose-built social housing. In many cases, this solution
proved unsustainable because governments were unable to provide housing on the
scale required (ibid.).
John Turner (1977) was among the first to assert that government policy should shift
from the provision of social housing to supporting rather than eradicating squatter
settlements. Turner asserted that residents provided the best solution to the housing
question: autonomous efforts to improve their dwellings proved more successful
than government-sponsored projects (ibid.). He emphasised the importance of
security of tenure as a prerequisite to housing improvements, noting that settlements
tended to improve over time as residents were willing and able to invest time and
money in their dwellings providing they were safe from eviction. While not
explicitly referring to the idea of regularising households’ individual property rights,
Turner advocated policies that would provide a secure environment for residents,
including the legalisation of squatter settlements and the suspending of evictions.
The emphasis on households’ latent potential to improve their living conditions
found favour with multilateral aid organisations such as the World Bank, which, in
the 1970s, promoted policies enabling the rational economic individual to thrive in
the free market. As a result, property rights legalisation became a popular settlement-
upgrading policy that was pursued in developing cities across the global south
(Jimenez, 1983; Jones and Ward, 1994). More recently, Hernando De Soto’s (2000)
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The Mystery of Capital caused a resurgence in the popularity of the policy: his ideas
have appealed ‘to a wide and highly influential audience … World Bank policy has
clearly been influenced by his arguments’ (Gilbert, 2002: 4).
De Soto and others (Deininger, 2003; Feder, 1987; Feder and Feeny, 1991) argue
that titles are crucially important for tenure security because they provide legal
protection to a person’s ownership rights. They are documents issued by the state
and registered in the cadastre that vest in the owner the state’s protection of their
property from appropriation. Titles also increase recipients’ interactions with other
stakeholders in the formal economy, such as banks and utilities companies,
providing additional legitimacy to an ownership right (Brandao and Feder, 1995; De
Soto, 2000). If a bank provides mortgage with a title as collateral, for example, the
lender too becomes invested in the integrity of the title it has lent against. In this
way, titles provide a platform for mutually strengthening relationships between
recipients and formal sector institutions.
Studies over the past three decades have supported De Soto’s claims about tenure
security with empirical evidence (Jimenez, 1983, Van Gelder, 2013; 2010). In De
Soto’s native Peru, the World Bank-funded Comisión de Formalizacion de la
Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) provided land titles to over 1.3 million households
between 1996 and 2002 (Calderon, 2004). It was found that legally securing tenure
greatly increased households’ perceptions of their tenure security: a survey of
recipient households showed that in all cases respondents felt that land title had
increased their sense of tenure security and reduced their fear of eviction (Kagawa
and Turkstra, 2002). In Buenos Aries, a study by Van Gelder (2010) also found that
households in receipt of formal ownership documents scored better on indicators
relating to their perception of tenure security. Legal tenure status was found to be
negatively and significantly correlated with the perceived probability of eviction and
fear of eviction. A similar study in Jakarta found over 90 per cent of households with
formal documentation believed their documents were the most important factor in
securing their tenure (Reerink and Van Gelder, 2010: 84). Interestingly, the study
also found that those without formal tenure documents still viewed the documents in
their possession as the most important signifier of their tenure security (followed by
the length of occupation), indicating that interventions to strengthen tenure
documents would be effective in increasing tenure security.
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Titling has also been found to increase tenure security at the intra-household level. In
some cases, formalisation programmes that address intra-familial property relations
can help women overcome their secondary relationship to property (Datta, 2006;
Field, 2003; Varley, 2007). In Mexico, the formal recording of women’s names on
title deeds and the storing of these deeds in government offices makes it more
difficult for their land to be appropriated by their (ex)husband (Varley, 2007). In
India, Namita Datta (2006) reports that joint titling was strongly welcomed by
women and perceived as important to increasing their tenure security. Illustrating the
importance of titles, Datta (2006: 283) quotes a programme beneficiary: ‘Now he
cannot ask me to leave the house. I am as much an owner of this house as he is. If he
decides to leave or run after another woman I will at least have the house.’ She notes
that women in general display a higher attachment to houses than men because of
their role in society and, therefore, emphasises increasing women’s tenure security as
a particularly important policy outcome.
A number of studies have highlighted the role of land titling in increasing tenure
security and thereby encouraging owners to invest time, money and effort in an
attempt to better their living conditions (Jimenez, 1983; Field, 2005). In Argentina,
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010), conducted a ‘natural experiment’ in a partially
regularised informal settlement in Buenos Aries, where a specific bureaucratic
context resulted in an allocation of titles exogenous to household and dwelling
characteristics. The study found that prior to titling, households in the area were
‘extremely similar’ and their plots ‘identical’ (ibid: 711), but those who had gone on
to receive titles began to invest far more in their property. Households in receipt of
titles lived in dwellings that scored 37 percentage points higher in an index of
housing quality than those that did not receive titles (ibid: 706). The authors
conclude that their ‘evidence supports the hypothesis that securing property rights
significantly increases investment levels.’ (ibid: 708) In Peru, Erica Field (2005)
uses panel data to show that households receiving titles increased investment in
housing by 68 per cent over a four year period. She notes that this increase was due
to ‘strengthening tenure security through property formalisation’ (Field, 2005: 281).
One of the main arguments used by those who favour land titling is that legal title
increases investment by improving access to formal credit across the population in
general, and for the poor in particular (De Soto, 2000; Feder and Feeny, 1991). Feder
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and Nishio (1998) note that titling improves credit supply services through two
mechanisms. The first is by stimulating demand for credit through increasing tenure
security for property owners. If property owners feel secure they will borrow more to
invest, in turn creating more demand for credit and increasing incentives for
creditors to extend services. Second, land titles can be used as collateral on a loan,
giving lenders the assurances they need to release credit and borrowers the means to
access it. This is an effect of the creditor’s ability to simply and legally seize a
debtor’s assets in case of default. In the short term, these mechanisms increase
households’ access to credit. In the long term, reduced risk is reflected in lower
interest rates and a more efficient and geographically dispersed credit-service
infrastructure. In rural areas there has been some support for this argument. For
example, Feder et al.’s (1987) empirical study of titling in rural in Thailand affirmed
a clear positive relationship between registered land and access to credit. In urban
areas, however, there have been few if any empirical studies that have shown this to
occur in regularised informal settlements (Field, 2005; Gilbert, 2012).
A few studies have asserted that formalising land rights has encouraged utility
companies and redevelopers to invest in upgrading settlements to the benefit of low-
income communities (Cantuarias and Delgado, 2004; Werlin, 1999). In Peru,
Cantuarias and Delgado (2004) report that households that received titles under the
COFOPRI programme enjoyed better access to electricity, water and telephone
services than those with no documents. In other areas, lack of titles has been
construed as a barrier to utility companies servicing informal settlements. In
Argentina’s Córdoba Water Concession Project, which aimed to harness the private
sector to improve water supply in the city of Córdoba, a lack of titles was considered
to be a major barrier for ‘pro-poor private sector participation’ because there was no
legal requirement for private-sector providers to extend services to areas where
residents did not have titles (Nickson, 2001: 21). In response, the mayor of Córdoba
pledged to provide titles to those with informal land rights as a prerequisite for water
supply extension to informal settlements.
Titles are seen as important to extending utilities because recipient households can
be held legally accountable for payment of services provided. Upgrading of service
infrastructure in the absence of titles in Jakarta’s kampungs, for example, turned out
not to be sustainable over the long term because private or state companies could not
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recover costs for infrastructure maintenance: ‘unless officials can threaten
individuals with loss of property’ there is no incentive to invest in services (Werlin,
1999: 1527). Property formalisation in tandem with service provision has been a
model promoted by aid agencies keen to ensure sustainable settlement upgrading
(McGranahan et al., 2008). The Swedish International Development and Cooperation
Agency (Sida), for example, has implemented this integrated approach widely across
informal settlements in Central America (ibid.).
Some studies have attempted to capture the impacts of titles beyond legal tenure
security, investment, credit and services. A study by Erica Field (2003) of Peru’s
COFOPRI programme found that including the names of both men and women on
titles increased women’s decision-making power in the family, which resulted in a
sharp decrease in fertility rates. In Buenos Aries too, Galiani and Schargrodsky
(2010) find that titling led to a decrease in fertility rates, which, in turn, resulted in
higher spending on children’s education. In India, Datta (2006: 293) finds a broad
range of benefits for women resulting from titling ‘increase women’s participation in
decision making, their access to knowledge and information about public matters,
their sense of security, self-esteem, and also the respect they receive from their
spouses.’ Titling has also been linked to improved health outcomes in regularised
informal settlements, including better scores on indicators relating to child nutrition
and adolescent sexual health (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004).
Another strand of debate emphasises the psychological aspects of titles, tenure
security and ownership in relation to emerging narratives about geographies of the
home. The home has been positioned as lying at the ‘heart of human life’ and,
therefore, protecting one’s home is of immense psychological significance (Blunt
and Varley, 2004: 3). The psychological and emotional dimensions of secure
homeownership relate to the concept of ontological security – a framework
forwarded by Anthony Giddens (1984) that refers to feelings of confidence, trust and
belonging in society. Secure homeownership is believed to be important to
ontological dimensions of security, particularly in societies that privilege the concept
of homeownership. In England, for example, Peter Saunders (1989: 187), notes the
importance of secure ownership in fomenting a ‘sense of self and belonging’ because
of a strong culture of homeownership in English society. Secure homeownership can
also contribute to a perception of economic security for owners and their families,
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which also has important ontological dimensions. A study by Ann Dupuis and David
Thorns (1998: 43) explored what homeownership meant to New Zealanders who had
lived through the depression of the 1930s, finding that respondents ‘pursued the
maintenance of ontological security through the economic benefits they perceived
homeownership brought them’. Respondents noted, for example, that secure
homeownership enabled them to pass down wealth to their offspring, thereby
securing the economic future of their family. This situation was associated with
feelings of happiness and contentment for homeowners.
Similarly, studies looking at titling in developing country contexts have noted the
important psychological impacts of titles for recipients. In some cases, titles have
been found to be associated with the psychological prestige of formal home
ownership, representing the end of a long struggle for residents of informal
settlements to gain acceptance (Doebele, 1987; Varley, 2002). Jean-Louis Van
Gelder's (2013: 13) study of informal settlements in Buenos Aires, for example,
observes that ‘residents simply wanted to be legal and not be regarded as informal
slum dwellers … [title] implies inclusion in a society that has systematically denied
them entry’. The psychological importance of titles has been noted in a study of a
partially regularised informal settlement in the city of Osasco, Brazil. Those in
receipt of titles 21 percentage points more likely to be ‘happy’ (according to an index
of happiness) than those without (de Moura and da Silveira Bueno, 2013: 196).
These more abstract feelings of contentment contribute to a psychological sense of
security that can have positive impacts on the socioeconomic empowerment of
vulnerable groups (Datta, 2006).
The important ontological dimensions of secure homeownership imply there also
exist important ontological dimensions to being excluded from secure
homeownership. In developing world cities, where access to secure homeownership
can be uneven, a number of studies have assessed the psychological impacts of this
exclusion (Brickell 2014; McGinn, 2013). In such cases, the emotional impact on
those excluded can be very significant. Drawing on the experiences of those
excluded from acquiring land titles and subsequently evicted in the Cambodian
capital of Phnom Penh, Katherine Brickell (2014: 1262) reports a resident’s feelings
of ‘regret for leaving the house she “loved” and regret for the “misery” and “torture”
she feels’.
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2.2.2 Critiques of land titling in unplanned settlements
Though evidence suggests that titling has increased tenure security in some cases,
conflating tenure security with land title and recommending it as a best-practice
panacea to urban poverty has been strongly criticised (Gilbert, 2002; 2012; Payne et
al., 2009).
Compelling evidence has shown that title is not necessary to increase tenure security
and encourage investment in informal settlements. Tenure security is a subjective
condition, not a ‘fixed, objective concept’, and therefore a household’s perception of
tenure security is affected by a variety of factors (Varley, 1987: 464). Land titling is
important as a signifier of official recognition of a settlement, but many argue that
there are other forms of official recognition that can encourage residents to feel
secure in their tenure to invest in improving their homes: for example a moratorium
on evictions or installation of utilities (Varley 1987, Gilbert 2002). In Mexico City,
Ann Varley (1987) found that title was not a precondition for investment in housing,
highlighting state provision of service infrastructure as the main factor that
convinced residents that their settlement was officially accepted. Similarly, in
Bogotá land with only an informal receipt of sale as documentation would be
immediately improved, as occupants based their investment decisions ‘less on the
exact legal status and more on [their] perceptions of the probability of eviction and
demolition (enforcement); as well as the availability of services and passage of time’
(Gilbert, 2002: 10). In both these examples, land titles were not a necessary
precondition for utilities to be extended into informal settlements. Titling can even
limit state investment in service infrastructure by acting as a politically useful but
less effective substitute for more costly service upgrading (Fernandes and Varley,
1998; Gilbert, 2004).
Others question the line of causality – from titles to tenure security to housing
investment – that underpins arguments made by proponents of titling. In Recife, for
example, favela residents with insecure tenure reportedly improved their homes to
strengthen their negotiating position in a bid to obtain official recognition of their
property claims (De Souza, 1998). In this case, the line of causality was inversed,
running from housing investment to tenure security to (potentially) titles. This
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direction of causality implies that titles are not a necessary precondition for housing
investments.
A number of authors argue that land titling increases tenure insecurity by causing
market-induced displacements (Durand-Lasserve, 2007; Durand-Lasserve and Selod,
2009; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2009). Payne et al. (2009: 447) assert that ‘market-
driven displacements appear to be an increasingly common means by which land
titles reduce security of tenure rather than increase it’, citing examples of Rwanda
and Cambodia, where low-income homeowners are driven out of central areas by
rising house prices. It is not only owners but also tenants who are vulnerable to
market-induced displacement – priced out of central areas by rising rents as titled
areas are gentrified (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Payne, 2001). Increasing
land prices due to titling expose the poor not only to gentrification, but also to
appropriation. The expectation of titling can encourage unscrupulous powerful
individuals to appropriate land before title secures it and increases its market value
(Gravois, 2005; Hirsch, 2011)
Critics have argued that proponents of titling misrepresent the relationship between
titles and access to formal credit. Specifically, De Soto and others fail to account for
the multiple constraints on extending formal credit to low-income households: banks
do not base decisions on loans solely on collateral, such that convincing banks of
one’s ability to repay loans (by providing proof of salary, for example) is a major
factor that limits borrowing (Gilbert, 1999; Payne et al., 2008). Moreover, lending
against the homes of low-income borrowers may be unappealing to banks: executing
repossession orders against low-income families could cause reputational damage
and might only recover a modest sum for the creditors (Payne, 2001). In recognition
of the difficulties those who have received land title may face in obtaining credit,
COFOPRI in Peru set up institutions specifically tasked with helping them. This
effort has resulted in a limited volume of formal lending being extended to the
beneficiaries of formalisation programmes, particularly in Lima (Field and Torero,
2006). However, COFOPRI estimates that 90 per cent of those who receive title will
be ineligible for private sector loans because of loan requirements other than
collateral, such as proof of their ability to service the debt (Kagawa and Turkstra,
2002). It seems that the majority of formal credit extended in Peru as a result of
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COFOPRI has come from public banks, and that these banks are becoming
increasingly reluctant to lend because of high default rates (ibid.).
Exposure to formal credit markets as a result of titling has been cited as a possible
cause of displacement, if households default on a loan and have their home
repossessed (Payne et al., 2009; Gilbert, 2012). The effect of credit markets causing
displacement through repossession has not been documented in empirical studies,
but is a fear for the future given the credit culture that land titling programmes such
as COFOPRI encourage, especially in light of the sub-prime mortgage defaults and
global financial crisis (Payne et al., 2009).
A number of authors argue that titling programmes fail to achieve many of their aims
because they are an alien and inappropriate response to the diverse tenure needs of
low-income groups (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009; Payne, 2001; 2004; Payne et
al., 2009). Titling is rooted in western notions of private property that may bear little
resemblance to the endogenous tenure systems present in developing country
contexts (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2003). Indeed, while
De Soto (2000: 231) calls formal property ‘a system of thought’ that has to be taught
to those in the informal sector, others argues that it is a system of thought ‘imported’
from the west and imposed on low-income populations, disrupting the fragile tenure
arrangements that enable the most vulnerable to access shelter in urban areas (Payne,
2001; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2003).
Formal property ownership may not accommodate the complex and/or divergent
priorities and tenure needs of low-income communities. Very poor households, for
example, may put up with a low level of tenure security in exchange for a location
close to livelihood opportunities and services – although that is not to say they too
would not prefer increased tenure security (Payne, 2004). These diverse needs are
reflected in the ‘bewildering complexity of tenure systems which exist in most cities
of the developing world … whilst the distinctions may be almost insignificant to
outsiders, they are crucial for those groups supplying or accessing housing’ (ibid:
169). A study by Boaventura de Souse Santos (1992) of tenure in Recife favelas, for
example, found that home ownership had been uncoupled from land ownership: a
household owns their home (i.e. physical structure) but not the land underneath it.
This arrangement facilitated a thriving housing market that provides low-cost urban
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housing to low-income groups. In such cases, formalising land would potentially
reduce the stock of low-cost urban housing by bundling housing with land
ownership. In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, customary tenure regimes are
based around communal ownership; implementing a system of individual ownership
may cause conflicts, increasing tenure insecurity for the most vulnerable as land
rights are drastically reorganised (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2009).
In recognition of the disjuncture between land titling policy and local tenure systems,
many authors argue that tenure policy interventions should be based on the latter
(Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Khemro and Payne, 2004; Payne, 2005,
2001). Local or customary tenure systems are often viewed as appropriate to local
needs as they have evolved ‘endogenously in response to changing resource
pressures’ (Hunt, 2004: 174). Policies should, therefore, strengthen and build on
rather than disrupt local tenure arrangements (Payne, 2005; Sjaastad and Cousins,
2009). In the case of Cambodia, Geoffrey Payne (2005) argues that the state should
push for a moratorium on evictions and provide legal protection for all forms of
tenure documentation, rather than pursue land titling.
Others have asserted that the formal/informal binary characterisation of land markets
promoted by proponents of titling is flawed. As Ann Varley (2002: 459) points out,
such categorisations discount ‘the ambiguity of experience’ of many households
searching for tenure security. De Soto claims that residents are trying to ‘cross a
bridge’ to legality, but the reality is there is not such a clear separation between the
formal and informal. Households regarded as having ‘informal’ property rights may
have (semi-)official documentation recognising rights other than an official land
title. In these cases households obtain their tenure security through a mixture of
formal and informal processes and titling may not improve tenure security. The
formal and informal are better thought of as ‘intersecting circuits’ – households
secure their tenure by whichever mechanisms best suit their situation (McAuslan,
2002: 30).
Arguments against titling can also follow similar binary dichotomies. Varley (2010:
68 citing Whitehead and Tsikata, 2003) notes how a current strand of the debate pits
African/traditional/good tenure systems against western/new/bad. Explaining and
universalising the experience of residents of the ‘global south’ in such binary terms
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risks masking their true needs. For example, both ‘western’ and ‘African’ accounts
of land formalisation do not speak to the tenure needs of women in Mexico’s ejido
settlements. Predominant ‘western’ discourses on property rights highlight the
experience of the rational economic subject, often equated with a male household
head, which fails to account for the experiences of female members of the
household. ‘African’ discourses highlight the role of formalisation in disrupting
community-based tenure systems. Both fail to adequately address the property rights
of individuals within families in a way that can explain the complexities of women’s
experiences. More generally, private property should not be universalised as a ‘new’
concept that is imposed on those living in unplanned settlements. In the Mexico
study, for example, the ‘institutional context and the dominant ideology’ of
participants was already private rather than collective ownership (Varley, 2010: 72).
2.2.3 LMAP and settlement upgrading
The debates around titling and settlement upgrading provide useful lines of inquiry
into Phnom Penh’s titling project. Settlement upgrading is particularly relevant in
Phnom Penh because unplanned settlements were (and remain) ubiquitous in the
city. At the time that donor-funded titling began in 2001 there were an estimated
175,000 households living in unplanned areas – around fifteen per cent of city’s
population (Sovannarith et al., 2001: 47). The large population in unplanned
settlements is largely a result of Cambodia’s traumatic urban history. As the city re-
urbanised following the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, returnees occupied any
properties they found empty. When the available housing stock had been exhausted,
new migrants occupied public buildings and erected makeshift housing on vacant
land, along roads and railway tracks, on the roofs of apartment blocks and similar
types of space (Khemro and Payne, 2004; Shatkin, 1998). Unplanned settlements
grew rapidly and by the mid-1990s were present in many parts of the city; the largest
were located in precarious areas along the banks of rivers or on stilts over lakes
(Urban Sector Group, 1994).
Historically, those living in unplanned settlements suffered low tenure security
(Engvall and Koko, 2007; Urban Resource Centre, 2002) and few residents were
able to acquire legal ownership documents (Catalla, 2000; Menzies et al., 2008).
During the 1990s, evictions of these sites were endemic and frequently accompanied
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by violence. From 1989 to 2001 NGOs estimate that 30,000 households in
unplanned areas were evicted (Sahakum Teang Tnaut, 2011).
In this context, Cambodia’s donor-funded Land Management and Administration
Project (LMAP) was implemented across the city (and the nation) in2002. In Phnom
Penh, the World Bank funded the systematic titling component of the project, which
aimed – ultimately – to formalise all land rights in the city. As a city-wide project,
Cambodia’s titling project did not specifically target unplanned settlements.
However, the project was mandated to implement the 2001 Land Law, which
provided rights to title for many in such areas and it was expected, therefore, that
many marginalised populations would benefit (Grimsditch and Henderson, 2008).
According to the World Bank’s 2002 Project Appraisal Document:
Many of the expected beneficiaries are poor and vulnerable to being
dislodged from the land where they live … The beneficiaries of land titles
would enjoy the benefits associated with land titles, in the way of
increased tenure security, access to credit and opportunities to increase
investments and productivity. (World Bank, 2002a: 10)
A key aim of this thesis is to establish whether the titling project did benefit
low-income communities in the way planners expected.
The literature on settlement upgrading suggests that there are two scales of analysis
to assess the impacts of titles on those living in unplanned areas. The first relates to
the question of whether those living in unplanned areas have in fact received titles or
not. Successfully extending legal title to unplanned areas requires a well-designed
titling programme (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002; McAuslan, 2002) and a political
landscape that shows willingness to reallocate property rights (Angel, 1983). Has the
LMAP built institutions capable of distributing titles efficiently, equitably and
transparently? These questions will be explored in depth in Chapters 5 and 6 of this
thesis.
A second scale of analysis is the difference titles make to those who receive them.
Do titles change the lives or homes of recipients? According to proponents of titling,
formalising property rights drives settlement consolidation by increasing tenure
security, which leads to greater levels of investment. In Chapter 7, I shall test
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whether titles have made any difference to the tenure security and investment
behaviour of recipients. Are traditional tenure systems a constraint to investment that
titles overcome by increasing tenure security as suggested by De Soto’s influential
work? Are there other potentially more important factors that motivate or inhibit
investment in housing, as suggested by Alan Gilbert, Geoffrey Payne and others?
How do the experiences of residents in Phnom Penh compare to key debates in the
literature on housing investment, for example the formal/informal conception of
tenure systems that has been critiqued by Ann Varley?
Another key assertion that can be tested in Phnom Penh is that title leads to greater
access to formal credit. In general, the literature shows little empirical evidence
supporting a link between titling and credit in low-income urban households.
However, there are concerns that titling may encourage households to take on formal
debt in the future by encouraging a credit culture (Payne et al., 2009; Gilbert, 2012).
The credit culture issue may be pertinent in Cambodia as the formal credit market
has grown significantly over the past few years: formal credit as a percentage of
GDP increased from around 10 per cent in 2005 to nearly 30 per cent by 2010
(Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2012). In particular, the microfinance
industry has expanded rapidly over recent years, increasing the availability of formal
credit to lower-income groups (Bylander and Hamilton, 2015; Ovesen and Trankell,
2014). In Chapter 8, I ask whether these conditions have resulted in formal credit
being extended to low-income households with or without title.
Finally, the suggestion that titling will lead to the displacement of low-income
groups by market-induced displacement can also be tested in Phnom Penh. There is
certainly scope for gentrification taking place because of the high property prices in
the city. Sylvia Nam (2011) notes that in the latter half of the 2000s property prices
in Phnom Penh were amongst the highest of any major Southeast Asian city, yet
Cambodia has one of the lowest per capita GDPs of any Southeast Asian nation.
Some studies suggest that titles have been a key driver of rising property prices,
thereby applying significant market pressures to centrally located low-income
communities and resulting in market-induced displacement (Durand-Lasserve 2007;
Gravois, 2005). Titling may also erode local communal systems of tenure that have
insulated communities from market-driven evictions (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009).
These issues will be explored in Chapter 9.
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2.3 Land titling and city-wide urban land management
Studies of the household-level impacts of titling have been paralleled by a literature
that views titling as part of a package of city-wide neoliberal reforms. As a
nationwide, World Bank-funded project, Cambodia’s titling project also links to
studies of neoliberal urban development.
2.3.1 Titling as a tool to increase efficiency of urban land markets
In the mid-1980s the World Bank started promoting land titling at a city-wide scale,
beginning with the 1986 Urban Management Programme, a ten-year programme
intended to position ‘development assistance in the urban sector in the context of
broader objectives of economic development and macroeconomic performance’
(Jones and Ward, 1994: 34). Projects that concentrated on titling informal
settlements were replaced by city-wide institutional reforms that standardised and
stripped down the state bureaucracies associated with land administration and
encouraged households to apply for land title individually (ibid.). This approach
exemplified the then orthodox ‘Washington Consensus’ development agenda, which
was based on the neoclassical belief that policy makers should install a skeletal
institutional framework supporting free exchange and allow institutions to develop
organically in response to changes in prices as economies grow (Lal, 1985;
Williamson, 1993). In relation to land administration, the state should do little more
than provide a universal formal system to recognise private property rights; it should
play no proactive role in systematically surveying and titling land and property.
Individuals would apply for a title deed if they felt that their property was valuable
enough to warrant official protection; as demand increased institutional capacity
would develop to meet it.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as urban development discourses were being
merged with neoliberal macroeconomic productivity models, many post-socialist
cities were emerging from years of isolation and beginning to embrace capitalism. In
these countries, the international financial institutions promoted ‘shock therapy’
transitions: in a very short space of time new city- or even country-wide skeletal
cadastral systems were put in place, fundamentally changing the institutional
landscape of many such societies. These transitions, however, tended not to result in
the efficient and equitable land markets predicted by planners, as existing power
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structures distorted markets by apportioning rents gained from privatisation through
established social networks, such as those associated with the military or public
office (Easterly, 2006). In Russia, for example, a law of proprietorship was
promulgated in July 1990 that enabled residents of Moscow to apply for property
titles (Pickvance, 1994). In central areas of the city, however, officials often opted to
enrich themselves by renovating and selling properties, rather than providing eligible
residents with titles. Chris Pickvance (1994) reported that this had the effect of
displacing poorer residents from inner city areas. Industrial assets also fell into the
hands of well-connected elites and government officials. Consequently, Russia’s
urban centres saw a decline in economic output and the emergence of a kleptocratic
elite (Black et al., 2000; Stiglitz, 2003).
In contrast, China’s transition has been characterised by a gradual shift from a
socialist to a capitalist system of property rights, which has incorporated socialist-era
institutions (Ho, 2001; Zhu, 2004). In some respects, this mode of transition has been
associated with more equitable urban development than experienced in Russia. In
Shanghai, Jieming Zhu (2004) provides an example of equitable, state-led
development policies promoted by authorities to manage the transition from
socialism to capitalism in urban areas. In 1988 full private ownership of urban
property was permitted in the city, and as a result land in the centre became
increasingly attractive to developers wanting to erect high-rise office and living
spaces. In commodifying land, privatisation put pressure on the established
socioeconomic practices of central areas: the factories, warehouses and workers’
housing organised around work units (Danwei). Rather than simply enabling market
forces to reallocate land use, the government has aimed to strategically balance
emerging private-sector interests with those of established urban groups: ‘to create a
land market where land use efficiency can be improved through market mechanisms,
while the old organisations of the Danwei are taken care of during the transition’
(ibid: 1254). To achieve this, authorities have developed a bespoke institutional
mechanism called the Land Development Right (LDR) to promote equitable urban
redevelopment projects (ibid.). The LDR framework enables residents who are
members of the Danwei, the Danwei institution and urban redevelopers to invest
collectively in a redevelopment project and share the capital from the finished
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product, which is considerably more than the market value that residents would
otherwise have received.
The failure of the results of land titling to conform to the predictions of neoclassical
economic theory in Russia and the relative success of China’s institution-focused
transition led to the World Bank asking some serious questions about the prevalent
development discourse. The most significant argument in terms of transforming
mainstream development economic thought has centred on inadequate institution-
building as key to explaining the perverse outcomes, in particular, of Russia’s
attempted land reforms. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the Bank,
asserted:
insufficient attention [was given] to an institutional infrastructure that
would allow a market economy to flourish … the International Monetary
Fund and treasury had laid the ground work for the oligarchs’ plundering
(Stiglitz, 2003: 202).
There was a failure to provide institutions to protect individual property rights,
which rendered them weak and vulnerable to appropriation by powerful rent-seeking
individuals. Planners did not appreciate the complexity of the reforms that were
required or the effect that corruption and, above all, a weak judiciary would have on
the emergence of a land market and on land-use efficiency. The experience of Russia
and China contributed to an institutions-focused policy agenda at the World Bank
(Stiglitz, 2003). Prominent development economists began promoting institution-
building policies and positioned strong institutions as the key variable explaining
cross-country variations in long-term economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Rodrik, 2006).
The focus on institutions has marked a shift in the Bank’s understanding of land
markets. Institutional failures are thought to increase transaction costs in land
markets, such as those associated with the searching, documenting, transacting and
financing of land transactions (Fawaz, 2009). The result is that the price of land
often does ‘not reflect its true social value, and the extent of land transactions will be
less than optimal’ (Feder and Feeney, 1991: 140). This will, in turn, undermine
efficient resource allocation, ultimately constraining growth. The role of policy
makers is to reduce transaction costs through institutional reforms.
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The Post-Washington Consensus institutions-focused land policies converge with De
Soto’s treatise on property rights, which perhaps explains why his ideas have been so
enthusiastically embraced by the World Bank. Both De Soto and World Bank
economists view the existence of a formal/informal binary distinction in tenure
systems as the key institutional deficiency constraining land markets (Brandao and
Feder, 1995). Those in the informal sector suffer from tenure insecurity because they
do not have recourse to legal institutions able to regulate or protect their assets. This
is reflected in their property being worth less than it would be in a ‘perfect’ market
because of the high transaction costs associated with informal ownership. The
orthodox World Bank policy prescription is to formalise all informal areas and build
a strong institutional framework to enforce the rights of all holders of property titles
to improve the functionality of land markets (Holstein, 1996; Markussen, 2008). The
aim is to unify tenure systems under the governance of a strong and transparent state
bureaucracy (the formal system) that can guarantee security of tenure. The end result
is supposed to be that price mechanisms will function effectively, effecting an
economically-efficient distribution of land conducive to growth and poverty
reduction (Deininger, 2003).
Advocates hold that titling will improve the economic efficiency of a city in three
ways. First, formalising ownership rights will realise the latent potential of land
markets as a driver of growth. Informally-held assets are priced to reflect the risk
associated with extra-legal tenure and are thus of no or very little economic value.
Proponents of titling argue, therefore, that land markets are stunted in countries
where formal rules do not apply across the board because much informal property
cannot be sold on the formal market. De Soto (2000) claims that there are billions of
dollars of dead capital in the world economy – a situation with prevents land markets
propelling economic growth in many cities of global south. Second, proponents
argue that in countries with strong and secure property rights, there will be higher
rates of investment, particularly foreign investment, and less rent-seeking (Stiglitz,
2001). This, in turn, will foster a spirit of entrepreneurialism and lead to equitable,
sustainable and high economic growth (North, 1990; Stiglitz, 2001). Third, informal
tenure systems limit access to formal credit (Feder, 1988; Feder and Nishio, 1998).
Lack of formal title limits demand for credit by limiting the incentive to invest and
constrains supply because lenders do not have the assurances they need to release
31
credit, or borrowers, the means to access it. Thus in the short term informality limits
households’ access to credit, but in the longer term it also stunts the growth of
formal credit infrastructure.
2.3.2 Land titling and neoliberalism
City-wide titling must also be viewed in the context of a voluminous literature that
has criticised international development programmes, particularly donor-funded
projects, at best as ineffectual, and at worst as covertly pushing an agenda that suits
the economic interests of western powers rather than host nations. Many of the
critiques view development interventions in the context of uneven power relations: at
the global level they are critical of the power structures that determine the dominant
development discourse and what constitutes best practice; at the national and local
level, they emphasise how best-practice models interact with local power structures
during and after implementation.
For many authors, a fundamental flaw with many best-practice models is their
reliance on economic theorems that fail to account for the complex array of power
structures embedded in local socioeconomic systems (Fine, 2001; Onis and Senses,
2005). This is particularly true of property reforms because ownership of land is so
closely connected with place-specific political, historical and cultural conditions
(Angel, 1983; Borras Jr. et al., 2008). What is worse, top-down development projects
can compound and strengthen elite power. Perhaps the most influential text
regarding the theoretical underpinnings of much post-development literature is
James Ferguson’s (1994) The Anti-Politics Machine. Ferguson identifies two main
problems with top-down development interventions which mean they are usually
destined to fail in their pro-poor project goals. First, constraints to development are
identified through western knowledge frameworks, and do not – indeed, cannot –
represent local realities. Second, development interventions are inherently apolitical,
viewing the state as simply a conduit that translates policy into reality, and do not
recognise that uneven distributions of power in state bureaucracies can negatively
affect project outcomes. Taking a broad view of the aid industry, Ferguson draws
parallels with Foucault’s genealogy of the prison. While project outcomes do not
match the stated policy intentions (reforming inmates in the case of prisons, reducing
poverty in the case of development interventions), their continual failure to do so
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often provides an entry point for greater state intervention and regulation and mainly
serves the long-term interests of those who implement them (i.e. donors and
governments). Thus for Ferguson (1994: 20) failure is an underlying (though
unconscious) logic of development programmes, what he calls their ‘strategic
intelligibility’: that they will always fail to tackle poverty despite their pro-poor
discourse.
Ferguson’s argument that development projects are a vehicle to further western
power has been a feature of much post-development literature. It is argued that those
who wield power in international financial institutions, unconsciously or otherwise,
serve the interests of advanced economies and that widely disseminated policy
prescriptions such as land titling are part of a strategy that reproduces a hierarchical
global capitalism which keeps rich countries rich and poor ones, poor (Escobar,
2011). Marcus Power (2004: 170-171) asserts that ‘the spatiality of power and
discourse in development’ results in policies that render developing economies more
amenable to the spread of global capitalism being pursued, and the good governance,
pro-poor agenda is merely window dressing, or an ‘engineering of consent’ (ibid:
175). Increasingly, post-development discourse has focused on what the ‘engineering
of consent’ actually means and what forms it takes. Ben Fine (2001) argues that the
transition from Washington Consensus laissez-faire institutional frameworks to
institution-focused Post-Washington Consensus has resulted in ever-deeper
structural reforms in host economies. Institutional economics, he argues, has allowed
economic planners to ‘colonise’ other aspects of social science, notably political
science, and to manipulate a wide range of institutions that intrude on the daily lives
of populations.
The Post-Washington Consensus’s engagement with governance structures has
resulted in Ferguson’s conception of a dogmatic anti-politics machine implementing
best-practice models being questioned. More recent studies have highlighted the
malleability of neoliberal development interventions, foregrounding the idea of
policy mobility rather than policy replication in the spread of neoliberal ideologies
(Li, 2007; Mosse, 2008; Peck, 2010). The concept of policy mobility refers to the
fact that institutions-focused projects work through local institutions and policy
makers rather than simply restructuring economies according to the principles of the
Washington Consensus.
33
The shift in scholarly debates has mirrored a shift in strategy at the World Bank:
there has been a focus on closing the gap between development policy and on-the-
ground realities by promoting context-sensitive approaches that build on local
knowledge, such as social capital and participatory projects (Mosse, 2008). Despite
the changing face of development policy, however, it is argued that neoliberalism is
still at its core (Li, 2005; 2007; Power, 2003). As a case in point, social capital has
come under particular fire for claiming to build on local knowledge, but actually
picking and choosing aspects of it to conform to the economic theory underlying
social-capital models (Cleaver, 2005; Fine, 2001). Tania Li (2005: 387) refers to the
governance strategies that World Bank projects use to disseminate neoliberal
ideology as a liberal ‘art of government’. Such strategies are still an exercise in
power which privileges the knowledge of the planner, but this effect is achieved in
more subtle ways than by simply imposing a bureaucracy as James Ferguson
suggests (Li, 2007; Mosse, 2008).
This idea that neoliberal policies ‘travel’ through space and adapt to and shape
different contexts in different ways is a key argument of the emerging literature on
postcolonial urbanisms. The main vehicle for neoliberalism to travel through urban
areas has been international development programmes (Robinson, 2011). Land
titling typically constitutes a central aspect of neoliberal planning strategies in urban
areas, and it works at three main levels to produce space.
First, the formal/informal distinction constitutes a tool that discursively constructs
territorial space, enmeshing the interests of local elites and the rationale of global
capitalism. Ananya Roy (2005) sees the discourse of informality as a projection of
Agamben's (2005) ‘state of exception’: a space where normal laws are suspended.
This discourse is perpetuated to justify certain kinds of neoliberal urban
interventions. ‘Informal’ settlements in Israel, for example, have been discursively
constructed using terms such as ‘illegal resident/immigrant’, ‘unapproved
development’, ‘illegal housing’, ‘building and planning infringements’ and ‘land
invasion’ (Yiftachel, 2009: 93). These areas have thus been designated ‘gray’ spaces
by the state and the neoliberal elites whose interests they represent: opaque,
illegitimate places that exist in a state of constant provisionality. Eventually, these
settlements are ‘whitened’, as discourses are mobilised that invoke neoliberal
concepts of ‘development’ or a need to protect the ‘national interest’, or ‘blackened’
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through evictions (ibid.). Thus, as in Agamben’s state of exception, planners have
discursively constructed a place where citizens do not enjoy rights afforded to them
by the state, but are nevertheless subjected to its laws: informality, therefore, is a
discursive tool to categorise and define space to justify neoliberal policy
interventions. Yifatchel argues that these discursive formations represent the coming
of an urban apartheid, where colonial techniques of rule are married to neoliberal
concepts of development (ibid.).
Second, the formalisation of land rights is part of a broad strategy to construct city-
wide neoliberal institutional frameworks. Institutions that formalise and administer
land fit into a larger urban governance strategy where ‘state-citizen relations [are]
becoming shaped by the culture of neoliberal speculation’ (Goldman, 2011: 564).
‘Neoliberal speculation’ refers here to the culture of making maximum profit from
the commoditisation of land, frequently displacing lower-income groups in the
process. This argument is essentially the same as those made by Payne (2001) and
Durand-Lasserve (2007), cited earlier in relation to market-induced evictions. The
difference is that Goldman (2011) emphasises the strategic and global aspects of land
formalisation policy at the city-wide scale: he highlights the role of the World Bank
in constructing an international property rights system in Bangalore that encouraged
investment from multinational firms in the technology industries, as part of a broad
process where urban governance is structured around speculation and profit making.
Third, regularising urban space can be viewed as an instrument that the state
strategically deploys to exert its power, reshaping that space to represent a future
vision of modernity (Scott, 1998). Thus struggles over informal spaces are laden
with political significance, where what is defined as an informal or as an illegitimate
urban practice by the state is less to do with what is legal or illegal and more to do
with distribution of power in society (Varley, 1998). For example, in South Africa
many of the country’s elite live in gated communities that contravene laws regarding
the use of public space, as do many unplanned settlements. However, the state
responds to these extra-legal activities in different ways: unplanned settlements are
perceived as a problem, whereas gated communities are perceived as a rational
response to insecurity and violence (Lemanski, 2004). Asserting control over
informal spaces, therefore, becomes a ‘complex political struggle’ (Roy, 2005: 150)
where new urban futures can be forged (Holston, 1998). Hence, informality can be
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decoupled from poverty and viewed as an arena where various groups vie to shape
urban space in their own interests. If land titling is implemented ‘successfully’ in
such areas, the result will simply be that the logic of a hegemonic neoliberal elite is
extended into these areas and ultimately that residents will be subject to the power of
a neoliberal state or property markets, which will saddle residents with high formal-
sector costs of living: either by market mechanism or force, the poor will be
displaced (Roy, 2005). Thus for the poorest, ‘secure rights can be more insecure than
informal claims’ (ibid: 154).
2.3.3 City-wide titling and the LMAP
In the following chapters, I seek to add to the debates on donor-supported
development interventions in urban governance structures using the LMAP as a case
study. Above all, I shall ask whether the LMAP represents an inclusive and equitable
land administration policy, as proponents hope, or the deepening of an exclusionary
neo-liberalism, as critics fear.
The literature on donor-supported policies in general, and that pertaining to land
titling in particular, has been highly polarised regards the supposed impacts of such
policies on Cambodia’s economy and society. On the one hand, World Bank
literature has espoused orthodox development economics to view titling as a Post-
Washington Consensus reform that corrects land market inefficiencies through
promoting strong institutions. LMAP project documents singled out the weak pre-
LMAP institutional mechanisms for registering property ownership as the overriding
cause of tenure insecurity that plagued Cambodia in the pre-donor period (World
Bank, 2002a). The result of these deficient institutions, according to the Bank, was
that conflicts were ‘endemic in Cambodia and reflect pervasive tenure insecurity’
(World Bank, 2002a: 37). Planners believed that systematically titling all land
parcels would reduce uncertainty over land ownership rights, strengthen tenure
security, increase investment and promote equitable economic growth.
On the other hand, much recent analysis of Cambodia’s post-socialist history has
viewed donor-supported institutional reforms as imported, inappropriate and
inherently exclusionary policies that have harmed the vulnerable (Hughes, 2009,
2007; Springer, 2010, 2009). Caroline Hughes posits that the extent of foreign
influence in Cambodia’s statecraft has meant that the national identity is a foreign
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import, with more recent institution-building interventions being modelled ‘on
standard liberal accounts of the rational, profit-pursuing individual in a society
comprised of similar individuals’ (2007: 836). She argues that donor efforts to
build equitable economic institutions merely engineer consent for the imposition of
frameworks that cause inequality and compound uneven distributions of power. To
support her point, Hughes (2007) cites an International Labour Organisation
programme that provided a conflict-mechanism for labour disputes over working
conditions. This strategy worked to dissipate workers’ grievances through making
minor concessions that did not address broader issues of exploitation. The ILO
policy intervention helped instil a neoliberal logic that saw workers contented to
reproduce global capitalism, overlooking their own underlying grievances (ibid.).
Similar arguments have been made relating to the LMAP and accompanying donor-
supported land interventions. Simon Springer (2013), for example, asserts that donor
interventions in land management have caused forced evictions. Far from promoting
equitable systems land management, World Bank institution-building has deepened
an inherently inequitable mode of neoliberal urban governance and has caused
violence by weakening customary systems of tenure and strengthening the power of
elites to dispossess others. Springer asserts that NGOs mistakenly believe that it is
the government’s failure to implement land laws that is the cause of insecurity. He
argues that in reality the opposite is true – that land laws promoted by donors are
inherently exclusionary:
while it is typical to critique Cambodia’s evictions as ‘illegal’ perversions of
law, in most instances this well-meaning appraisal is factually incorrect….
The SLR [Systematic Land Registration] and LMAP were purposefully
designed to facilitate and disseminate awareness for conditions wherein,
following an initial period of allowable registration, oral precedents
[customary tenure systems] would no longer be honoured... Thus, the
insistence that forced evictions in Cambodia are necessarily ‘illegal’ is both
naïve and unhelpful. What is actually needed is a more critical appreciation
of law’s violence (Springer, 2013: 18)
The polarised interpretations of city-wide titling are interrogated in this thesis by
pursuing a number of lines of inquiry. In Chapters 5 and 6, I analyse patterns of
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inclusion and exclusion resulting from both pre- and post-LMAP property regimes to
assess whether the LMAP represents a more inclusionary framework (e.g. De Soto,
2000) or the deepening of exclusionary urban governance mechanisms (Springer,
2013). How exactly do pre- and post-LMAP institutional, regulatory and legal
frameworks for land administration address the issue of tenure insecurity for low-
income urban communities? How have such laws been implemented and who has
benefited from them? In other chapters, I assess whether specific socioeconomic
outcomes related to titling have been spread equally across the population: have
different sub-sections of society benefitted from new institutional arrangements for
land ownership in terms of investment (Chapter 7) and credit (Chapter 8)? In
particular, have low-income groups accessed and benefited from titles in the way
that World Bank (2002a) policy makers predicted? Finally, in Chapter 9, I examine
the types of social and demographic change resulting from titling, both in areas
included and excluded from the project. Through exploring these issues, I hope to
reveal whether the LMAP has perpetuated inclusive or exclusionary urban land
markets in Phnom Penh, and to contribute to debates about the efficacy of donor-
funded titling interventions more generally.
2.4 Conclusion: reconciling targeted and city-wide debates
In this chapter, I have reviewed two strands of literature that have engaged with
titling at the targeted and city-wide scales. I have suggested that the issues raised in
these debates have important implications for Cambodia’s titling project. As a city-
wide project that also aims to formalise the property rights of those in unplanned
settlements, analysis of titling in Phnom Penh provides an opportunity to reconcile
these two strands of debate.
Reconciling salient themes in the city-wide literature with those made in relation to
targeted titling interventions brings new perspectives to city-wide reforms. A
criticism levelled at some city-wide analyses of international development policies is
that they focus heavily on the theoretical attributes of such interventions (Robinson,
2011). On the one hand, proponents of titling use economic models to construct the
problems, identify the appropriate solutions and predict the inevitable (positive)
outcomes of their policies. On the other hand, critics use the fact that titling is based
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on the theories of development economics to predict the inevitable negative
outcomes of such policies. In this sense, criticisms of development policies can use
the same logic as institutional economics, but in reverse – project outcomes will
inevitably conform to a pre-ordained theoretical rationality. Discounting the
possibility of any beneficial outcomes based on a theoretical reading of international
development policies can limit the scope of analysis of such interventions in the
same way as predicting universal positive outcomes.
Engaging with debates addressed in the literature on targeted titling enables an
approach focused on the observed outcomes of titling as distinct from the policy’s
roots in World Bank theory. The questions raised in the literature on targeted titling
relate to the range of outcomes of titling at the household level, charting experiences
of security, investment, allocation of credit and other household and dwelling
characteristics. Testing such arguments in the context of city-wide debates
‘decentres’ the concept of neoliberalism from the analysis at the household level to
recognise ‘that alignments with neoliberalism in some contexts may create
opportunities for constructing better futures for urban dwellers’ (Robinson, 2011:
1104).
A key aim of this thesis is to provide a critique of titling that yields policy
suggestions to improve outcomes for vulnerable groups. In this endeavour, a
conceptual openness to the ‘positive’ aspects of land titling is crucial if a range of
policy implications to benefit low-income groups are to become apparent. Such an
approach does not imply that titling is an inherently good or bad policy framework,
but seeks to identify how the intervention can be leveraged to benefit the vulnerable.
As Ananya Roy (2005: 155) notes, it is an uncomfortable truth that to achieve better
outcomes for the marginalised may require ‘working through rather than against
institutions of power.’ She argues that harnessing the laws, regulations and
institutions of power (be them of the state or international organisations) can
empower the marginalised and further their interests: ‘the master’s tools cannot
dismantle the master’s house, but perhaps when strategically used, they can allow
those on the outside to occupy the master’s house.’ Following this approach, it is my
goal to provide a critique of titling as an international development intervention, but
to also uncover how ‘the masters tools’ can be leveraged to the benefit of those
‘outside’ the master’s house.
39
Engaging city-wide and targeted literatures also enables us to explore the household
level impacts of titling beyond unplanned settlements. City-wide titling programmes
have become a ubiquitous international development policy, receiving billions of
dollars in funding. Despite this, there has been little or no research that has assessed
how formalisation has affected communities outside unplanned settlements. Simone
and Rao (2012: 318) identify ordinary urban areas in the developing world as one of
the most under-researched issues in urban studies: communities that occupy the
space between the very poor and the emerging ‘global’ middle class – ‘between the
superblock and the slum’. Engaging project-based and city-wide literatures offers the
potential for achieving an understanding of how donor-funded land policies affect
these groups.
40
Chapter 3: A History of Land Reform and Urban Transition in
Cambodia
3.1 Introduction
Cambodia is perhaps best known for two contrasting periods of its history: the
ancient Khmer Empire of the Angkor era and the Democratic Republic of
Kampuchea of the Khmer Rouge. Fittingly, given the subject of this thesis, both
periods were remarkable for their contribution to urban history. The Khmer Empire,
which existed from the 9th to the 15th centuries, is best known for Angkor, its capital,
the site of world’s largest preindustrial settlement (Evans et al., 2007). The ancient
city is famed for its sophisticated urban form, which supported a thriving urban
population and provided a base for Southeast Asia’s largest empire. In contrast, the
Khmer Rouge was responsible for one of the great tragedies of urban history: the
forced evacuation of Cambodia’s cities in the mid-1970s and murder of most of the
urban population is widely recognised as one of the greatest atrocities of the 20th
Century (Kiernan, 1996).
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical narrative of urbanism and tenure
reforms in Cambodia to provide a context for subsequent discussions. In presenting
these interlinked histories, I explore the country’s divergent rural and urban
development trajectories and the varied experiences of its urban populations from the
Angkor period to the present day. I also relate Cambodia’s urban and tenure
transitions to key political movements in Cambodia, revealing close links between
tenure reform and political power.
3.2 Beginnings of urbanism at Angkor
Cambodia’s urban history begins in AD 802, when King Jayavarman II established
the ancient city of Angkor, which developed into a sprawling metropolis at the centre
one of the great ancient civilisations. At its peak in the 13th Century, the city covered
a huge area, including a high-density urban core of around 35 km2 and a low-density
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urban complex extending over 1,000 Km2 (Evans et al., 2007). To put that into
today’s context, New York City included around 800 Km2 of urban space in 2016.
There is evidence to suggest that property ownership played an important part in the
workings of the ancient city. A detailed analysis of property regimes recorded in the
inscriptions of Angkor by Michael Ricklefs (1967: 419) reveal ‘a functioning system
of private land-ownership’ that included property titles and a legal system to enforce
property rights. Inscriptions discovered in the city show details of properties owned,
transferred and provide records of dispute resolution mechanisms. This formal
tenure system projected the power of the king and state in several important respects.
First, property rights were distributed by the king to shore up patronage networks:
large plots of land were allocated to favoured court members, which often included
the rights to slaves to work the land. Second, the kings pushed the frontiers of the
Khmer empire by providing ownership rights over lands in peripheral areas to his
subjects. Third, as well as extending the power of the state over territory, property
ownership was used to project power over Angkorian society. There is evidence that
as the power and bureaucratic capacity of the Khmer Empire grew, registered
property ownership was extended across the population ’to the most humble of free
men’ (Ricklefs, 1967: 426). As with the property of elites, these rights were
registered in inscriptions and were protected by Royal Law. Populations considered
illegitimate, or not part of normal society, were not afforded these rights: slaves –
either those born into slavery or those who had acquired the status through debt –
were not eligible to own land (ibid.).
Outside the realm of Angkor, however, there seems to be little evidence of private
ownership aside from the large holdings of elites. During and after the Khmer
Empire period, many Khmer viewed land not in terms of private ownership in the
western sense, but part of an all-encompassing physical and metaphysical realm
called the sruk that defined ‘Khmerness’ (Chandler, 1996). Land was divided into
two distinct types, that of the sruk, i.e. Khmer lands, and those lands that were not
part of the sruk, i.e. foreign lands. For Khmers, Muller (2006: 178) explains, ‘the
king was not only master of all beings in his realm, but also owned all the land’.
Land devoid of such royal protection was considered cursed (ibid.).
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While the idea of the sruk provides a broad conceptual framework of land
ownership, the day to day practice of administering land was not so abstract.
According to May Ebihara (1984: 288), while the king was ‘nominally and
symbolically’ owner of all the lands, freemen could enjoy ‘de facto property
ownership and inheritance’. These de facto rights to land were linked to land’s
productive value, rather than as a commodity of value itself. For example, the
Cambodian elite did not tax land, but rather harvests. Land could be used as
collateral on a loan, but again only by virtue of its function of producing food. If
peasants defaulted on a loan, for example, they would ‘pawn’ the land to the money
lender, who would be paid back in the form of produce from the land. Once the loan
was paid off, the peasants could again farm the land for their own needs (Chandler,
1996). These de facto claims were underpinned by unwritten social contracts: if a
household worked a given parcel, then to all intents and purposes they owned it,
though this form of ownership was rarely documented (Steinberg, 1957).
3.3 The introduction of a European system of property rights
With the fading of Angkor and the Khmer Empire in the 14th and 15th Centuries, the
capacity of the state to administer land also lessened. In the post-Angkor and pre-
colonial period Cambodia was ruled by a succession of weak royals who were
subservient to either Thailand or Vietnam and lacked the capacity or desire to
implement a formal system of ownership (Steinberg, 1957; Yuon, 1982). This
situation changed in the 19th Century as foreign powers took a more interventionist
approach to Cambodian governance. In 1840 Vietnam, under Minh Mang, invaded
Cambodia and began to survey and register land ownership rights so that they could
be administered by the state (Chandler, 1996). This intervention was part of a
broader strategy to advance Vietnamese power, which went as far as forcing
Cambodians to wear Vietnamese-style clothing (Chandler, 1972). The strong bonds
of patronage between the Cambodian masses and the elite, however, meant that it
was extremely difficult to implement any meaningful change in land-holding
patterns. In fact, the response of the Cambodians was to revolt. This, and Minh
Mang’s death, resulted in the restoration of traditional tenure systems and the
withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodian lands (Chandler, 1996).
43
In 1867 Cambodia became a protectorate of the French, ushering in a colonial period
that saw changes in land governance – at least in urban areas. In 1884 the French
passed a law that gave individuals the right to own land. In a similar vein to Minh
Mang, the decree was part of a package of reforms designed primarily to cut the ties
between the traditional elite and replace them with the French colonial state, or as
commentators at the time noted, ‘an effort of European administrators in Asia to deal
with the problem of harmonising native customs, as to this department of
government, with civilised notions of freedom and justice’ (Maxwell and Thomson,
1885: 81). The decree set out the process for registering land ownership with the
state and obtaining a title for it. It ruled that no ‘verbal contract’ could supersede or
‘mutate’ a titled claim of ownership (ibid: 89). In doing so, it sought to move
Cambodians from a ‘native’ system of verbal tenure to a ‘modern’ system of titles.
The French justified their intervention by emphasising the problem of tenure
insecurity, lack of investment and access to credit that resulted from customary
tenure. According to Jean Moura, the Administrator of the French Protectorate of
Cambodia in the 1850s, Khmers suffered tenure insecurity because they did not
legally own land in the western sense: ‘first occupiers are dispossessed without a
word of warning, without the excuse of public interest and simply in order that
someone may help himself to a field quite fit for cultivation’ (cited in Maxwell,
1884: 130). Even as the decree was passed, however, commentators questioned
‘whether the political condition of the country will admit of [the decree’s] peaceful
introduction’ (Maxwell and Thomson, 1885: 82). Such reservations turned out to be
well placed. Tentative attempts at land titling precipitated mass civil unrest in
defence of the king and were only haphazardly implemented and poorly enforced. In
a context where all land was believed to belong to the king, Steinberg (1957: 204)
suggests that land titling by foreigners was ‘not seen as an attempt to develop a
system of private ownership, but an attempt to defraud the king’.
While the 1884 land law was not adopted by the rural population, it was linked to the
development of Cambodia’s urban spaces. The French colonial period heralded a
new chapter in Cambodia’s urban history, which had declined following the
abandoning of the city of Angkor that occurred in the 14th and 15th Century. Prior to
the French occupation, Cambodia had returned to a rural society, with small
settlements located on riverbanks to benefit from trade and populated mostly by a
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Chinese merchant class. These settlements were worlds away from the large,
sophisticated urban complex of Angkor. Writing in the late 1850s, the French
traveller Henri Mouhot described the new capital Udong:
the market-place, occupied by the Chinese, is as dirty as all the others of
which I have made mention. The longest street, or rather the only one, is
a mile in length. The entire population numbers about 12,000 souls
(Mouhot, 1864: 199).
In Phnom Penh, which became the capital city under the French in 1867, the new
property laws had an important effect on the city’s development. The decree led to
the emergence of formal land markets for Khmer elite and French expatriate
populations, resulting in a housing and construction boom in 1890s Phnom Penh
(Chandler, 1996). As a Western-style tenure system developed during the colonial
era, large sums of money were invested in constructing grand buildings that remain
in Phnom Penh today and the city’s population expanded rapidly (Osborne, 2008).
Phnom Penh emerged, at least in parts, as one of the most aesthetically pleasing of
the cities in French Indochina (Muller, 2006).
Outside of the bubble of the Phnom Penh elite, tenure systems remained much as
they had done in pre-colonial times: based around social bonds and kinship, with
land conceptualised as the sruk under the divine realm of the king. After the failed
attempts of titling rural Cambodia, the French largely stayed out of land
administration in rural areas. They considered rural Cambodia as reactionary and
barbaric, prone to frequent violence and unable to move into the modern French-
constructed reality (Edwards, 2006). Consequently, the only interactions between the
Khmer masses and the French colonial administration were through tax collection,
again in terms of a portion of households’ harvests. For the average rural household,
the conception of land tenure remained the same at the end of the colonial period in
the 1950s as it was in the 1860s (Steinberg, 1957).
Cambodian society was not characterised only by a rural/urban distinction; as
urbanisation took hold, Phnom Penh became a fragmented urban space as new social
groups emerged. A growing middle-class of urban Khmers were seen by traditional
urban elites as an unwelcome intrusion on the colonial serenity of Phnom Penh.
Consequently, colonial urban planners worked to render a socio-cultural divide in the
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city’s spatial plan and separated the civilised urban spaces reserved for the European
and Cambodian elite from emerging social groups. Penny Edwards (2006: 432) cites
a decision from the Municipal Council of Phnom Penh in 1915 regarding
permissions to construct shops and offices for Cambodians:
put [them] out by the road to Kampot, and next to Stung Meanchey,
where establishments of this type are better placed … [with their] many
inconveniences, dust, noise, the movement of many natives … [there] is
no place for [such things] in the districts which have, over the years, been
reserved for Europeans.
While this middle class were recognised as by colonial authorities as having a right
to live in Phnom Penh – albeit not in the same locales as Europeans – the growing
urban poor communities were regarded in a different light. With the expansion of
Phnom Penh, poor rural migrants initially erected makeshift accommodation along
the river (Rabe, 2009). From 1915, the French began a policy of evicting these
residents to beautify the river area, resettling the evicted residents on plots of land on
the city’s outskirts (ibid.). Rapid urbanisation also resulted in population change at
the rural-urban fringe. Urban dwellers began to purchase land for speculative
purposes on the edge of cities, leading to increased landlessness in rural areas on the
urban fringe (Kiernan, 1982).
While the French had given up on formalising the land rights of Cambodian
smallholders, they did extend control in rural Cambodia through granting land rights
to a colonial elite of expatriate plantation owners. The formal system the French
created encouraged new forms of investment through providing land concessions,
which led to a diversification of agricultural practices to include large enterprises,
notably rice and rubber plantations (Muller, 2006). This was primarily as a response
to France’s strategy of developing primary product export markets as an important
source of revenue in South East Asia. As the plantation owners were part of or had
close ties with the French colonial administration, and large mechanised
landholdings supported the colonial development strategy, virtually all state support
for agriculture went to large French-owned concession plantations. Helmers (1997)
notes that the province of Battambang played host to many large rice plantations
(over 16,000 Ha) where the French colonial state invested significant financial
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resources and experimented with large scale mechanisation, even building a railway
linking Battambang to Phnom Penh, from where rice was shipped to regional and
global markets. Meanwhile, expatriate plantation owners remained in their
companies’ head offices in Phnom Penh, and were considered among the wealthiest
foreign residents of the city (Osbourne, 2008).
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 and the popular and
charismatic King Sihanouk came to power. The king, who later abdicated and was
elected Prime Minister, became a keen supporter of Phnom Penh’s development as a
modern city. Under his rule the divergent trajectories of rural and urban Cambodia
became even more pronounced. While life for rural Cambodians remained relatively
unchanged, Phnom Penh’s built area doubled in size between 1953 and the late
1960s as universities, hospitals, sports stadia, markets and residential areas were
built for a burgeoning urban class (Osbourne, 2008). Much of the development was
planned by Cambodia’s most celebrated modern architect, Van Molyvann, who
became Head of Public Works and State Architect under the government of King
Sihanouk. Many of his works are now recognised as among the most outstanding
examples of Khmer modernist architecture, including the Royal University of Phnom
Penh, the Olympic Stadium and Independence Monument. There were also planned
residential areas to integrate the growing middle class into the urban fabric in a way
that did not disrupt the urban form that Sihanouk cultivated, most notably in the
Tonle Bassac area where large apartment complexes were built as ‘machines for
living’.
Within Phnom Penh there were familiar social tensions as low-income Khmer
populations encroached on the king’s vision of the city. Like the French, King
Sihanouk viewed low-income self-built housing as a blot on his civilised,
sophisticated and modern city. To address the problem of the urban poor, the
government decreed that urban residents should abide by certain codes of conduct so
as to not damage Cambodia’s image in ‘foreign newspapers’ (Figure 3.1). The edict
construed housing without titles, which in practice referred to self-built communities,
as an illegitimate urban practice. Such housing was to be ‘immediately removed’; if
residents did not comply with this rule they would be ‘punished according to the law
as an example to others’.
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Figure 3.1: Government edict on urban living
The father of national independence has criticized the dirty condition of Phnom Penh, of
which foreign newspapers have also spread gossip. Therefore, the King has decided to form
a committee to ensure all city streets and buildings are kept clean and attractive. To assist
the committee in its duties, please observe the following:
Do not litter;
Do not urinate/defecate in public;
Do not build structures for public vending on sidewalks or on land that you have no deed or
rights to;
Those structures built in improper places must be immediately removed.
The successful clean-up of Phnom Penh will only go smoothly with the assistance of the
people. Do not allow your interests to hurt the reputation of the King or the Khmer people.
Those who do not respect this edict will be punished according to the law as a model for
others.
Source: Public Edict No. 1, Phnom Penh Cleanliness and Beautification Committee, 1958
(cited in Rabe, 2009: 62)
The government’s policy of exclusion of low-income populations was initially
successful. During the 1950s and 1960s the rapidly expanding class of urban poor
lived on the city’s fringes and were not considered to be integrated into the urban
space. Milton Osborne (2008: 127), who lived in the city from 1959 to 1961,
described the poor:
Just what proportion of Phnom Penh’s population they represented is
difficult to know. European foreigners had little awareness of them
except when they took a ride in a cyclopousse [rickshaw]. Overall they
were an almost invisible mass, living well away from the city centre in
shanty towns eking out a living in various forms of manual labour.
The facade of urban order desired by King Sihanouk began to crumble in the late
1960s, however, as a result of an increasingly difficult geopolitical context. The war
in neighbouring Vietnam began to spill over into Cambodia. America’s secret
bombing campaign against Viet Cong supply routes in Eastern Cambodia included
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over 230,000 sorties and nearly 3 million tonnes of ordinance and are estimated to
have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and maimed many more (Owen and
Kiernan, 2007: 2). This action resulted in a growing communist insurgency in the
countryside led by the Khmer Rouge who promised to defeat the American
imperialists. King Sihanouk, who had attempted to walk a tightrope of neutrality
during the Vietnam war, was vulnerable to attacks by the left for failing to stop the
American bombing, and, increasingly, the right for failing to deal with the growing
Khmer Rouge insurgency. In response to King Sihanouk’s perceived failure to deal
with the communist threat, the CIA-supported General Lon Nol staged a coup
against Sihanouk in 1970, signalling the start of the Cambodian civil war.
From 1970 to 1975 it is estimated that Phnom Penh’s population doubled as people
fled war in rural Cambodia (Kiernan, 1996). Many of these migrants did not reside in
the urban periphery, as in the 1950 and 1960s, but flocked to central urban districts,
squatting in uncompleted buildings or temporary structures on the banks of rivers
and lakes. An urban planner at the time and future Phnom Penh governor, Kry Beng
Hong, wrote with alarm of the sudden increase of squatters in downtown Phnom
Penh, but considered them a ‘temporary’ problem caused by insecurity in the
countryside (Beng Hong, 1973). It was expected that they would return to rural areas
or be re-housed at the urban fringe once the war had ended. However, the events of
the years that followed resulted in a very different urban space from the one he
envisioned.
3.4 The Khmer Rouge period
The rural/urban distinction that had been cultivated by the French and later by King
Sihanouk was also deployed by the Khmer Rouge, but to very different ends. King
Sihanouk had characterised the societal divide in paternalistic language: referring to
peasants as his ‘children’, he invoked traditional concepts of patronage and
hierarchy (Cixous, 1994). The Khmer Rouge, however, characterised the rural/urban
distinction as an oppressive construction; cadres were taught to hate the urban class
as corrupt and parasitic, profiting from the toil of peasants and doing nothing to end
the misery wrought upon them by American bomber raids (Shawcross, 1979). The
Khmer Rouge promoted an effective propaganda campaign, which, ironically, used
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films that had been commissioned by King Sihanouk to promote Phnom Penh, to
demonstrate the ostentatious practices of the urban elite (Osborne, 2008). The
Khmer Rouge proclaimed that the tonic for urban decadence was an extreme brand
of agrarian socialism, which necessitated a return to a pre-industrial, pre-urbanised
society. In the words of their leader, Pol Pot:
We are building socialism without a model. We do not wish to copy
anyone; we shall use the experience gained in the course of the liberation
struggle. There are no schools, faculties or universities in the traditional
sense, although they did exist in our country prior to liberation, because
we wish to do away with all vestiges of the past. There is no money, no
commerce, as the state takes care of provisioning all its citizens. The
cities have been resettled because this is the way things had to be. Some
three million town dwellers and peasants were trying to find refuge in the
cities from the depredations of war. We evacuated the cities; we resettled
the inhabitants in the rural areas where the living conditions could be
provided for this segment of the population of new Cambodia. The
countryside should be the focus of attention of our revolution, and the
people will decide the fate of the cities (cited in Mysliwiec, 1988: 6).
When the city fell in April 1975, the antipathy of the Khmer Rouge towards
Cambodian urbanism found an outlet. Within days, the Khmer Rouge had marched
the entire population – swollen to around 2 million in April 1979 – to work in rural
areas. Witnesses remember the brutality of the evacuation, which included summary
executions of those suspected of being connected to the previous government (Bizot,
2007), and forcing even the seriously ill to evacuate hospitals (Mysliwiec, 1988).
The city was reduced to a skeleton workforce of around 20,000 to 30,000 needed to
keep basic services running (Kiernan, 1996). The few accounts of the city from this
period or immediately after describe a ghost city, with once bustling streets, markets,
cafes and restaurants lying empty (Becker, 1998).
In engineering their perfect society, the Khmer Rouge intended to wipe the concept
of modern ‘urbanism’ from Cambodian history (though, ironically, they had
emblazoned on their flag an image of the city of Angkor). They achieved this
through destroying much of the physical, institutional and human infrastructure
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associated with urban life. The city’s housing stock was ransacked by the army; a
survey immediately following the Khmer Rouge collapse of power estimated that
around 80 per cent of Phnom Penh’s housing stock had been destroyed between
1975 and 1979 (Beng Hong, 1983). Cars were stripped, with rubber from the tires
fashioned into flip-flops and then left in the street to rust, while libraries were
emptied in an ‘orgy of book-burning’ (Osborne, 2008: 45). Former urban residents
were singled out by the Khmer Rouge in the new agrarian society. They were
referred to as Neak Themi (new people) and assigned to special work groups,
enduring harsher conditions than their rural counterparts; many were also sent to
concentration camps to be ‘re-educated’, never to return, or were summarily
executed after being accused of counter-revolution.
The Khmer Rouge period was significant from a tenure perspective because all
vestiges of the French Colonial tenure system were completely destroyed. The
Khmer Rouge wanted to create a ‘year zero’ for Cambodia – to begin building a new
society on a blank slate. A key aspect of the dismantling of the ‘old’ society was
erasing the imperialist tenure regimes installed by the French (Kiernan, 2014). The
institutions, laws and social norms that governed people’s interaction with land were
radically redefined or destroyed by the Khmer Rouge (Khemro and Payne, 2004).
All claims of property ownership were declared void and records, including cadastral
registers and maps, were destroyed (ibid.). The vast majority of the bureaucrats and
officials who had staffed the property system were forced into exile or executed,
while most property owners were ‘killed or had died during the period 1975 – 1979’
(ibid: 182). With the death of these populations died the memory, records and
knowledge of urban land ownership prior to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
Rural land holding patterns also radically changed. In the pre-Khmer Rouge era the
distribution of land had been largely egalitarian and based around small family-run
farms (even though distribution of wealth and social power was highly polarised).
Farming in the Khmer Rouge period was characterised by extreme communisation:
work units were organised into collectives and traditional methods of farming
abandoned (Kiernan, 2014).
The Khmer Rouge period, therefore, represents a watershed moment in the
institutional and regulatory history of Cambodian land administration. The systems
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of ownership and transfer that defined the Colonial and Independence period came to
an end; they were replaced with a socialist system whereby ownership was not
legally possible. It would not be until 1989 that institutions facilitating private
ownership would be reintroduced in Cambodia. However, as shall be discussed
presently, later arrangements of property ownership bore little resemblance to pre-
Khmer Rouge frameworks. Instead, they represented a new chapter in the
institutional and regulatory mechanisms associated with property ownership. Indeed,
this break was explicitly acknowledged in Article 7 of Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law,
which stipulated: ‘any regime of ownership of immovable property prior to 1979 [the
year the Khmer Rouge were toppled] shall not be recognized.’ In this sense, the
Khmer Rouge regime were successful in their goal to induce a ‘year zero’ for
institutional and regulatory regimes associated with land administration in Phnom
Penh and throughout Cambodia. This action had significant implications both in
relation to succeeding socialist-based land holding arrangements and subsequent
systems of private property ownership, which were to be built from scratch.
3.5 The Vietnamese occupation
After a period of rule that spanned just four years but ended the lives of an estimated
fifth of Cambodia’s population, the Khmer Rouge was ousted from government in
1979. After a series of border skirmishes, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and
forced the regime from the city; the Khmer Rouge continued to fight a guerrilla war
from the west of the country until the mid-1990s. The Vietnamese installed a one
party socialist state that was sympathetic to the interests of Vietnam and supported
by Vietnamese military and government advisors. The leaders of the regime were
former cadres of the Khmer Rouge’s Eastern Zone, who had defected to Vietnam
during Pol Pot’s purges of party members (Gottesman, 2004). This Vietnamese-
sponsored government was named the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).
During the PRK period the patronage system of governance that has defined
Cambodian politics to the present day was established. Its bedrock was the close
personal relationships between the powerful former-Khmer Rouge cadres that
became leaders of the new PRK regime in 1979 (Gottesman, 2004; Heder, 2005).
These key figures, including Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and, most notably, current
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Prime Minister Hun Sen, went on to dominate Cambodian political life over
subsequent decades.
The patronage networks that underlay PRK rule are best described by historian Evan
Gottesman in his 2004 work, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge. Gottesman was able
to gain unprecedented access to achieved documents that shone light on the inner
workings of the PRK regime. He found that the leaders of key ministries, such as the
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, were members of a close knit group
of former Khmer Rouge cadres. Many shared long personal bonds that were
cemented through marriage and other personal connections. As well as consolidating
their power in the central ministries of Phnom Penh, the PRK also drew on
established Khmer Rouge military networks to exert control across the country. The
party leadership of Chea Sim, Heng Samrin and Hun Sen appointed provincial
governors who had been their Khmer Rouge comrades, and who already had
established power in their localities. Many key governors were also tied to the
leadership through family connections.
Patronage networks were strengthened through the strategic distribution of state
resources. Government distributed the rights to highly-valued resources or
commodities, such as forestry, gasoline and medicine, to political leaders in key
ministries and provincial governors who, in turn, distributed these resources to
lower-level bureaucrats in a manner that ensured the support necessary to maintain
power (Gottesman, 2004). In this way, the allocation of state resources to solidify
patronage networks permeated society, from top leaders, to local officials who often
paid bribes to access government positions where they could gain control over
lucrative resource stocks (ibid). The mutual dependence inherent in these patronage
structures ensured party loyalty and enabled the PRK government to exercise
political control effectively.
Patronage governance had an impact on land distribution in Phnom Penh during the
PRK period. Control over large areas of real-estate was distributed among political
elites to shore-up patronage networks. Chea Sophra, the current Minister of Rural
Development and former Governor of Phnom Penh, explained to a news reporter
how he acquired an eleven hectare plot in the early days of the socialist republic
(worth an estimated 45 million USD today):
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I have owned my land since January 7, 1979 [the day Phnom Penh was
liberated]. If you look at the history of that time, there were [at first] only
70 [Cambodians] in Phnom Penh, so individuals could own several
houses or several pieces of land. It is easy for [people] to criticise senior
[government] officials as corrupt, but look at the history … No one was
using money yet. (Phnom Penh Post, 28 February 2015)
From this statement it seems that a small group of communist leaders acquired
‘ownership’ of large swathes of real-estate following the fall of Phnom Penh. It is
likely that political leaders permitted this activity to solidify political networks by
distributing the spoils of war in the form of urban real estate in place of hard cash,
which was not reintroduced until 1980, setting in place a pattern of rent-seeking that
has defined the leadership ever since. It is also likely that leaders accumulated assets
to demonstrate their political power to discourage potential challengers from
threatening their positions within the regime (Gottesman, 2004).
State distribution of resources and commodities became more important as informal
markets began to develop where commodities and resources could be traded, and
hence profits could be made, as the 1980s progressed. A changing geopolitical
landscape in Vietnam meant that the government increasingly tolerated informal
markets and began to relax their enforcement of key communist principles governing
commerce (Gottesman, 2004). With regards to land markets, David Chandler (1996)
notes that, despite the socialist sensibilities of the PRK, it is now generally accepted
that the Vietnamese ruled with a relatively soft hand and did not impose a rigid
communist doctrine, tolerating the informal exchange of land rights.
As part of this process of increasing state tolerance of market activity, there is
evidence of nascent informal land markets emerging in Phnom Penh during the PRK
period, with many land transactions reported in Phnom Penh during the 1980s,
increasing in frequency as the decade progressed (Cambodia Development Resource
Institute, 2007). These transactions appear to have been facilitated with a contract of
sale written between two parties, which were sometimes witnessed by local
authorities. There is, however, no detailed information available about the extent and
nature of land market transactions at this time.
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Regards, the development of Phnom Penh during this period, it is important to note
that – like the Khmer Rouge before them – the PRK government viewed Cambodia
as a rural country. Therefore, many of the reforms they implemented concerned
agricultural production; there was much less focus on urban development. Initially,
agriculture remained organised on a collective basis. Over time, however, traditional
family farming methods were reintroduced as each rural family was allocated a
private plot of 600-2,000 m2 for a house and private farming (Curtis, 1989). The
government also implemented a system of rural taxation to fund public works to
boost agricultural productivity and even provided state loans to farmers (ibid.).
In contrast, there was very little investment in public infrastructure in urban areas,
including Phnom Penh. Roads remained potholed, electricity supply erratic and
sanitation coverage low: a 1988 survey, for example, found that around 50 per cent
of the city’s residents had no functioning toilet (Mysliwiec, 1988). In addition, many
families shared housing with others in order to support each other weather the
difficult circumstances of 1980s Phnom Penh, which included high crime rates, a
lack of basic services and the scarcity of consumer goods.
Phnom Penh did, however, slowly begin to re-urbanise through the 1980s. By 1981
the population had reached an estimated 300,000 to 400,000, including a few
returning residents, but mainly consisting of rural families who had been displaced
by war and who had never lived in a city before (Osbourne, 2008). The growing
population made homes in abandoned housing, occupying any structures that were
found empty (Khemro and Payne, 2004). It is also during this period that unplanned
settlements began appearing in Phnom Penh as the available stock of vacant property
diminished (Urban Sector Group, 1994). As will be demonstrated in later chapters,
migrants constructed dwellings in a range of public spaces, usually controlled or
administered by government ministries or the military.
3.6 The emergence of private property
In 1989 the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia and an independent Cambodian
government, the State of Cambodia (SOC), was formed. Though new in name, the
SOC was simply a repackaged PRK, with leaders Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng
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Samrin maintaining their positions as rulers of Cambodia. After the Vietnamese
departure, however, the former communists quickly abandoned their socialist
principles and implemented a raft of market reforms (Hill and Menon, 2013).
One of the first acts of the new government was to install the regulatory apparatus to
enable formal property ownership and exchange. In 1989 a decree was passed that
that permitted homeownership in Phnom Penh for the first time since the fall of the
city to the Khmer Rouge fifteen years earlier. In this sense, the SOC represented the
beginning of a new period of tenure and land administration in Cambodia based on
the concept of legal private ownership.
The decision by the Cambodian government to implement market-based tenure
reforms were primarily a pragmatic response to the changing domestic situation in
Cambodia, including the growth of informal land markets, and the growing trend
toward marketization across transitioning socialist economies globally (Gottesman,
2004). Tenure reform was not, initially, the direct product of international financial
institutions or other global policy making entities, which did not become active in
Cambodia’s land sector until the mid-1990s, as I will discuss presently.
The 1989 decree invested in a person(s) or entity the legal right to apply for a land
title, which was considered definitive proof of ownership. In a similar fashion to the
post-Soviet transition in 1990’s Eastern Europe, the approach encouraged
households to apply to the state for formal title to their land. As was discussed in
Chapter 2, this neo-liberal doctrine posits that as socioeconomic development
progresses, land prices increase and the incentive to encroach on others’ land
increases, more and more people will start to apply for formal title. In response to
this growing demand, the apparatus for managing formal land will develop
appropriately in response to the changing needs of society and the increasing price of
land.
In Phnom Penh, the allocation of titles was not defined by price mechanisms,
however, but by the same patronage governance structures that characterised the
distribution of state resources during the PRK period. In this way, the Cambodian
reforms had a similar affect to the Russian land privatisation model: pre-existing
power structures meant that formal ownership remained the preserve of the urban
elite (Engvall and Koko, 2007). Worse, in Phnom Penh, the law ushered in a period
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of rabid capitalism, where top officials acquired swathes of valuable real estate,
evicting low-income groups in the process (see Chapter 5). Consequently, Engvall
and Kokko (2007: 7) assert that the land law became ‘a “get rich quick” manual for
the upwardly mobile who knew how to satisfy the formal registration requirements’.
3.7 Donor-supported tenure frameworks
One of the greatest changes in tenure associated with Cambodia’s market reforms
relates to the stakeholders involved in shaping land policy. Crucially, by replacing
socialism with capitalism, the government reconnected Cambodia to global circuits
of aid, bringing to an end decades of isolation from the ‘western’ or ‘capitalist’
world (Shatkin, 1998). During the Khmer Rouge period, the country’s interactions
with the outside world were limited to a few socialist states, including North Korea,
China and (initially, before relations deteriorated) Vietnam. From 1979 an
international embargo on the Hanoi-backed PRK government and ongoing civil war
meant that flows of capital and knowledge into the country came only from the
communist bloc, particularly from the Soviet Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Gottesman, 2004). The Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989 signalled the end
of these socialist alliances and paved the way for western development assistance
and the resumption of bilateral relations with governments in North America,
Europe, and other aligned countries globally. It also heralded the beginning of
relations with multi-lateral organisations representing these interests, such as the
United Nations, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
The first major donor intervention in Cambodia’s was made by the United Nations in
the early 1990s. The United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
intended to bring to an end the guerrilla war waged by Khmer Rouge remnants by
administrating free elections in the country (Widyono, 2007). In promoting
democratic reforms, the intervention also hoped to replace a decade of patronage
governance presided by Hun Sen and other top leaders. This process began in 1991,
when the Paris Peace Agreement secured the participation of the various Cambodian
factions in UN-administered elections scheduled for 1993. This was the first UN
mandate to take on many of the roles of a state, including the authority to supervise
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judicial processes throughout Cambodia ‘to ensure the maintenance of law and order
and the protection of human rights and freedoms’ (Donovan, 1993: 6). Although the
1993 UN-backed elections were won by the opposition party FUNCINPEC, the
results were not accepted by the leaders of old regime, Hun Sen, Chea Sim and Heng
Samrin, who had rebranded themselves as the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
Instead, a coalition government was formed, with CPP leader Hun Sen and
FUNCINPEC leader, Prince Ranariddh, acting as ‘co-prime ministers’ until 1997,
when Hun Sen consolidated his power in a bloody coup d’état.
The coup did nothing, however, to dampen the flow of aid to Cambodia. Over the
coming decade, international financial institutions, aid agencies and NGOs flocked
to the city, and became a key fixture in the country’s development. In this context,
the land sector became a key area for reform (Hendrickson, 2001; Hughes, 2009;
Springer, 2009).
In the mid-1990s donor organisations became increasingly visible in shaping the
Cambodian government’s land policies. In 1995, the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) made the promulgation of a new land law (which became known as the 2001
Land Law) a condition of future funding, and in the mid to late 1990s German and
Finnish government development agencies started pilot land titling projects
(Torhonen, 2004). Since 2000, the World Bank’s role has become increasingly
prominent. With the World Bank as principle technical and financial backers, and
with German and Finnish support, the government started the process of formalising
the entire country, implementing the Land Management and Administration Project
(LMAP) in 2002.
The LMAP has been the most significant donor-supported intervention in land
administration in Cambodia to date. Through the project, planners aimed to
formalise all land rights in Phnom Penh – and Cambodia as a whole – by titling
every eligible private plot of land, classifying and demarcating state-owned land, and
strengthening the capacity of the land ministry to enforce property rights equitably,
predictably and transparently (Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2007).
During the first five-year funding period, the World Bank expected to formalise the
land ownership rights for 198,000 parcels in Phnom Penh, accounting for the
majority of the city’s dwellings, including many of those in unplanned settlements
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(World Bank, 2002a: 43). The Bank expected that the LMAP would be funded for a
second phase, as had been the case for the World Bank-funded land titling project in
neighbouring Thailand, which was supported over three phases (ibid.). As noted in
the introduction, however, the LMAP ended prematurely in 2009, although titling
continued after then with support from other donors.
The LMAP is a typical example of the institutions-centred Post-Washington
Consensus international development paradigm. It required significant reform of
regulations and institutions associated with land administration in Cambodia. The
comprehensive programme of reform it entailed was included in the World Bank’s
(2002a) Project Appraisal Document, which set out the detailed plans for project
implementation around five components (Figure 3.2).
Component 1 involves building the regulatory framework to achieve a universally
applicable, formal system of tenure in Cambodia. This includes the installation of
institutional mechanisms to facilitate the development, promulgation,
implementation and monitoring of land laws and policies. New laws that ensure
equitable access to secure land tenure are to be published and made easily accessible
to the public, and mechanisms put in place to ensure that policy makers are held to
account and have their decisions debated in public and academic forums (World
Bank, 2002a).
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Figure 3.2: Components of the LMAP
Component 1: Development of land policy and regulatory framework
(a) Development of the capacity of the Secretariat of the Council of Land Policy.
(b) Formulation of key policies for land administration and management.
(c) Development and drafting of legal instruments.
(d) Dissemination of policies, laws, rules and regulations.
Component 2: Institutional development
(a) Long-term institutional development of the Land Ministry at all levels.
(b) Project management.
(c) Development of land management and administration education program.
(d) Development of a private surveying industry.
Component 3: Land titling program and development of a land registration
system
(a) Information dissemination and community participation.
(b) Systematic land titling program.
(c) Sporadic land titling program.
(d) Development of a modem land registration system.
Component 4: Strengthening mechanisms for dispute resolution
(a) Strengthening the national cadastral commissions.
(b) Strengthening the provincial cadastral commissions.
(c) Legal assistance for disadvantaged.
Component 5: Land management
(a) Clarification of procedures for defining different classes of land, such as forest
land, protected area land, private land, and public private land
(b) Procurement of aerial photographs and satellite images as needed.
(c) Preparation of land classification maps for each of the project provinces showing
boundaries of forests, protected areas, land under private use, land under public use,
land under concession, and other types of land use.
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2002a
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Component 2 aims to build the institutions capable of enforcing regulations and laws
relating to property registration, transfer and ownership in Cambodia. This
component links closely to the recent trend in best-practice land tenure
interventions: to build the institutional capacity of the state to enforce property rights
and enable markets to function effectively (see Chapter 2). To this end, the LMAP
sought to develop the institutional capacity of the land ministry – the Ministry of
Land Management Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) – to enable it to
implement and enforce a universal system of private property rights. Component 2
entails the significant expansion of the MLMUPC and its transformation into a large
institution capable of executing a diverse set of roles regarding land administration.
The General Department of Cadastre and Geography is responsible for training the
cadastral officials involved in titling, storing details of landholdings and maintaining
the central database for land title registration and issuance. To ensure that state
power is spatially extended across Phnom Penh and the country, the MLMUPC
employs a hierarchical land governance structure. The central ministry in Phnom
Penh constitutes the highest authority, followed by Provincial Land Management
Offices (or Municipal Land Management Office, in the case of the capital, Phnom
Penh), which are located in the main urban centres of every province, and then
District Land Management Offices. These local offices are responsible for collecting
and maintaining cadastral records, which are then fed to the MLMUPC in Phnom
Penh. In this way, the state’s power is administered at different levels; the result is
that household interaction with the apparatus of the state regards land administration
will increase.
Components 3 and 5 of the project relate specifically to the administrative and
practical aspects of formalising the entire country, from rural smallholdings to urban
housing to vast areas of tropical rainforest. The most important way this was to
occur was through the systematic land registration component – perhaps the most
administratively demanding aspect of the LMAP. This process involves numerous
steps. Once a district is earmarked for systematic titling, the MLMUPC-trained
titling teams will be deployed there. A demarcation officer will determine the
boundaries of parcels of land, while the adjudication officer will clarify the property
rights associated with that parcel (World Bank, 2002a). If there is no dispute, the
ownership rights of adjudicated parcels will be publicised by the local authorities.
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The decision will then be ratified by local and provincial authorities and sent to the
MLMUPC where a formal title is issued. In tandem to this process the survey officer
will note the location of each parcel of adjudicated and titled land, which will then
be included in the national cadastral database. Titles can also be obtained through
sporadic land registration, which refers to a process where an applicant applies to the
MLMUPC of their own accord.
The Cadastral Commission (Component 4 of the LMAP) is set up to deal with
disputes arising from LMAP-associated titling – both systematic and sporadic. The
commission is intended to replace the informal role of local authorities in mediating
disputes because it is believed that their process does not conform to principles of
‘good governance’, namely procedural transparency or accountability (World Bank,
2002a).
As the preceding overview of the project demonstrates, the LMAP has been
associated with significant changes in Phnom Penh’s land sector. Not all of these
changes, however, have been associated with the state apparatus. As donor
involvement in land policy has increased, so too has NGO activity. The number of
NGOs assisting the vulnerable to benefit from the LMAP and associated land
reforms has grown rapidly over the past two decades, mirroring the expansion in
donor land-sector activity. This has included an increased presence of international
NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions, as well as local organisations, such as the Urban
Sector Group and Cambodian Centre for Human Rights. These groups have
advocated for land titles for vulnerable households in a variety of ways, and have
become particularly adept and negotiating the shifting political, regulatory and
institutional arrangements governing land tenure in the capital (See Chapter 6).
3.8 Land market activity outside the formal framework
In tandem to the expansion of formal tenure, a number of other ‘informal’
mechanisms used by those unable or unwilling to use the formal framework have
proliferated over the past two decades. Important in this respect are the large number
of informal settlements in Phnom Penh, which, since the late 1980s, have grown
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rapidly in both size and number (Figure 3.3; Urban Resource Centre, 2002). By the
end of the 1990s, residents of unplanned settlements accounted for an estimated 15
percent of Phnom Penh’s population of just over a million (Sovannarith et al., 2001).
Today, the population is estimated to have grown to 250,000 at the most recent
estimate (Phnom Penh Municipality, 2012). Such settlements are spread across the
city, but mainly associated with former public spaces, such as riverbanks, lakes,
parks, canals and other greenfield sites. Many residents of informal settlements do
not have formal ownership documents, and so utilize other ‘informal’ mechanisms
of tenure and property exchange. Even outside unplanned areas, many residents in
planned accommodation do not have titles – a legacy of the Khmer Rouge’s
destruction of all property records in the 1970s (Grimsditch and Henderson, 2009).
Figure 3.3: Location of unplanned settlements in Phnom Penh 1994
Source: Urban Sector Group, 1994
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The most comprehensive survey of ‘informal’ tenure systems in both planned and
unplanned areas of Phnom Penh was conducted by the Cambodia Development
Resource Institute in 2007 (Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2007). The
survey demonstrates the ubiquitous role of local authorities in administering land
ownership and transactions outside the formal framework.
Before detailing the results of the CDRI survey, it is useful to put them into context
by briefly outlining the main administrative divisions of Phnom Penh. Local
government in the city can be divided into four tiers. The highest tier is Phnom Penh
Municipality. Below the municipality there are District government offices, of
which there are nine in Phnom Penh. Below the district are commune offices, of
which there are 76 in Phnom Penh. The lowest administrative division of
government in Phnom Penh is the village; on average there are between 15 and 20
villages in each commune.
The CDRI tenure survey noted that most of the properties in Phnom Penh conferred
ownership through documents provided by these local government offices, rather
than formal titles provided by the land ministry (the MLMUPC). The results of the
CDRI (2007: 41) survey suggested that 86 per cent of plots (out of a total of 1,658)
included in the survey had semi-official ownership documentation, including papers
issued by the district (50 per cent) and the commune or village (36 per cent). Only 5
per cent were in possession of a legal title. The remaining respondents either had no
documents or documents not stamped by any local authority. Similarly, the transfer
of ownership had typically been facilitated by local authorities. The survey found
only a tiny minority (0.3%) of the 1,012 reported land sales were formally registered
at the MLMUPC (Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2007: 50). The
majority of transactions (60 per cent) were documented at the commune level, while
20 per cent were documented at the village and 13 per cent at the district level. Local
authorities facilitated the sale of property by providing a stamped receipt of the
transaction.
Although the CDRI survey was conducted nearly a decade ago, the types of tenure it
highlights are still ubiquitous in areas where LMAP titling has not taken place: in
such areas, tenure documents and transactions facilitated by local authorities remain
prevalent (Flower and Grimsditch, 2015).
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3.9 Conclusion
Cambodia’s history of land tenure is inextricably linked to its urban history. From
the historical analysis presented in this chapter, three salient trends emerge in
relation to property reforms and urban development.
First, the state has often distributed property rights to elites as a way of
consolidating, extending or projecting political power. In the Angkor, period elites
were provided with large parcels to extend the margins of the empire and shore-up
support for the king. In the colonial period, titles were distributed to secure
investments for a colonial urban elite in central Phnom Penh, and in rural areas
through the provision of land concessions. During the 1980s, government officials
were able to amass large swathes of urban real estate because of their connections to
the regime. This trend continued into the 1990s, when property was privatised – as
will be discussed in-depth in the next chapter.
Second, the association between urban areas as ‘civilised’ or ‘progressive’ spaces
where property rights systems flourish, in contrast to rural spaces which are
‘traditional’ and ‘reactionary’ has been a defining feature of property reforms in
Cambodia. From the Angkor period to the return of the free market, tenure reforms
largely ignored rural small-holders, instead providing titles to urban properties
and/or concessions to agricultural land to urban elites. The exception to this trend
was the Khmer Rouge, and to a lesser extent the PRK, which targeted property
reforms, such as collectivisation, at agriculture to increase productivity in the sector.
Despite the differences in desired outcome between socialist and capitalist land
reforms, both used the conception of rural and urban difference as a model to
implement their tenure reforms. For the French, and later King Sihanouk, tenure
reform underpinned urban development, just as it underpinned rural development for
the socialists. The impact of mechanisms of ownership associated with the LMAP on
Phnom Penh’s development will be explored in depth in the remained of this thesis.
Third, the extension of property rights to sections of the population considered
legitimate citizens is a recurrent theme throughout Cambodian’s history. In the
Angkor period, the right to own property was extended to all freemen, while slaves
were not permitted to formally own property. Similarly, in the French and Sihanouk
periods the urban poor were often denied land ownership rights as an ‘illegitimate’
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social group. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the relationship between
ownership documents and urban citizenship are an important feature of the LMAP.
The more recent donor-funded land reforms have been justified as an attempt to
remove the inequalities that have defined past systems of tenure. They aim to
provide tenure security for all Cambodians, and to bring other benefits associated
with titles, including increased investment and equitable access to affordable credit.
In doing so, titling aims to create a fairer society based on the principles of good
governance and inclusive growth. The justification for this most recent foreign
intervention is, therefore, much the same as the land laws implemented by French
colonial administrators. The key question which will be addressed in the following
chapters is whether more recent donor-funded interventions have improved the lot of
ordinary and low-income urban residents or whether they have resulted in the same
inequitable tenure regimes that defined the French period and subsequent systems of
private property rights.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This thesis is based on over a year of fieldwork in Phnom Penh during 2012-2013. It
draws on a variety of methods, including a survey of over 200 households, over 80
key informant interviews, archival research and a variety of other data. In this
chapter, I detail the range of qualitative and quantitative methods I have used to
assess the effects of donor-funded land titling in the city. The chapter is organised as
follows: first, I review the methodological approaches to land market analysis in the
literature and describe the approach to data collection and analysis I use in this
thesis, which is structured around the city-wide and household scales. Second, I
explain my use of city-wide research methods, including analysis of documents, key
informant interviews and other fieldwork activities. Third, I discuss my household-
level research strategy, explaining site-selection criteria, providing an overview of
the sites, and describing my approaches to data collection and analysis. I conclude by
considering the ethical aspects of the fieldwork and the limitations of the research
methods employed.
4.2 Overall methodological approach
4.2.1 Approaches to land policy analysis
It has been suggested that methodologies for land market analysis follow either
neoclassical or political economy traditions (Jones and Ward, 1994). Neoclassical
methodologies test policy interventions against a pre-defined set of economic criteria
as markers of policy success or failure, typically relying on econometric analyses.
Such an approach has, however, been criticised for reducing an array of social
interactions to economic principles (Fine, 2001). In land policy analysis, a focus on
economic indicators alone misses uneven distributions of power that frequently
affect policy outcomes (Jones, 2000), simplifies and codifies complex social
relations associated with land ownership (Varley, 2002) and fails to account for the
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wider historical, political and socioeconomic factors that affect tenure security
(Gilbert, 2002).
A methodology informed by political economy methodology, on the other hand,
views property as a social construction. A focus on the social relations that have
produced land has facilitated the application of a variety of methodological tools,
including discourse analysis (Yiftachel, 2009), historical research methods (North,
1990), household surveys (Varley, 1987) and ethnographic methods (Brickell,
2014). These tools have revealed land-policy formulation to be a dynamic practice
associated with shifting geopolitical priorities (Hirsch, 2011; Springer, 2013) and
influenced by a range of historical, political, economic and social conditions, which
can generate both winners and losers (Jones and Ward, 1994; Hunt, 2004; Varley,
2010).
Both political economy and econometric methodological approaches have been
applied to Cambodia, generating a variety of results and policy implications. An
econometric analysis using census data found that farmers with formal ownership
documents achieved higher rates of productivity than farmers who did not have such
documents: higher tenure security among those with formal documentation was
found to be the casual mechanism increasing productivity (Markussen, 2008). On the
basis of this finding, the study concluded that titling would increase tenure security,
rates of investment and agricultural productivity.
Studies inspired by political economy have used methodological tools that look more
closely at the process of implementation to present a more nuanced picture of
titling’s impact in Cambodia. Robin Biddulph (2010) mapped rural areas where
titling had been deployed by government against areas where land conflicts were
highest and found an important discrepancy: titling tended to be implemented in
areas with low instances of land conflict and high tenure security such that it had an
insignificant impact on tenure insecurity. This political economy analysis challenges
the econometric assumption that titling automatically results in increased tenure
security, highlighting constraints in the implementation phase. Biddulph notes that
the goal of donor programmers to provide title to residents of areas where people
suffered insecurity was not achieved because it was against the interests of powerful
figures, concluding that ‘the development industry is poorly equipped to engage in
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political struggles which involve opposing the projects of a host nation’s political
elite’ (Biddulph, 2010: 224).
As well as identifying top-down interference, political economy analyses have
suggested that programmers’ goals have also been undermined by local-level
processes in Cambodia. Buntheon So (2010) highlights the issue of ‘cadastral
sustainability’, using survey data to chart post-titling land transactions in rural
Cambodia. He finds that many of those who received titles went on to transfer
ownership rights through informal mechanisms, rendering the cadastral database out
of date and undermining donors’ desire to promote tenure security through formal
ownership.
Political economy methodologies have also looked at the process of implementation
on a broader geopolitical scale, drawing on governance- and discourse-focused
analyses, and viewing titling in Cambodia in the context of a global battle of
ideologies, cultures and classes. These methodological approaches have uncovered
global hierarchies of power that contribute to the spread of capitalism to the
detriment of poor Cambodians (Hughes, 2009, Springer, 2013). These latter works
have been highly critical of land titling and other projects as neoliberal reforms
intrinsically designed to dispossess the poor.
The example of land titling policy analysis in Cambodia demonstrates how findings
can vary greatly depending on methodological approach, even when examining the
same issue in the same location. The econometric approach of Markusson (2008)
assumes titling will result in positive outcomes, the political economy methodologies
of So (2010) and Biddulph (2010) show how positive intentions may be mediated by
elite capture, while the geopolitical methodologies employed by Springer (2013)
have asserted the inevitability of titling fomenting tenure insecurity.
4.2.2 Approach of this study
In this thesis I use political economy methodologies to study the impacts of the
LMAP in Phnom Penh. The methodological tools I use are closely linked to the
overall aims of this thesis: they have been developed to explore both the positive and
negative aspects of titling – both in terms of its implementation and its outcomes –
and to identify the ways that low-income groups can benefit in the context of titling.
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These guiding methodological principles are linked to the policy-oriented conceptual
framing of this thesis, outlined in Chapter 3.
To achieve these aims, my data collection and analysis has operated at two scales:
the city-wide scale and household scale.
At the city-wide scale, I have taken a broad view of the LMAP as an intervention
with implications across Phnom Penh. I have looked in detail at the legal and
institutional reforms that have occurred as part of the project, and explored how both
residents in unplanned settlements and outside them are treated in the law and in
practice. This has entailed, firstly, a consideration of the temporal aspects of land
governance in Phnom Penh. To this end, I have considered the LMAP in its
historical context, exploring how reforms associated with the project have differed
from property regimes before them. In particular, I have looked at differences in
relation to their provision of equitable access to legal ownership documents across
the city’s different sub-groups. I also consider how the implementation of the LMAP
is linked to other political, social, economic and cultural changes in Cambodia, and
in international development discourse more generally, that have occurred over the
past two decades. Secondly, I explore the city-wide spatial aspects of the LMAP,
identifying areas that have received titles, areas that have not and analysing the
reasons underlying the state’s allocation of titles across the city. I consider how the
distribution of titles has led to city-wide changes in the urban landscape, highlighting
in particular the role of titles in facilitating large-scale domestic and foreign
investments.
I also assess the outcomes of the LMAP as a city-wide reform at the household scale.
I attend to what difference titles have made to recipients and non-recipients across
the city in relation to key indicators associated with titles, including tenure security,
housing investment and access to credit. To capture these household-level effects, I
have conducted surveys in three contrasting sites: an ‘ordinary’ planned settlement
where titling has occurred, an unplanned settlement where titling has occurred and
an unplanned settlement excluded from titling.
The methods used in the production of this thesis broadly conform to these two
different scales of analysis, and hence the remainder of this chapter is structured
around city-wide and household methods. Similarly, in my analysis chapters, the
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temporal- and spatial-based analyses of titling rely on the data from city-wide
methods (Chapters 5 and 6), whereas the assessment of household-impacts of title in
relation to tenure security, investment and credit rely on survey data and key
informant interviews (Chapters 7 and 8). In Chapter 9, I draw on both city-wide and
household-level data to paint a complex picture of titling and urban change in Phnom
Penh, suggesting that this process occurs at multiple scales.
4.3 City-wide methods
4.3.1 My role as a participant in Cambodia’s land sector
My knowledge of Phnom Penh’s land sector is rooted in my experiences of living
and working in the city. I arrived in Cambodia in 2009 and immediately began
working with the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), which was one
of the key organisations representing communities that had been excluded from the
LMAP and were facing eviction. After this, I worked as a researcher at the
Cambodia Development Resource institute (CDRI) – Cambodia’s leading policy
research institute – where I participated in a project assessing the impact of titling in
urban and rural areas. It was at CDRI that I spent the next five years working at their
head office in Tuol Kork in central Phnom Penh. From 2014 onwards, I worked as a
consultant for other projects relating to titling and land tenure in Phnom Penh’s
unplanned settlements, principally as part of the European Commission-funded
Human Rights Spatial Planning Projects 1 and 2. These projects involved the
mapping of unplanned settlements and collating and analysing residents’ tenure
documents.
Participating in the urban land sector in Phnom Penh has meant that I have
experienced many aspects of land administration in the city. While advocating for
communities under threat of eviction, I developed hands-on experience of the
responses of communities facing eviction, the processes by which NGOs would
support threatened communities, and the strategies of government to push through
evictions. This experience was particularly useful in my analysis of NGO strategies
to obtain titles for those in unplanned settlements in Chapter 6. Having worked with
the NGOs involved in these cases, I had a good knowledge of the strategies they
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deployed and was, therefore, able to provide an in-depth analysis developed through
my participation. I have been able to define and contrast different approaches of
NGOs (see Chapter 6 on the differences in strategies between sectoral and advocacy
NGOs), and highlight successful tactics that have been used to obtain titles for
residents living in unplanned settlements.
My professional relationships with people and organisations working in the land
sector also enabled me to source laws and relevant policy documents, maps and other
data, which were integral to the production of this thesis. A good example is the
official correspondence between municipal and LMAP officials that I draw on in
Chapter 6. The letter details areas to be excluded from the LMAP’s systematic titling
component when the project was rolled out in the commune of Tonle Bassac, and
gives reasons why certain areas were being excluded from the project. This
communication had been obtained by NGOs and subsequently shared with me
through professional contacts. It provided an important insight into the reasons why
officials excluded some areas, and the processes through which these exclusions
were actioned.
Through considerable time spent in unplanned settlements over the course of five
years, I have been able to observe how land markets work and the documents
associated with both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ tenure, which proved valuable in
developing an in-depth understanding of the laws, regulations and practices of de
jure and de facto tenure across the city. This understanding has enabled me to
provide perhaps one of the most in-depth analyses of tenure in Phnom Penh to date.
In Chapter 3, 5, 6 and 7, I have provided details of the types of documents associated
with the various tenure mechanisms, the level of official recognition and security
associated with them, and the forms of property transfers that they have facilitated.
Perhaps as important as my professional experiences have been my personal
relationships with those involved in the land sector. As a systematic titling project
that involved significant legal reform, the LMAP affected everyone in Phnom Penh
to some extent. I knew friends and acquaintances that lived in areas that had been
excluded from titling, for example, and others that had obtained titles and used them
to access loans or for other purposes. Through personal relationships with
development workers in the land sector, I was also privy to confidential information
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about large-scale land transfers and other procedural aspects of titling. While I have
not used information yielded from personal ‘off-the-record’ encounters directly in
this thesis, the knowledge I have developed as a result of them has provided the solid
base on which this thesis has been built. Moreover, these personal encounters have
opened up avenues of inquiry that have led me to other sources of information and
data that I have used in this thesis. For example, off-the-record information on the
relationships between key tycoons and officials involved in large land transactions
provided me with the key details (names and places) that I then explored more fully
using different sources, such as newspaper articles and other forms of online fact-
checking. This approach is in evidence in my analysis of patronage networks and
land transfers in Chapters 5, 6 and 9.
As a result of my role as participant in Phnom Penh’s land sector, I have enjoyed
relatively privileged access to a breadth of sources. Such access may not be available
to researchers who have not been embedded in development work in the same way I
have. I hope that my privileged position in this regard, and the deep immersion it has
afforded me, has brought new insights to the issues covered in this thesis.
As well as being a participant in Phnom Penh’s land sector, I was also a resident of
the city for many years. My experiences as a resident and as a participant in urban
life have also informed many aspects of this thesis. During my period of residence in
the city, I saw significant changes in the urban landscape. I witnessed the removal of
low-income settlements in violent evictions, and the development of large,
residential and commercial complexes in the spaces that unplanned settlements once
inhabited. I came to know areas of the city associated with rapid development, and
have watched them transition over the years. Every day I travelled across the city,
and became well versed in the everyday rhythm of urban life, a key aspect of which
has been the widening disparity between the economic elites and lower-income
groups. I also participated in the cultural life of the city, including engaging with
artistic representations of Phnom Penh’s transition. I assisted with the annual Our
City Festival arts programme over 3 years, which explored artistic responses to
Phnom Penh’s rapid transition and residents’ reactions to it through the medium of
site-specific public art.
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Living in such a rapidly changing urban space and experiencing it in myriad ways on
a day-to-day basis has affected how I have consciously engaged with key themes in
the city’s development in this thesis. It has also, perhaps, affected me at a sub-
conscious level by influencing how I have interpreted issues associated with titling
and urban change. This is particularly the case in relation to the strong emotional
response associated with viewing the injustice of urban transition, replete with
evictions and elite capture of valuable real-estate.
4.3.2 Documents
Analysis of documents relating to land administration in Phnom Penh was crucial to
understanding the roots of the LMAP, the structure of the project, and the historical,
political and socioeconomic context in which it was implemented. Given the wide
scope of the project, it was also necessary to use secondary sources to gain an
appreciation of its range of outcomes across Phnom Penh – an impossible task if
relying exclusively on primary methods given the resources available to me as a PhD
researcher.
I spent a significant period of time searching libraries, archives and collections of
documents in Cambodia, together with web archives, and in requesting material from
donors and other contacts. I amassed hundreds of documents, which I organised and
coded around key themes and by source. This documentary analysis gave me a solid
foundation on which to identify, approach and interview key informants.
Legal and policy documents
Assessing the legal and policy frameworks associated with the LMAP was the
foundation on which my research has been built. A solid legal understanding was
important, first, to identify the LMAP procedures in relation to titling in unplanned
and planned areas, and in relation to large-scale investment and land concessions;
second, to facilitate an analysis of policy intentions against policy outcomes; third, to
enable me to identify the complex ways that the LMAP has been used by actors such
as the government, private-sector elites, civil society and communities to promote
their own interests; fourth, to place the LMAP in the wider context of international
development policy analysis.
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I accessed a variety of legal and policy documents in the production of this thesis.
Key donor documents were readily available and provided the overall aims and
framework for the project. The most important of these was the Word Banks’s
(2002a) Project Appraisal Document, detailing the rationale, scope and intent of the
LMAP. Other useful documents included the LMAP Project Credit Agreement
(World Bank, 2002b), which detailed the government’s commitments to the World
Bank having received the project loan, and the Inspection Panel review of the LMAP
(World Bank, 2010) – a response to the LMAP’s failure to secure tenure for those
living around Boeung Kak Lake, detailing the procedural irregularities of that case.
Laws promulgated by the Cambodian government were also important to
understanding the LMAP. The project has been designed as a package of land
reforms and is governed by a myriad of complex legal processes. The most important
laws in this regard are the Constitution of 1993, the Civil Code of 2011 and Land
Law of 2001 – theoretically in that order according to legal precedent. In practice the
2001 Land Law is the key document detailing property rights and establishing
criteria for legal ownership. The 2001 Land Law is supported by a number of sub-
decrees that establish the legal procedures and details needed to implement legal
requirements, such as a detailed framework for demarcating public land or
implementing systematic land titling. Other sub-decrees amend and/or add
clarifications to the law. I have collected and analysed numerous other legal
documents, such as circulars, announcements, letters and cadastral maps that have
enabled me to identify the regulatory structures of land management in Cambodia.
Obtaining all relevant laws and regulations was challenging and I cannot be certain I
was successful. All laws are published in hardcopy in the Royal Gazette in the
Khmer language: accessing these hardcopy laws regularly and obtaining accurate
translations was beyond my capacity. Instead, I relied on newsletters from the
international law firm DFDL, which provides summaries in English of all laws
promulgated by the government on a monthly basis. If there was an interesting law
that looked relevant to my research I could then track it down and get it translated. I
also obtained translated land laws from the German government’s land rights
programme, from other websites such as Open Development Cambodia, and from
contacts working in the land sector. While this thesis is up to date with relevant laws
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as of 2016 (to my knowledge), it is possible (indeed probable) that some legal points
may become out of date as new laws are promulgated.
Historical material
Political economy approaches to land market analysis suggest that reforms are often
mediated by local contextual factors. Following this insight, I collected data relating
to historical land polices, regulatory frameworks and patterns of ownership and
conflict in Phnom Penh. In doing so, I hope to identify the historical factors that have
affected the project’s implementation and explore differences the LMAP has
engendered in Cambodia’s land governance.
I collected historical legal documents relating to land privatisation in Phnom Penh,
including important laws promulgated in the late 1980s and early 1990s that
permitted homeownership for the first time since the fall of the city to the Khmer
Rouge fifteen years earlier. These documents were crucial for establishing the legal
regimes prior to the donor-funded interventions of the late 1990s and 2000s, and the
processes of acquiring titles at that time. In addition, I collected cadastral and other
maps to determine patterns of land ownership across Phnom Penh during the pre-
donor period.
Perhaps the most important source of historical data came from research I conducted
at the National Archives of Cambodia. There I discovered a large cache of
documents covering historical land disputes during the UNTAC period (1991-1993).
The UNTAC civil administration in Cambodia was responsible for monitoring
human rights abuses as Cambodia prepared for elections in 1993 and in theory
‘correcting’ abuses where they occurred (Williams, 1999:26). I spent time searching
through complaints made by residents to Phnom Penh provincial headquarters of the
UNTAC civil administration relating to land conflicts. The case files included
witness statements, signed declarations, copies of property documents and other
evidence. They provided an important insight into the nature of land conflicts at that
time, which often involved powerful figures who remain influential in public life to
this day.
Online newspaper archives were also important for establishing past patterns of land
conflict. The Phnom Penh Post and the Cambodia Daily – the two most widely
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circulated English-language newspapers in Cambodia – have archived news reports
dating from the early 1990s. These news sources provided important information on
historical land conflicts in Phnom Penh and the political context in which they
occurred.
Finally, WikiLeaks US Embassy cables provided a fascinating behind-the-scenes
insight into the behaviour of the political and diplomatic elite regarding land policy
and ownership in Cambodia, from the 1970s to 2011. The cables include reports of
confidential conversations between diplomats and political leaders regarding the
distribution of titles and details of the relationships between the political and
economic elite, which were helpful in establishing how laws were wielded by those
in power and to what ends. It was of note that land policy and land conflicts were a
prominent issue in the cables, underscoring the importance of these issues in
contemporary Cambodian life.
Web research
I acquired information about large-scale investments and those behind them through
web searches of companies active in Phnom Penh’s land sector. This research
uncovered details of patronage governance that influenced the distribution of titles
and large-scale investments in the city. For example, by visiting the websites of
prominent redevelopers I obtained details about the companies associated with
certain parcels of land or disputes, and established links between companies – some
of which extended beyond Cambodia’s borders – thus revealing important networks
through which land transfers have been actioned. I also drew on the websites of
global real-estate agents, such as CBRE and Frank Knight, to investigate the
increasingly global nature of Phnom Penh’s land markets and to acquire data on
property prices.
Databases
I used a number of databases to determine patterns of land ownership, investments
and relocations of urban poor communities. I utilised a database provided by the
Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), of around 2,000 households, to
explore pre-LMAP tenure systems across the city, and a database provided by the
NGO Sahakum Teang Tnaut to view the location, characteristics and distribution of
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ownership documents in unplanned settlements in Phnom Penh. I also drew on
census data and the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database to explore
broader socioeconomic changes in the city.
4.3.3 Key informant interviews
Key informant interviews were an important tool enabling me to understand how the
LMAP had worked in practice during its implementation phase, how practice
deviated from policy, and how the LMAP contributed to urban change in Phnom
Penh. Overall I conduced over 80 key informant interviews, with officials, donors,
community representatives, community members, civil society representatives and
private sector actors (See Appendix 1). I attended most interviews with my research
assistant, Mr Sim Vichet, a final year Bachelor studies student in Environmental
Studies at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP). Vichet had a good
understanding of land law and related issues and so was particularly helpful in
interviews; when interviews were conducted in Khmer he acted as interpreter. Where
possible I recorded interviews and later transcribed them. In some cases, however,
people asked that I did not record our meetings.
Government and donor officials
As they are responsible for making key decisions about how the LMAP is
implemented, I tried to interview relevant officials in the Land Ministry.
Unfortunately, however, I was unable to meet many despite repeated requests
transmitted through different channels. I did manage to interview two district-level
cadastral officials, but I found that these interviews were disappointing and yielded
little useful information; because of the sensitive subject matter, the interviews were
quite tense. When I asked sensitive questions (for example: ‘have there been any
areas excluded from titling and if so what were the grounds for these exclusions and
who authorised them?’), I would get no response. These incomplete responses were
unsurprising. As I suggest in later chapters, the process of implementing the LMAP
at the higher levels is made deliberately opaque and characterised by smoke and
mirrors. In most cases, speaking with higher-level officials about such topics on the
record is unlikely to provide a complete representation of how the project is
implemented.
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Much more forthcoming with information about the LMAP were commune-level
government officials. The commune (of which there are 67 in Phnom Penh) is an
urban administrative category between district (of which there are seven in Phnom
Penh) and village (of which there are over 600). These officials were more involved
with the day-to-day administration of their areas and facilitated a diverse range of
land-related activities, such as providing informal conflict-resolution mechanisms or
documents to enable people to access credit, and recording transactions and other
transfers. Interviews with commune officials were useful for finding out more about
the LMAP’s implementation – concerning, for example, areas that had been
excluded - and also to gain the opinions of experienced sub-national officials about
the impact titles were having on land administration and property markets in their
areas.
Interviews with donor officials from the World Bank and GIZ were also fruitful.
These interviews provided detailed information about how the project was
implemented from the donor perspective and about problems that had been
encountered, as well as opinions on why these issues had arisen. Donor employees
had a direct insight into the project because they worked with the government – often
in the land ministry – to implement the project.
Village officials and community representatives
I conducted interviews with community representatives that were very helpful in
developing a bottom-up view of how the project was implemented. Village chiefs,
local level officials who lived within a ‘village’ – the lowest administrative unit of
government, consisting usually of a few hundred households in central urban areas –
provided both details of and opinions about the project in relation to their local area.
Although they are affiliated with a political party, officials at the village level are
also members of their community. As a result they were very engaged with titling
because it affected them both as citizens and as local officials.
In addition to village chiefs, I also interviewed other community representatives in
unplanned settlements. In unplanned areas, villages could have larger populations
and were often organised around a number of NGO-supported savings groups. Often,
the leaders of these savings groups were women from the community who had
received leadership and community-mobilisation training from an NGO. These
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leaders were a good source of information as they had usually lived in the
community for a long time, were very willing to talk to outsiders and often had
detailed records of events of the community. They could say what kind of documents
people had and provided detailed histories of the community.
Civil society organisations
Cambodia has a long tradition of active civil society groups, many of which have
been important actors in the land sector. There are two main groups of NGOs
working with urban poor communities in Phnom Penh: human rights NGOs
providing legal and advocacy support and urban sector NGOs providing material
support for infrastructure upgrading and for savings groups, as well as other services.
Human rights NGOs work mainly in areas where things have gone wrong with the
implementation of the project. Important land rights groups in Cambodia have
included the now-defunct Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE),
Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), Equitable Cambodia (EC), Sahakum
Teang Tnaut (STT) and others. These groups provide legal assistance to
communities that have been excluded from adjudication under the LMAP and/or that
are facing eviction. Interviews with such civil society informants were important
because they allowed me to identify cases where the LMAP has not been
implemented correctly or where weaknesses in the LMAP meant that secure tenure
has not been achieved for marginalised groups. The interviews also helped me to
develop an understanding of the strategies used by human rights NGOs and the
communities with which they worked to access titles and increase tenure security.
By contrast, organisations that work with the urban poor on issues other than land
rights advocacy – for example, in promoting savings groups or providing technical
and material assistance for settlement upgrading – tended to engage with authorities
in a different way. The main difference was that, unlike the advocacy groups, these
organisations were not averse to working with local and municipal authorities.
Examples of such groups include the Community Development Fund (CDF),
Community Managed Development Partners (CMDP), Urban Poor Women for
Development (UPWD) and others. In interviews I explored how the LMAP had
intersected with the activities of these groups.
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Private sector
A different perspective on land titling in Phnom Penh was provided by private sector
stakeholders associated with the city’s land sector. Specifically, I was interested in
whether the LMAP had changed the investment behaviour of domestic and
international companies. I was able to meet representatives of a Hong Kong-based
real-estate company involved in land acquisitions and developments in Phnom Penh
to discuss what impacts titles were having on large-scale land investments in the city.
I also interviewed officials from two of Cambodia’s ‘big three’ banks, including the
head of mortgages of ACLEDA and ANZ Royal and a former CEO of ANZ Royal.
These meetings proved particularly fruitful in highlighting the importance of titling
in relation to access to credit for redevelopers, and how, in turn, increased
availability of credit had important implications for land-related investments in
Phnom Penh.
4.3.4 Data from other research projects
In the production of this thesis, I have drawn on focus group discussions, interviews
and surveys with residents in unplanned settlements I have completed as part of the
EC-funded Human Rights Based-Spatial Planning (HRBSP) project, implemented
by People in Need (PIN), Sahakum Teang Tnaut (STT) and Urban Poor Women for
Development (UPWD). This is currently the largest civil society project concerning
land rights and tenure security in Phnom Penh, targeting 5,000 households in
unplanned areas under threat of eviction. I have worked on HRBSP I and II since
2013, conducting focus group discussions and implementing surveys regards the
legal status of residents in the communes of Charang Chamres and (in the near
future) Boeung Tumpun. The on-going project aims to document and strengthen the
possession claims of target households, who were under threat of eviction from the
government. I have not used questionnaire data from this work, but have drawn on
key informant interviews and more general experiences and insights garnered from
my involvement with the project as a consultant.
I have also drawn on focus group responses from my work as a consultant on the
EC-funded DIPECHO IX: Building Disaster Resilient Communities II project,
implemented by a broad consortium of NGOs led by Action Aid. In this project, I
looked at the problem of flooding and other disasters affected urban poor
81
communities in the Chbar Ampov and Russei Keo districts of Phnom Penh and the
city of Kampong Cham. The study considered how tenure and related issues – such
as investment and access to credit – intersected with resilience to disasters, and so
provided some relevant information for this thesis. I have obtained the relevant
permissions to use data from these projects.
4.3.5 Making sense of multiple streams of data
The range of sources drawn on in this thesis presented logistical challenges because
of the volume of material that needed to be assessed. To meet this challenge, I
developed a strategy to follow clear lines of inquiry, drawing on multiple sources of
data to support my assertions. Often, the starting points for these lines of inquiry
came from my role as a participant in Phnom Penh’s land sector. I would often
become aware of key issues through off-the-record conversations I had with
associates, or leads from key informant interviews. In following up these lines of
inquiry, I took on the role of a ‘detective’, sorting through documents, databases,
exploring specific points in key informant interviews and linking data sources
together to paint a full picture of a particular issue.
There are numerous examples of this kind of approach being used in the production
of this thesis. In Chapter 5, for instance, I used multiple sources of data to explore
the issue of titles being used by corrupt officials in the transfer of public land to well-
connected tycoons. From my work as a development professional, I was aware of the
name of a prominent business tycoon with a reputation for land grabbing who was
particularly active in Cambodian politics during the 1990s. With this information, I
searched the national archives for records of conflicts where he was an actor, finding
one in a downtown area of Phnom Penh, which involved the transfer of state public
property by officials to his company, and the eviction of residents living in an
unplanned settlement. Searching through archived newspaper articles I was able to
ascertain the tycoon’s high-level political contacts and find examples of other
conflicts in which he was involved. In this way, I used multiple sources to provide an
in-depth analysis of a transfer of state land to a prominent tycoon and the
accompanying dispossession of a poor community, thus demonstrating the
mechanics of a ubiquitous process of urban transition in 1990s Phnom Penh.
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This ‘detective’ process of uncovering data enabled me to draw links between a
complex web of companies and individuals, which is in particular evidence in
Chapters 5, 6 and 9. Fact-checking data from multiple sources was an important
aspect of this process because of the opaque nature of distributing titles and
valuable areas of real-estate.
4.4 Household-level analysis of project implementation and outcomes
Household surveys are a useful tool to assess the outcomes of land policies (Varley,
1987; Payne et al., 2009; Van Gelder, 2010). Survey data enables comparisons to be
made between those who have received titles and those who have not and between
the experiences of respondents before and after titling. My household-level analysis
is based on questionnaire data from three contrasting survey populations. I
supplemented questionnaires with more in-depth interviews to gain a detailed
understanding of the outcomes of titling in the survey sites. In this section, I first
detail the criteria used to select survey sites, before providing an overview of the
sites. I then explain my data collection and analysis methods.
4.4.1 Rationale for survey site selection
The rationale underlying survey site section was to capture a range of titling-related
outcomes, highlighting the positive and negative aspects of the LMAP, and
identifying the project’s winners and losers. To achieve this, I selected three survey
sites, which covered a variety of outcomes associated with the distribution of LMAP
titles across Phnom Penh. I selected one survey site that was an unplanned settlement
that had been excluded from titling. The exclusion of unplanned settlements from the
titling process has been a defining problem of the LMAP; excluded communities are
considered the main losers of the project (Grimsditch and Henderson, 2009).
Therefore, exploring the experiences of this group has been a key aim of this thesis. I
also selected an unplanned settlement that had been included in the LMAP and
where residents had received titles. There has been no analysis of such areas so far in
the literature, but highlighting the experiences of these residents is crucial if the full
spectrum of LMAP-related impacts on residents of unplanned settlements in the city
is to be captured. Finally, I chose one site located in a planned area of the city.
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Planned residential areas account for the majority of title-related experiences in the
city, yet this population has been largely ignored in academic debates on titling in
Phnom Penh, and, indeed, internationally (Simone and Rao, 2012). To address this
information lacuna, I wanted to assess what effect titles had on residents in such
areas. As shall be discussed presently, I selected a planned site where a proportion of
residents had received titles, and a proportion of residents had not received title
because of bureaucratic constraints, but expected to in the near future. In this
context, I was able to assess the difference title made to recipient households.
The sequencing of the LMAP’s implementation also had an important bearing on
site selection. For obvious reasons, survey sites needed to be in an area that had
already been titled, which limited the pool of possible sites as much of Phnom Penh
remained untitled by the time of fieldwork. In addition, I wanted to select sites where
residents had received titles as early as possible, to maximise time during which
changes in the area or in their behaviour could have become apparent. Two of the
earliest areas to receive titles were the commune of Tuek Laark Muoy, where
systematic titling had begun in 2007 and households had received titles in 2008, and
the nearby Tuek Laark Bai, where titling begun in 2009, with households receiving
titles in 2010. The relatively long period between (some) respondents receiving titles
and fieldwork meant that there was a reasonable period of time for titles to have had
an impact. After speaking to the commune chiefs I found two appropriate sites in
these areas In Tuek Laark Bai there was a large unplanned settlement on a former
greenfield site where residents had received titles, while in Tuek Laark Muoy there
was an unplanned settlement adjacent to a railway line had been excluded from
titling. I selected these two unplanned sites as fieldwork locations and a further
planned area in Tuek Laark Muoy (Figure 4.1). Tuek Laark Muoy was selected
because it was a planned residential area typical of central Phnom Penh, where
residents had received titles towards the beginning of the project. It was also in the
same district of the city as the two unplanned sites and so in a preferable location
from a logistical point of view.
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Figure 4.1: Location of survey sites
Source: Open street map
4.4.2 Overview of the survey sites
Site 1 – An ‘ordinary’ settlement where titling had taken place
Location: District Tuol Kork, Commune Tuek Laark Muoy, Villages 1 and 2.
Site 1 is a planned residential area typical of many neighbourhoods in Phnom Penh.
The area included approximately 300 households and is in one of Phnom Penh’s four
urban districts, to the east of the historic centre. The commune was built between
1954 and 1975, as part of the expansion of the city sanctioned by King Sihanouk,
and houses the Royal University of Phnom Penh, one of the great Van Molyvann-
designed pieces of architecture in Phnom Penh. In 1975, like the rest of Phnom Penh,
residents in the area were evacuated to the countryside and the area remained empty
(like the rest of Phnom Penh) until the ousting of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979.
Most residents occupied their property for the first time in the 1980s or purchased
their plot in the 1990s as many large plots were subdivided (see Chapter 7).
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The population of Site 1 were engaged in a diverse range of livelihood activities,
from low-income clothes washers living on side streets to higher-income
shopkeepers living on the main streets. Many people were vendors in an open-air
market located on a main street in Village 1. In recent years many households had
supplemented their income by adding rooms to their property which they rented out
to migrant workers and students.
According to village chiefs, between 60 to 80 per cent of households received title in
2008. The reason why some households had not yet received titles was that cadastral
officials did not have the technical skills or regulatory instruments to create multiple
titles for a single land parcel (i.e. in apartment buildings, a title for households on the
first floor, a title for households on the second floor and so on). It was promised that
these cases would be addressed in a second round of titling. While these households
had not received titles, their land parcel (as oppose to their share of the building) had
been registered in the cadastre, so it was not regarded as state or public land.
The distribution of titles in Site 1 was unrelated to household socioeconomic
characteristics linked to tenure. This was an almost identical situation to the ‘natural
experiment’ survey sample in Buenos Aries (Di Tella et al., 2007), which consisted
of an unplanned settlement where a portion of residents had received titles and a
portion of residents had the delivery of their titles delayed due to bureaucratic
constraint, but expected to receive titles in the future. The authors note that such a
tenure situation provides a useful context in which to isolate the difference titles
make to a household’s socioeconomic activities.
Site 2 – an unplanned settlement where titling had taken place
Location: Khan Tuol Kork, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Village 1
Site 2 is an unplanned settlement consisting of 211 households located just south of
Tuek Laark Muoy. Like Tuek Laark Muoy, the area was originally built during the
rapid expansion of Phnom Penh during the 1960s. Site 2 is located on what was once
an open space and wetlands in an otherwise residential area. Settlers started to move
to the area in the early 1980s, and gradually began reclaiming land from the lake and
building makeshift dwellings from wood (see Chapter 7). During the 1980s and
1990s, the settlement was considered illegal by authorities as the land was claimed
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by the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts. An archived land dispute from 1992 shows
that a restaurant and nightclub built on a portion of the land was forced to shut
because the ministry claimed the plot was needed for the development of a cultural
centre, although this planned construction never occurred (see Chapter 6).
Today the area is furnished with narrow paved roads and is connected to municipal
electricity, water and sewerage infrastructure. The dwellings include a variety of
structures, ranging from self-built shacks made from wood or low-cost alternatives to
newly constructed structures made from concrete. Respondents reported a variety of
low-income livelihood activities; common jobs included public sector workers
(e.g. police officers, teachers), small business owners and informal sector workers
(e.g. food-stall owners, motor-taxi operators) and other service sector employees
(e.g. security guards, hotel staff).
Despite being considered an illegal settlement prior to 2009, the village was not
excluded from titling when the commune was declared an adjudication zone by the
authorities. Cadastral officials began registering residents’ individual property claims
in 2009 and households received titles confirming their legal ownership in 2010. As
in Site 1, some households did not receive titles because of technical and regulatory
constraints, such as those arising from multiple owners per plot. As a result, the
village chief estimated that 50 per cent of households had obtained titles and that the
rest would receive titles later in a second round of titling.
Site 3 – an unplanned settlement excluded from titling
Location: Khan Tuol Kork, Commune Tuek Laark Muoy, Village 15
Site 3 is an unplanned settlement of 257 households in the same commune as Site 1,
Tuek Laark Muoy. The settlement is located in a former marshland area near the
Royal University of Phnom Penh and close to the main railroad track out of Phnom
Penh. It was settled in the early 1990s. According to the village chief, most of the
population moved in between 1992 and 1995, either reclaiming vacant marshland or
purchasing sub-divided plots. The properties are self-built and of a worse quality
than Site 2, although residents had access to public electricity, water and sewerage
(see Chapter 7). Residents worked jobs to those in Site 2, but there were fewer public
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servants and business owners and more informal sector workers, such motorcycle-
taxi operators, hawkers and other informal traders.
None of the residents in Site 3 had titles as the village was excluded from titling
when the commune was declared an adjudication zone for systematic titling in 2008.
Cadastral officials did not visit households in the area to assess their property claims
and since then there has been no sign that officials intend to provide those in the area
with titles in the future.
4.4.3 Data collection
The majority of my time on fieldwork was spent conducting household surveys. In
total I conducted 204 questionnaires across the three survey sites at a rate of around
five a day. Overall, during the fieldwork period I collected data from 92 households
in Site 1, 64 in Site 2 and 48 in Site 3. I would have liked to have reached more than
60 households in Site 3, but there was a political issue which meant we were unable
to continue surveying in the area. Our fieldwork was conducted during the very tense
2013 election period and the opposition party-affiliated village chief who granted our
research was replaced by a governing party-affiliated chief, who no longer permitted
us to carry out household surveys in the area during the pre-election period.
My strategy for implementing the survey included the following steps.
First I developed the questionnaire to cover issues related to the outcomes and
implementation of titling, including access to credit, investment in housing and other
issues (see Appendix 2). I then consulted researchers at CDRI with experience in
implementing land policy-related surveys for their advice and feedback, and
amended the questionnaire accordingly. I decided to keep many questions open and
code them later, so as to better capture the potential diversity of perspectives that we
might encounter. I also conducted numerous role-playing exercises with my
research assistant, Vichet, to refine the survey.
I then met with the village chiefs of the respective survey sites and provided them
with a letter written in Khmer introducing me and the research project. I asked for
the basic demographic data for the area, details of common tenure documents,
information about land conflicts and the issues related to the settlement’s history. As
members of their communities, the village chiefs were knowledgeable in this regard
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and provided detailed histories of the area. I sought permission from each village
chief of my intention to conduct a questionnaire in the area.
After obtaining permission from the village chief, Vichet and I then began carrying
out the survey in the respective sites. We walked down streets, knocked on people’s
doors, introduced ourselves and asked if they were willing to be interviewed for the
survey. In areas that were titled (Site 1 and Site 2) we collected responses for
households that had received titles and for households that had not. If a person
indicated a willingness to be interviewed, we presented them with a letter in Khmer
explaining who we were and what we were doing and assuring them that their
participation would be anonymous. We made it clear that this was a PhD research
project the results of which would provide them with no direct benefit. Some
households would say they were too busy or did not want to be interviewed, while
others were happy to participate.
If someone agreed to be interviewed, Vichet would ask the questions in Khmer and
fill out the questionnaire, and I would make additional notes separately clarifying
where necessary. When there was an interesting answer we would deviate from the
questionnaire for a while and continue as a semi-structured interview before then
returning to the structured questions of the questionnaire. In this way, we were able
both to collect survey data and gather more open-ended interview data from
respondents. As well as survey responses, we collected interesting information on
the history of the settlements, the rumours of developments and evictions and
people’s personal concerns and experiences of titling. Each interview usually lasted
from 45 minutes to an hour. Some were shorter - if, for example, the respondent had
just moved to the area, had not invested anything in the property and had no reported
credit activity.
We selected times of day and week to conduct interviews to reach the widest
possible sample. For example, we did not interview any households between
10.30am and 1.30pm because women would be at the market and then preparing
lunch during these periods. Instead, we conducted fieldwork between 8.30am and
10.30am in the morning and between 2pm and 5.30pm in the evening when women
as well as men would also be able to participate. We also conducted research on the
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weekends to ensure we did not miss male and female respondents who were working
during the week.
After each interview day we would return to the CDRI office where Vichet and I
would go through the day’s responses, clarifying any outstanding issues and writing
up notes. This reflective process was very valuable in extracting accurate data from
each interview and improving the implementation of the questionnaire. For example,
when we first started carrying out the survey, we began by asking households about
their socioeconomic characteristics, such as number of people in the household,
profession, education etc. This strategy confused people, because we had told them
we wanted to know about titling and they could not understand why we wanted
detailed personal information. Their suspicions were heightened because of the
looming election. In many cases, this first section of interview was quite tense and
people asked us on many occasions why we wanted this kind of information. We
therefore changed the sequence of questions, to start with questions directly related
to titling. Respondents were much more comfortable talking about their experiences
in this regard and rapport was strengthened during this line of questioning. We
included the household characteristics questions at the end of the questionnaire as a
‘last few questions’, which greatly reduced suspicions, because respondents were by
then satisfied as to our intentions.
4.4.4 Data Analysis
After the survey was completed, I developed a coding system for open-ended
questions to enable data entry and proceeded to code all answers systematically.
Once all the questionnaires had been coded, I created a database in the SPSS
software programme and entered the data. During this process, I put in place
mechanisms to minimise human error in data input, such as conditions which
prevented conflicting responses being entered. Once all the data had been input and
‘cleaned’ I began analysis. I decided to use descriptive statistics so that the study
could be understood by the widest possible audience and focused my analysis on
how tenure security and the investment and credit-seeking behaviour of households
had been affected by titling.
90
4.5 Ethics and limitations of the research
While I believe that my research methods were appropriate for this study, it is
important to acknowledge their limitations and also consider the ethical implications
of some of the techniques used.
An important data source for this thesis has been archived documents. As noted
earlier in this chapter, such materials include land dispute cases from the UNTAC
archives, articles from the main English language newspapers in Cambodia and also
the WikiLeaks archives of US embassy cables. Relying on this archival material to
paint a picture of historical and present-day land disputes can be problematic because
of the political positions of those who have produced the material. In Chapter 5 in
particular, I have drawn heavily on archived UNTAC documents. Using UNTAC
civil administration case files in this way runs the risk of presenting Cambodian
history from the perspective of the UN, and thus potentially missing competing
points of view with regards to land-related issues. The propensity for some forms of
archival material to espouse certain political or ideological positions is well
documented in the literature (Ellis, 1992). In the case of UNTAC case files,
however, I hope that the coverage of land conflicts is balanced: the material included
the verbatim statements of all stakeholders involved in the conflicts, including
residents’ in unplanned settlements, and the tycoons and government officials whose
actions were the subject of residents’ complaints. These statements contained no
interpretation by UNTAC officials and I believe, therefore, they constitute an
accurate representation of the views of the various stakeholders involved in the land
conflicts cited.
In addition to the ‘traditional’ forms of archival sources used in this thesis, I have
also drawn on electronic archives, namely US embassy cables published by
WikiLeaks. These cables are characterised by the political leanings of their authors,
which are aligned with the strategic interests of the United States’ government.
Therefore, using the cables as a single source would be problematic because of the
one-sided representation of events one would convey. Given these constraints, I have
used US embassy cables as one of multiple sources of data to look at certain events,
relationships and policies. In the main, I have not used the interpretations of US
officials of events described in the cables, but have drawn on the factual content
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contained therein. For example, in Chapter 5, I have used data from the cables to
explore relationships between economic and political elites, rather than rely on their
interpretations of these relationships in relation to Cambodia’s governance
structures. This kind of data is important because although at a superficial level the
relationships between tycoons and officials are well known, the WikiLeaks
documents provide in-depth accounts of these links garnered through high-level
access afforded to top American diplomats. Where I have used the interpretations of
officials, they have been clearly cited and not presented as fact. In Chapter 5, for
example, I note that a World Bank official interpreted the close relationships
between tycoons and officials as a sign that Cambodia had become a ‘corporatist’
state.
An important ethical consideration regards using US embassy cables related to the
sensitive and often confidential nature of the material. This was particularly the case
regards the Cambodian sources cited by US diplomats. Analysing the cables, I was
surprised to see that the names of sources for some sensitive information had not
been redacted by WikiLeaks. In many cases where a source was cited, the author of
the cable had included the word ‘PROTECT’ in parentheses. Presumably, this was
intended as a security measure to ensure the US embassy’s sources were not
divulged to the public and thus compromised and potentially put in danger.
WikiLeaks had not taken the time to redact these names, some of whom were
prominent human rights activists working in Cambodia’s land sector. I was careful
not to include any information from WikiLeaks that would compromise sources in
this way.
During fieldwork my position as a western male affected my research strategy when
working in low-income areas. As Gill Valentine (2005) observes, the positionality
of the researcher is an important consideration when conducting fieldwork in
developing countries. My position as a relatively wealthy western male may have
affected some of my interactions with research participants. Respondents may have
provided responses that they thought I wanted to hear, or felt compelled to provide
me with information that they would rather not have, or omitted things that they may
have believed would reflect badly on them. I took numerous steps to mitigate issues
associated with my positionality. I tried to build rapport with participants by
speaking Khmer (the main language in Cambodia). I attended Khmer language
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lessons for over a year prior to fieldwork, and developed my vocabulary to
understand issues around land conflicts, land documents, credit activity and housing
investment, in addition to more typical conversational topics. If there were parts of
conversations I could not understand, I would ask my research assistant Vichet to
translate. My language skills enabled me to understand key issues during interviews
and, in doing so, meaningfully interact with participants to foster a friendly
atmosphere. Most participants seemed to find speaking to a foreigner in Khmer a
novel and enjoyable experience, and would ask my questions about my personal life
(e.g. whether I was married, if I had any siblings, why I came to Cambodia), which I
answered. I should also mention that I had worked in Phnom Penh at a Cambodian
organisation since 2009 and had developed an understanding of social and cultural
cues. For example, if I could see a certain line of questioning was making a
respondent uneasy I would cease.
I was clear with all respondents about the scope and aims of my research and my
affiliations with UCL and CDRI. Most respondents were unaware of either
organisation, although some officials were aware of CDRI because of other surveys
implemented by the organisation in their areas. As noted earlier, I was very careful to
make it clear that neither respondents nor their community would derive any direct
benefit from participating in the research: I did not represent an organisation that
would provide infrastructure upgrading or related activities. I did not y respondents
for participating in the survey, or key informants for interviews, and on only one
occasion was I asked for money. Doing so might have affected responses and could
also have impeded the activities of others researchers unable to pay participants.
Instead, on the advice of other researchers I gave participants a bar of soap on
completion of the questionnaire as a token gesture of my gratitude for their
participation. The exception for this was day-long focus groups and participatory
assessments implemented during consultancy work, where participants were paid
five dollars each per day to compensate for their time; this was the policy of the
NGO in question.
Given the sensitive nature of my research, it is possible that some data contained in
this thesis may not be completely accurate. In particular, the data about credit
activity may under represent true levels of borrowing as some respondents seemed
uncomfortable disclosing their financial situation. For example, I asked one older
93
respondent whether he had obtained a land title, to which he replied in the
affirmative, noting that it was currently with the bank. Later, when I asked him
whether he had taken any loan from the bank he became defensive and said that he
had not. Others would ask why I would think they needed to take a loan out in a
slightly defensive tone. Younger people were much more open about their credit
activity – an outlook that may be linked to an emerging culture of increased
borrowing from microfinance companies and banks (see Chapter 8).
The funding for this thesis came from a UCL Impact Award Studentship, which aims
to support policy-oriented research; co-funding was provided by CDRI, a
Cambodian policy research institute. These sources of funding had an effect on my
research by encouraging me to conduct a policy-focused analysis. From the UCL
side, the research was designed to meet two of the College’s ‘Grand Challenges’ by
identifying policies that contribute to sustainable cities and human wellbeing (two of
UCL’s five Grand Challenges). CDRI also supported the research on the basis that it
would yield practical policy suggestions that could appeal to a Cambodian audience,
including Cambodian researchers, civil society and policy makers. In addition to this
core funding, my fieldwork in Cambodia was supported with a Royal Geographical
Society Award. The Slawson Award is also designed to support research with high
policy impact, and so further contributed to the policy focus of this research.
The policy focus of this research potentially narrows the scope of inquiry to the
specific effects of titling in Phnom Penh. To mitigate this, I have tried to conduct a
broad policy analysis that relates the impacts of titling at the household and city-
wide scale in Phnom Penh to global processes of development policy generation. In
doing so, I hope to have provided policy analysis that is relevant to Cambodia, but
also speaks to larger debates about titling and international development
interventions.
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Chapter 5: The Exclusion of Unplanned Areas from Cambodia’s
First Round of Titling, 1989-2001
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyse the patterns of exclusion during Phnom Penh’s first round
of titling. This period began with laws promulgated as socialist rule ended in 1989
and finished with the donor-supported land reforms of 2001. I suggest that laws
relating to property registration excluded residents in low-income, unplanned
settlements from receiving titles. Instead, titles to the land on which unplanned
settlements were built were often transferred to powerful officials and tycoons
through patronage networks to solidify political and business relationships among
elites. In addition, the state controlled access to titles in order to transfer prime real
estate from urban populations and practices that it deemed illegitimate (low-income
groups living in unplanned areas) to those it considered legitimate (tycoons investing
in redevelopment projects).
‘Unplanned settlements’ refer to areas of self-built housing constructed as Phnom
Penh re-urbanised following the fall of the Khmer Rouge and the end of their policy
of de-urbanisation. Those who could not find housing built dwellings in areas the
state considered ‘unplanned’ including the city’s open spaces, rooftops or large
buildings that had been left to decay during the Khmer Rouge era (Khemro and
Payne, 2004; Urban Sector Group, 1994). As noted in Chapter 3, by 2000 this
population was estimated at 175,000 residents in a city of around 1 million
(Sovannarith et al., 2001).
The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by exploring the context in which the
exclusion of unplanned settlements from titling occurred. I argue that patronage
governance, rapid privatisation and a negative perception of the urban poor among
elites left the assets of the poor vulnerable to appropriation. I then assess how these
underlying causes of exclusion were represented in inequitable legal frameworks and
the inequitable distribution of land ownership documents. I draw on data from a
CDRI baseline tenure survey of pre-LMAP tenure documents to explore patterns of
exclusion from titling in the commune of Tonle Bassac commune – an area
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associated with unplanned settlements, redevelopment and land conflicts. I then shift
scale to present case studies of specific land conflicts involving unplanned
settlements. I draw on archived reports of land conflicts investigated by the UN
Transition Authority in Cambodia’s (UNTAC) Civil Administration in the period
1991-1993. I discuss two land conflicts involving residents of unplanned settlements
and powerful individuals to reveal in detail how exclusionary laws, patronage
governance and negative perceptions of poor communities resulted in the exclusion
of residents in unplanned areas acquiring ownership documents and the transfer of
their land to elites.
Through this analysis, I hope to contribute to the literature on post-socialist transition
in Phnom Penh. It is widely acknowledged that transition from socialism to
capitalism in Cambodia in the late 1980s and early 1990s was inequitable and
dominated by powerful vested interests (Heder, 2005; Hughes, 2003). In this
process, Simon Springer (2013) notes the key importance of the promulgation of
inequitable laws by government to dispossess the poor of their assets. This chapter
builds on Springer’s assertion providing a detailed study of the mechanics of
exclusion and dispossession in relation to laws relating to urban land ownership in
the 1989-2001 period, drawing on an in-depth analysis of historical legal documents
and archived land disputes.
5.2 Patronage, privatisation and poverty in Cambodia’s land sector
In Chapter 3, I discussed the patronage mechanisms of governance that emerged in
Cambodia following the fall of the Khmer Rouge. In this section, I provide a detailed
analysis of how patronage governance synergised with privatisation reforms that
occurred in 1989. In particular, I explore the symbiotic relationship between tycoons
and government officials as two elite groups that dominated political and economic
life in the country, and detail how this relationship came to define Phnom Penh’s
land sector.
5.2.1 Public and private sector elite patronage
Land privatisation in Phnom Penh was implemented in a context of patronage
governance. The leaders enacting mark-orientated reforms in 1989 were the same
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small group that had presided over the decade of Vietnamese-sponsored socialism of
the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), from 1979 to 1989. Patronage
governance, as I have noted in Chapter 3, defined the PRK government from its
inception. Key leaders had long personal relationships most had belonged to the
same Khmer Rouge unit and defected to Vietnam prior to the 1979 invasion and
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge. Once in power, they quickly exerted political
control by installing former associates into key political positions. Party discipline
was wielded, and loyalty bought, by harnessing patronage networks based on the
distribution of food aid, control of forestry, mineral rich areas and other commodities
and resources (Gottesman, 2004). Mutually beneficial political relationships centred
on the distribution of state resources in return for political support and were
underpinned by strong personal, often familial, bonds (ibid). Powerful politicians
vied to consolidate strong networks in strategically important bureaucracies, such as
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, to boost their personal power.
Chea Sim and Hun Sen, former Khmer Rouge comrades, emerged as the most adept
at building such networks and by 1989 had become the PRK’s most powerful
leaders. They were able to wield considerable influence over the state’s most
powerful bodies (Frings, 1994).
Market-orientated reforms represented a significant change in Cambodia’s economy,
but the PRK’s legacy meant that patronage remained a defining trait of the political
system. In 1989 Cambodia saw the departure of the Vietnamese troops and advisers
that had upheld a socialist republic for a decade, the liberalisation of the economy
after 15 of years of socialism, and even a change in name from the People’s Republic
of Kampuchea (PRK) to the State of Cambodia (SOC). Moulding this process,
however, were the same leaders that had governed through the 1980s.
The dual forces of patronage and privatisation enabled key figures to distribute
newly created assets to cement their power. A key reform involved the
commodification of urban land, which was implemented through the promulgation
of a government decree in April 1989. The act of land privatisation was not
implemented solely as an economic reform to stimulate land markets, but enacted in
such a way as to consolidate the power of the ruling elite (Frings, 1994; Gottesman,
2004).
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The Cambodian government sought to leverage land privatisation to tighten their
grip on power through consolidating patronage governance in two key respects.
First, the 1989 decree meant that land was transformed into a commodity that had
been ‘given’ to the people by a new government seeking to cement its legitimacy
(Ledgerwood, 2008). The act of ‘giving’ sought to confer the leaders’ right to
govern through mobilising traditional conceptions of patronage and power. For Judy
Ledgerwood (2008: 217), by redistributing land the Cambodian People’s Party were:
seeking to enact, however uncomfortably, a series of actions and a ritual
activity that would appeal to a Khmer public that was still (to varying
degrees) steeped in a tradition of celebrating hierarchical arrangements of
leadership, tied to the public demonstration of political, economic and
social efficacy. They were demonstrating that there was an established
political order, as per Khmer tradition, even if they were not royalty.
Second, the ownership rights to prime urban land were allocated in a way to
strengthen patronage networks among the political elite. This practice was
essentially a continuation of the patronage politics of the PRK period, when political
alliances were forged through the distribution of state resources with high revenue-
generating potential – such as forested areas – to important officials (Global Witness,
2007; Gottesman, 2004). When land was privatised, urban real-estate became one of
the most important and valuable resources that could be distributed by the state to
consolidate patronage networks (Ledgerwood, 2008).
Soon after Phnom Penh’s land was commodified international capital began entering
the city, inflating land prices and providing greater incentives for elites to
accumulate urban real estate. In particular, the incentive for officials and tycoons to
enhance their property portfolios increased greatly when staff from the UN
Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) came to Phnom Penh in 1991. At the
time UNTAC was the largest UN operation in its history. Thousands of international
staff descended on the city looking for property to rent and, as a result, the price of
Phnom Penh real estate increased dramatically. A 1993 UNTAC report (cited in
Khemro, 2001: 58) found that property prices in the capital increased fivefold
between 1989 and 1993 because of intense speculation resulting from rising rental
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fees. In this climate, well-connected officials were able to mobilise their patronage
networks to seize valuable pieces of land with impunity:
a massive land grab began, especially in Phnom Penh. Some officials
began to act as though state property and vacant private property (or
property that could be rendered vacant by the use of force) was theirs to
occupy, ‘own’, and therefore sell. (Engvall and Kokko, 2007: 7)
The capture of urban real-estate by elites was only one part of patronage governance
associated with land administration. The other part was the transfer of these
resources to business tycoons, who were able to extract more value from urban
properties through realising their redevelopment potential. Key to facilitating the
transfer of land in this way were the strong personal and professional relationships
between prominent businessmen and top government officials. In leaked US
embassy cables, a former Cambodia Country Director for the World Bank asserted
that links between government and tycoons were so close that Cambodia had
transitioned from a socialist to a ‘corporatist state’.1 She highlighted the shady
practice of channelling public contracts through trust networks to prominent
businessmen. The patronage networks between the economic and political elite
mirrored those of top government officials that had defined Cambodia’s political
system during the socialist period. Many tycoons had close personal relationships to
politicians, or held political roles themselves. Figure 5.1, adapted from US Embassy
cables, details the close relationships between the country’s top tycoons and high-
ranking government officials.
1 US Embassy Cables, 09PHNOMPENH515, 27/07/09
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Figure 5.1: Relationships between tycoons and officials
Tycoon Description and relationship with government
L.Y.P  Amassed a large fortune from importing and exporting
cigarettes, generating electricity, and running casinos and
resorts;
 CPP Senator and advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen;
 on the board of the Cambodian Red Cross, headed by Hun
Sen's wife;
 Sihanoukville Governor Say Hak is his cousin.
M.R  Founded Mong Reththy Group Co., Ltd, which initially
exported rubber to Singapore, Malaysia, China, and other Asian
countries;
 went to school with Prime Minister;
 a board member of the Cambodian Red Cross and serves as a
CPP senator as well as advisor to Humn Sen.
L.C.H  Managing Director of Attwood Import Export Co.
 business associate of Tep Bopha Prasidh, Minister of
Commerce Cham Prasidh's wife;
 business associate of Ngyn Sun Sopheap, the wife of the
Director of the National Department of Customs and Excise;
 a board member of the Cambodian Red Cross.
Y.P and
L.Y.P
 One of the most politically and economically connected
couples in the country;
 has access to at least 315,028 hectares of land for agribusiness;
 very close to Hun Sen and wife;
 son married to Lim Chhiv Ho’s (see above) daughter.
Source: US Embassy cable2
2 US Embassy Cables, 09PHNOMPENH515, 27/07/09
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As shall be demonstrated in later sections of this chapter, elite patronage networks
both facilitated large-scale land transfers and were strengthened through them:
permitting tycoons to access urban land through informal networks benefitted
corrupt officials by providing a revenue stream and benefitted companies and
individuals able to obtain legal ownership of plots with redevelopment potential at
below-market rates.
5.2.2 The urban poor as an illegitimate social group
In a context of patronage and privatisation, the urban poor were a group whose assets
were particularly vulnerable to elite capture. While the government ‘gave’ property
to elites and to citizens whose political support it required, residents of unplanned
settlements were viewed by the political class as an illegitimate group that should not
be permitted to live in urban areas, never mind own prime urban real estate. The
government’s 2002 National Strategic Development Plan, a flagship government
policy document published every five years, demonstrates a widespread negative
perception of the urban poor:
both the authorities and the better-off city dwellers tend to blame the
poor for their wretched conditions and stigmatise the poor as socially
undesirable, criminally inclined, even mentally defective. The usual
response from middle-class people and from officials is that the urban
poor should be sent back to the rural areas where they belong. (Royal
Government of Cambodia, 2002: 85-86)
At the heart of the negative perception was a long-held dichotomous conception of
the functions of rural and urban areas and their respective populations (see
discussion in Chapter 3). On the one hand, rural areas comprised the vast majority of
ordinary Cambodians – their labour driving rice and rubber production. On the other,
urban citizens – particularly in the capital – comprised the country’s political and
economic elite. The urban poor disrupted this dichotomous conception of
Cambodian citizenship as comprised of rural/masses urban/elite – hence the belief
that poor rural migrants to cities should be ‘sent back to rural areas where they
belong.’
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The unplanned settlements where low-income urban residents would often
reside were aesthetically incongruous with the vision of capitalist urbanity that
politicians were keen to promote. Following market reforms, elites wanted to
project Phnom Penh as a global city which reconnected Cambodia into the
global economy following years of isolation (Khemro, 2001; Shatkin, 1998).
Modern urban development became a matter of national pride; unplanned areas
were associated with poverty and disorder and became a source of
embarrassment and shame for the government. Consequently, in the 1990s the
Phnom Penh municipality embarked on a series of beautification projects
(Urban Resource Centre, 2002). Officials promoted urban development along
the lines of those characterising neighbouring metropolises such as Bangkok
and Ho Chi Minh – the Prime Minister even bestowed a national award on the
developer of the tallest sky scrapper (Phnom Penh Post, 5 January 2006).
Because unplanned settlements did not fit with the image of a modern ‘global’
Cambodia that the ruling party sought to promote, many were demolished by
the authorities in the name of development. In the two-year period from 1994
to 1995, for example, approximately 1,700 households were evicted in the
course of ‘beautification’ projects across Phnom Penh (Sahakum Teang Tnaut,
2011).
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall explore how these underlying drivers of
exclusion found expression in Cambodian land laws and property transfers.
5.3 Tools of exclusion: inequitable legal frameworks
The underlying drivers of exclusion were represented in the promulgation and
implementation of land laws by the Cambodian government. In this section, I
explore the legal frameworks developed by the government to exclude residents in
unplanned areas acquiring ownership titles. I then provide an example of exclusion
in the distribution of ownership documents in the commune of Tonle Bassac – a
centrally located area that has historically been associated with unplanned
settlements and government-sanctioned urban development.
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5.3.1 Exclusion and the 1989 decree and 1992 Land Law
On 22 April 1989 the government of Cambodia issued a decree that in principle
paved the way for all Phnom Penh households to obtain ownership titles for their
property. The decree stated that the government would ‘provide ownership to each
Cambodian family occupying any house in any commune or district of the country’.3
In theory the 1989 decree permitting land ownership in Phnom Penh applied to all
families occupying a home. In practice, however, the government established
procedures for registering ownership rights that provided a legal framework for the
exclusion of those living in unplanned areas. Circular 05, promulgated in June 1989,
was a key procedural document in the exclusion of those living in unplanned areas
from receiving ownership documents. It established the process by which households
could apply for land titles, making a distinction between those occupying housing in
planned and in unplanned areas. Owners of planned housing – planned
accommodation on planned streets – were automatically eligible for title and could
begin the application process at their local commune office immediately.4 By
contrast, people living in unplanned areas were not automatically eligible. Instead,
municipal authorities would decide whether those living in such areas would receive
titles on a case-by-case basis.5
While Circular 05 did not deem ownership claims of residents in unplanned areas
illegitimate by default, it introduced ambiguity as to their legality. Those living in
unplanned areas were unable to obtain documents recognising their ownership at
their local commune office and so existed in a state of legal limbo until their
eligibility for title was decided by municipal authorities. Later, the 1992 Land Law
formalised the ambiguous tenure of those with ‘unclear ownership status’.6 It was
decreed that such households could have temporary possession rights conferred with
a certificate of ‘temporary occupation’ granted by the commune.7 In doing so, the
state formalised a class of ‘temporary’ residents who had no rights to occupy their
dwelling permanently and who could be – and often were – evicted.
3 Article 2, Sub-decree No. 25 ANK, State of Cambodia, 22 April 1989
4 Article 4, Circular 05, State of Cambodia, 3 June 1989
5 Prakas No. 2746, State of Cambodia, 2 August 1989
6 Article 67, 1992 Land Law, State of Cambodia, 13 October 1992
7 Article 67, 1992 Land Law, State of Cambodia, 13 October 1992
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The categories of owner/planned and possessor/unplanned were associated with a
variety of legal documents (Figure 5.2). In planned areas, the process of applying for
title typically generated a number of official papers, which could be used as proof of
ownership in lieu of a title. First, when an application for title was submitted at the
commune office, applicants would receive a commune receipt to show that the
authority recognised the applicant’s ownership claim.8 If the claim was supported,
the application would be sent to a sub-committee formed of commune
representatives and cadastral officials who would arrange for a visit to survey the
applicant’s plot; 10-15 days before the visit a notice would be posted in a public area
and neighbours informed of the applicant’s intention to obtain a title (Sovannarith et
al., 2001). The survey team would then visit the plot and demarcate boundaries, and
if there were no ownership or boundary disputes, a standard form would be
completed and sent to district authorities; the applicant would receive a survey paper
receipt with a stamp from the district (this document is commonly called Slab Moan,
which translates as chicken wing, in reference to the printed feather emblazoned on
the document). If the claim was deemed valid, the district chief could then approve
issuance of a land title, and communicate this to the central cadastral authority,
which would enter the ownership details into the national cadastre, and a land title
would be printed and issued to the applicant (ibid.).
8 Prakas No. 2746, State of Cambodia, 2 August 1989
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Figure 5.2: Routes to obtaining pre-LMAP tenure documents
Sources: Sovannarith et al., 2001; 1992 Land Law; Circular 05 1989
Given the complex (and costly) application process, there were relatively few titles
distributed in Phnom Penh. Between 1989-2001, 5,649 titles were distributed in a
city which in 1999 included just under 170,000 residential land holdings
(Sovannarith et al., 2001: 20, 39). Many in planned areas considered the survey
paper receipt (Slab Moan) an adequate ownership document because it listed the
Applicant applies to register land at
commune office.
Commune affirms household’s right
to apply for ownership documents
and issues an APPLICATION RECIPT.
If household transfers a property
they can apply for a TRANSFER
RECEIPT, which is signed by local
authorities. Otherwise, a receipt is
signed by the two parties and not
local authorities.
Sub-committee consisting of officials
from the commune and district
cadastral office demarcate
boundaries of plot and if no dispute
provide a SURVEY PAPER.
Sub-committee submits decision to
district cadastral to be confirmed; it
is then verified by provincial
cadastral office. Finally, the record is
entered into the national cadastral
database and LAND TITLE is issued.
Commune categorises plot as
temporary and issues a CERTIFICATE
OF TEMPORARY POSESSION or NO
DOCUMENT.
Applicant applies to register land at
commune office.
Ownership Documents Possession Documents
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coordinates of the parcel and was signed and approved by district authorities (Figure
5.3). In some cases the survey paper receipt was preferred to a land title because it
meant the property could be transferred informally without incurring a transaction
tax. It was understood that the survey paper receipt could easily be converted to full
title for a fee if necessary and therefore was considered de facto title.9
Often, those in unplanned areas were unable to mount even the first rung of the
ladder to acquiring a title: they were prevented from obtaining an application receipt
from the commune. Officials would refuse to provide an application receipt because
it would signal that the commune recognised that the household had a legitimate
claim to ownership.10 Instead, applicants were provided with documents that
confirmed their possession of the plot (Figure 5.2). ‘Possession’ documents found
in the course of my PhD fieldwork in unplanned areas often included commune- or
village-endorsed certificates of possession, making no reference to ownership, and
were often hand-written roughly (Figure 5.3). Frequently, households used records
of land transactions signed by the village or commune, contracts between buyer and
seller not ratified by any local authority, and other documents recording a transfer of
land ‘ownership’, such as inheritance or gift as proof of their tenure rights. In other
cases, households with no tenure documents would rely on other official papers, such
as resident permits, to prove their occupation.
The legal framework defined in the 1992 Land Law and previous decrees on
ownership, therefore, created two systems of tenure. First, in planned areas
authorities recognised households’ ownership rights and provided them with official
ownership documents (though not necessarily full title). Second, in unplanned areas,
residents were denied ownership documents and only granted papers acknowledging
their temporary possession.
9 Interview with Research fellow (Social Development unit), Cambodia Development Resource
Instituted (CDRI), Phnom Penh, 20 February 2014
10 Interview with Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, District Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, 6
February 2013
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Figure 5.3: Pre-LMAP tenure documents
Note: Above: ownership document, survey paper receipt stamped by district authorities
(Slab Moan). Below: possession document, handwritten letter that states that the named and
finger-printed persons have occupied their property since 1999.
Source: PhD fieldwork
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5.3.2 The distribution of tenure documents in Tonle Bassac
The commune of Tonle Bassac in central Phnom Penh provides a good example of
how residents in unplanned areas were excluded from acquiring ownership
documents, and the reasons underlying these exclusions.
The centrally located commune housed large unplanned settlements in the 1980s and
1990s, and was associated with rampant urban poverty. The presence of such
settlements did not sit well with government officials: only a few decades earlier the
same area had presented the pinnacle of Cambodian urbanism. During the rule of
King Sihanouk in the 1960s and early 1970s the area was synonymous with Khmer
modernist architecture and associated with national pride at a time when the nation
had just gained independence from France (Nam, 2011; Simone, 2008). Many
structures were designed by Van Molyvann in preparation for the GANEFO games –
an alternative to the Olympic games for non-aligned nations. Planners intended the
area to project to the globe the birth of a new nation with a rich history by marrying
modernist architectural forms with nationalist symbolism. The commune housed
several notable examples of Khmer modernist architecture, including the Bassac
theatre, the Chaktomok theatre, the Hotel Cambodiana, the White Building (or
Bouding) the Grey Building, the National Assembly and other government buildings.
One unforeseen outcome was that the open space incorporated in modernist designs
(combined with the commune’s central position) rendered the area a desirable
location for poor migrants, who began to occupy the commune’s derelict modernist
structures and open spaces in the late 1980s and 1990s (Catalla, 2000; Khemro,
2001). In the eyes of the planners, this population did not ‘belong’ in Tonle Bassac
and hindered the city’s development: the people ‘belonged’ in rural areas not in
central Phnom Penh, where they constituted a stark and very visible reminder of a
poverty-stricken reality that leaders wanted to leave behind. Beng Hong Socheat
Khemro (2001: 37), a high-level official at the Land Ministry and the son of a former
governor of Phnom Penh, noted that authorities considered Tonle Bassac’s
unplanned settlements ‘a disgrace to the city’s image and the nation as a whole’.
This negative perception of residents in unplanned settlements in Tonle Bassac as
illegitimate urban citizens meant that they were excluded from obtaining titles or
ownership documents associated with them. The data in Table 5.1, drawn from a
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Cambodia Development Resource Institute survey of pre-LMAP tenure documents,
illustrates how residents of unplanned settlements in the commune relied on
‘possession’ rather than ‘ownership’ documents to secure their tenure. The data
shows the tenure documents of respondents in two villages (an administrative unit
below commune) in Tonle Bassac. Village 16 consisted mainly of self-built
dwellings located in a large unplanned settlement; the village also included a small
number of planned dwellings along a main road. Village 9 consisted solely of
planned housing structures set in an established residential neighbourhood.
Table 5.1: Tenure documents in planned and unplanned areas
Tenure Document
Village 16
(unplanned)
Village 9
(planned)
Pre 2001 land title 1.5% 7.2%
Survey paper (Slab Moan) -- 82.6%
Application receipt 19.1% 4.3%
Letter of ownership transfer
(commune level) 29.4% 5.8%
Letter of ownership transfer
(village level) 29.4% --
Letter of ownership transfer (not
signed by authorities) 5.9% --
No document 14.7% --
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N 68 69
Note: Ownership documents are highlighted in grey
Source: CDRI survey of pre-LMAP tenure
In Village 16, the majority of households had some form of ownership document.
Around 83 per cent had survey papers (Slab Moan) and 7 per cent had land title.
From a legal perspective, 90 per cent of households had very secure property rights,
with at least the coordinates and boundaries of their plots recorded in a document
issued by district authorities (Slab Moan). By contrast, the majority of households in
Village 9 had documents recognising only temporary occupancy. Nearly 60 per cent
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of households had transfer documents stamped by local authorities – an even split
between village- and commune-signed receipts. A significant minority – 15 per cent
of all households surveyed – had no tenure documents of any sort. A portion of
planned housing located in Village 16 probably accounted for the nineteen percent of
households that had obtained commune-issued receipts for title and the single
household had been able to acquire a land title.
When I visited Village 16 in 2013, I was told that residents had been systematically
barred from obtaining land ownership documents over many years. 11 On many
occasions, the village chief had enquired at the commune office about community
members obtaining application receipts for title, but their applications were
consistently refused. Residents were told by officials that they did not legally own
the land and that the parcel belonged variously to the state or to a private company.
According to residents the site was originally a greenfield site administered by
Ministry of Defence.12 In the 1980s military families were permitted by the ministry
to build dwellings on the land. During the 1990s these families subdivided their
property and sold it to new migrants.13 The land title for the entire parcel of the area
was thought to have been sold to a tycoon in the early 1990s, though details of the
transaction were not made public and identity of the purchaser was unclear.14
5.4 Transferring real-estate via patronage networks
In the previous section I demonstrated how those in unplanned areas were excluded
from legal ownership. In this section, I explore the processes through which their
land rights were distributed to political and economic elites. I focus on two land
conflicts to demonstrate how the process of transferring land among elites worked in
practice. The first case involves a conflict between a high-ranking official and
residents in an unplanned settlement, and the second, a conflict between residents
and a tycoon. In this section, I draw on archival materials from the UNTAC period.
11 Interview with Village Chief, Village 16, Commune Tonle Bassac, 8 February 2013
12 Letter from Director of Phnom Penh LMAP Project Management office to Chair of the
Administrative Committee for Phnom Penh, 7 October 2009
13 Interview with Village Chief, Village 16, Commune Tonle Bassac, 8 February 2013
14 Interview with Village Chief, Village 16, Commune Tonle Bassac, 8 February 2013
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5.4.1 A land grab by General Chao Phirun
The impunity with which officials appropriated valuable real estate was
demonstrated in a 1991 land conflict involving an official from the Ministry of
Defence and a community living in an unplanned settlement in central Phnom Penh.
The plot in question was a greenfield site administered by the Ministry of Defence
where a low-income community of demobilised soldiers and their families had self-
built dwellings. Residents claimed to have lived on the land since 1984, having
received permission from their unit commander to build shelters on land close to
where their unit was based. They had lived in the area without incident until
receiving threats of eviction from a powerful official, Lieutenant General Chao
Phirun, in 1991. Chao Phirun was Director General of the Department of Materials
and Techniques – a powerful entity because it controlled the military’s armaments.
In the face of threats, and believing Chao Phirun’s claim to be illegal, residents
lodged a complaint at the UNTAC provincial headquarters in Phnom Penh. The
complaint appealed for assistance from the UN in the protection of residents’
property.15 During the investigation, Chao Phirun asserted that the plot in question
was needed by the Ministry of Defence in the public interest, although no specific
purpose was identified. He had sent a letter to the 23 families living on the plot in the
name of the Department for Materials and Techniques, informing residents that their
land was required by the military and ordering them to leave within 15 days. Each
household would receive the equivalent of 450 USD in gold in compensation if they
complied.
Residents alleged, however, that Chao Phirun was motivated by personal gain rather
than the public good. They claimed he had a reputation for selling state assets to
enrich himself and that their eviction was the latest in a long list of cases:
The Director General of Materials and Techniques sold large areas of
land, armament warehouses, car warehouses, materials warehouses that
belonged to the military. He did so to serve the interests of a number of
people, above all himself. We are aware that the Director General of
Materials and Techniques took our land as his own property and he is
15 Letter sent from General Chao Phirun to residents, 6 January 1991
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negotiating its sale with a businessman for the price of 1,200 damlang of
gold [approx. 540,000 USD] 16
Residents noted that the general had threatened a violent eviction if residents did not
accept the offer of compensation and vacate the area.
Despite believing the action illegal, UNTAC was unable to protect the community
from the threats of violence by such a powerful figure. Consequently, all but one of
the threatened households left the land and squatted nearby.17 It is not clear from
archived documents what happened to the plot in question, but it is reasonable to
assume that it was sold to a businessman, as the community suspected it would be,
who then legally registered the land and received a title. Certainly by 2013 when I
visited the site, which is located on Street 19 close to the Royal Palace, there were no
signs that an unplanned settlement existed there.
The Chao Phirun case is emblematic of the patronage systems that defined land
allocation in Cambodia. Determining ownership of the land involved many entities:
the state, a powerful official, the UN, residents and, potentially, an unnamed
businessman. The outcome of the dispute suggests power was concentrated in the
elite, and resources were allocated through patronage networks: residents in an
unplanned area supported by the UN civil administration were evicted, while a
powerful official acquired the land by making a spurious claim to be acting in the
public interest.
That the government allowed this appropriation to occur suggests that the support
and loyalty of the powerful official was more important than that of the poor
residents. Indeed, the Realpolitik of eliciting loyalty from strategically important
military figures, including General Chao Phirun, was demonstrated five years later in
1997, as Prime Minister Hun Sen faced the biggest challenge to his rule. A political
dispute turned into a military confrontation between troops loyal to Hun Sen and
units loyal to the elected co-Prime Minister and FUNCINPEC party leader, Prince
Norodom Ranaridhh Despite opposition from within his own party, Hun Sen was
able to call on personal patronage networks in the military to crush the threat to his
16 Petition against eviction carried out by General Chao Phirun submitted to UNTAC Civil
Administration Phnom Penh HQ ,6 June 1991
17 Petition against eviction carried out by General Chao Phirun submitted to UNTAC Civil
Administration Phnom Penh HQ ,6 June 1991
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rule (Heder, 2005; Peou, 1998). Lieutenant General Chao Phirun threw his support
behind Hun Sen during the conflict. He was accused of using his position in charge
of Cambodia’s arms deposits to funnel military equipment to troops loyal to Hun Sen
(Phnom Penh Post, 28 June 1997). Hun Sen’s military units carried out hundreds of
extra-judicial killings against opposition party members, forcing the opposition
leader Prince Norodom Ranaridhh to flee the country. Dissenting factions in Hun
Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party were also silenced, as Hun Sen established himself
as the undisputed ‘strongman’ of Cambodia’s political system (McCargo, 2005).
5.4.2 Theng Bunma and the Thai Boon Rong Company
A 1993 land dispute provides an example of how well-connected private sector
interests acquired property occupied by communities living in unplanned
settlements. The case involved a business owned by the tycoon Theng Bunma, the
Thai Boon Rong Company, which had acquired a reputation in the early 1990s for
conducting dubious land deals. The company’s dealings had drawn the attention of
UNTAC officials, who thought it responsible for ‘major land purchases throughout
Phnom Penh’.18 In a number of instances, residents in unplanned areas evicted as a
result of these purchases complained to the UNTAC Phnom Penh provincial
headquarters, appealing to their mandate to protect property from appropriation.19
The process through which the Thai Boon Rong Company acquired urban real estate
reveals much about the informal process through which ownership rights were
transferred among elites. In February 1993 UNTAC provincial headquarters in
Phnom Penh received a complaint regarding an unauthorised eviction (i.e. one not
carried out by the state) involving the Thai Boon Rong Company. According to
investigators, a land dispute had begun two years earlier, when the company bought
a 26,000 m2 piece of land from Cambodia’s Supreme Court in central Phnom Penh
for 500,000 USD.20 The Supreme Court had been allocated land by the central
government in 1988 in order to build a new court building. However, the planned
construction did not go ahead. Instead, lower-level employees from the court were
18 Letter from Eduardo Vetere, Director, UNTAC Phnom Penh Provincial HQ to Gerald Porcell,
Director, UNTAC Civil Administration, 1 February 1993
19 Letter from Eduardo Vetere, Director, UNTAC Phnom Penh Provincial HQ to Gerald Porcell,
Director, UNTAC Civil Administration, 1 February 1993
20 Prak Sok, Deputy Director of the People’s Supreme Court, statement given to UNTAC Civil
administration, 16 February 1993
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permitted to build dwellings there. A resident of the area at the time, Mr Kim Sophat,
testified to UNTAC civil authority investigators:
I was transferred in 1988 to the Supreme Court … I had no place to
stay in Phnom Penh and I knew that the Supreme Court had land
located on the opposite side of the Chinese embassy. So I obtained
verbal permission from the then Chief of the Supreme Court, Mr.
Khang Saren, to stay in that land and so I went there on 6 August
1988.21
Residents lived in the area without incident until the Supreme Court began
negotiations to sell the land to the Thai Boon Rong Company.
Negotiations were conducted through informal networks involving powerful
officials. The key broker between the government and the company was the Deputy
Chief of Cabinet of the Supreme Court, Mr Samreth Chhorn. The deal was brokered
behind closed doors and there was no public announcement of the court’s intention
to sell the land, which might have enabled rival bids or allowed the sale to be
publically scrutinised or challenged.22
The informal negotiations between the company and the court resulted in a legal
process, which lent legitimacy to the transfer. The Supreme Court made a request to
the Council of Ministers for legal authority to sell the plot to the company, and on 11
November 1991 the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers approved the
Supreme Court’s request and issued a decision permitting the court to sell the plot.23
A few days later Khang Sarin, president of the Supreme Court, issued decision No.
1082/91, giving the court the legal mandate to (i) sell the 26,000 m2 plot to the Thai
Boon Rong company and (ii) remove all existing structures on the plot within 30
days of the announcement. 24
21 Kim Sophat, Supreme Court official and resident affected by sale of land near Chinese embassy to
Thai Boon Rong Company, statement given to UNTAC civil administration, 1993 (exact date not
recorded)
22 Letter from Eduardo Vetere, Director, UNTAC Phnom Penh Provincial HQ to Gerald Porcell,
Director, UNTAC Civil Administraion, 1 February 1993
23 Decision No. 1082/91, Supreme Court and General Attorney attached to the Supreme Court, 15
November 1991
24 Decision No. 1082/91, Supreme Court and General Attorney attached to the Supreme Court, 15
November 1991
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Residents living in the unplanned settlement only became aware of the process when
the decision was issued by the court. The households living on the site refused to
comply with a number of eviction notices and, eventually, in January 1993, the
company decided to evict residents by force. The company evicted the residents
without informing the municipality, even though by law the municipality had to
issue and execute all eviction notices.25 During the UNTAC investigation it emerged
that the company had enlisted the services of Military Unit 246 as a private army; the
unit had participated in the eviction brandishing AK47 machine guns.26 UNTAC
officials also noted with alarm that when Theng Bunma visited the UN office to give
evidence as a civilian he was accompanied by an attaché of policemen as his
personal bodyguards.
A striking aspect of the Theng Bunma case is the close links between patronage
networks and the promulgation and enforcement of law to the benefit of elites. The
most remarkable aspect of the case is that the country’s highest judicial authority –
the Supreme Court – played a central part in the dubious deal. It is reasonable to
speculate that the Supreme Court claimed that it needed the land for a new court
building in 1988, on the eve of land privatisation, in the knowledge that it would
soon become a valuable asset. Once administrative control of the property was
secured, its sale to a well-connected tycoon was brokered through informal channels
hidden from public view. At the same time the legality of the sale was ensured by a
decision of lawmakers at the Council of Ministers. This, in turn, vested in the
Supreme Court the legal authority to demand unplanned households to vacate the
area. Finally, an eviction was carried out by the company, in contravention of
Cambodian law, and using military units accountable to the government. These
enmeshed legal and informal processes resulted in the transfer of state land to a
private investor, potentially enriching corrupt bureaucrats in the process, and
illegally using state force-power to violently dispossess residents of their property.
Transferring land to well-connected tycoons enriched corrupt officials in the short-
term, but also fed the longer-term patronage governance objectives of key political
leaders. The then owner of the Thai Boon Rong Company, Theng Bunma, was close
25 Letter from Eduardo Vetere, Director, UNTAC Phnom Penh Provincial HQ to Gerald Porcell,
Director, UNTAC Civil Administraion, 1 January 1993
26 Letter from Jesudas Bell, Deputy Director, UNTAC Phnom Penh Provincial HQ to Commanding
Officer, Ghana Battalion, 23 March 1993
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to Prime Minister Hun Sen and claimed to have personally financed the Prime
Minister’s 1997 coup, and even to have given the Prime Minister a bullet-proof
limousine in the early 1990s (Phnom Penh Post, 17 May 1996; Wall Street Journal,
24 July 1997).
Transferring urban real estate from poor residents in unplanned settlements to rich
tycoons also fostered the process of urban transition that the government was keen to
promote. As I noted earlier in this chapter, leaders wanted Phnom Penh to change
from being the capital of a poor nation to a centre of global capitalism. Transferring
land to tycoons like Theng Bunma was a key part of this process. He was an
influential figure in bringing investment to Phnom Penh, upgrading its infrastructure
and redeveloping central areas. He was also a conduit for foreign capital to enter
Cambodia. One of his better-known ventures was partnering with the
Intercontinental hotel brand to bring the first international hotel to Phnom Penh
(Phnom Penh Post, 29 August 1997).
While UNTAC officials attempted to counter the role of informal networks in land
distribution by providing support to the victims of land conflicts (Williams, 2009),
patronage were so entrenched in the state apparatus that UN officials found they
were powerless to protect the rights of vulnerable residents (Widyono, 2007). Top
UN officials thought that going against these networks might jeopardise the entire
peace keeping operation. The impotence of the UN operation in this regard
eventually caused the head of the UNTAC civil administration, Gerard Porcell, to
resign from his post in 1993 (ibid.).
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored why and how residents in unplanned areas were
excluded from obtaining ownership titles to their plots between 1989 and 2001. I
have suggested that titles were allocated through patronage networks and distributed
to a political and private-sector elite to serve the strategic interests of government.
Residents in unplanned areas who were prevented from receiving titles lived in a
constant state of provisionality, which was formalised in laws relating to ‘temporary
possessors’.
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The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that land titling was a deeply
political process and that the pattern of its implementation was defined by the
political realities of the time. Conflicts over ownership pitted residents in unplanned
areas against a political and private sector elite. These conflicts were invariably won
by elites, who gained prime-urban real restate by evicting residents from unplanned
areas.
The conflicts over unplanned settlements in Phnom Penh can be viewed as a
microcosm of broader patterns of urban governance at that time. Residents in
unplanned areas were cast as second-class citizens denied the right to permanent
accommodation in the city while elites enjoyed almost total control over such areas,
protected by laws they themselves had promulgated. Titling was the primary
mechanism by which elites asserted control of these urban spaces. In the next
chapter, I chart how donor-funded land titling (and associated reforms) post-2001
changed the nature of conflicts over the ownership of unplanned spaces in the city.
117
Chapter 6: Donor-Funded Land Titling in Unplanned Areas of
Phnom Penh
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I suggested that exclusionary tenure systems in the period
1989-2001 prevented those in unplanned settlements obtaining ownership
documents. In this chapter, I turn to more recent, post-2001 tenure reforms. I assess
whether city-wide, systematic land titling implemented through the LMAP and
associated donor-funded activities have resulted in the continued exclusion of those
in unplanned areas from receiving ownership documents, or whether previously-
excluded communities have been able to access titles under the project. In doing so,
I argue that the polarised representations of donor-funded land-titling programmes in
the literature mask the diversity of their impacts and preclude the identification of
strategies to promote the interests of marginalised urban communities in Phnom
Penh.
Neoliberal economic theories define current policy agendas set by important
international financial institutions. Prominent development economists have pushed
an international policy agenda that seeks to construct efficient and equitable markets
in the economies of the global south by building global-standard institutions
(Stiglitz, 2001; Rodrik, 2006). In this context, the World Bank has promoted city-
and country-wide land-titling to register and enforce private property rights in an
efficient and equitable manner as a means to stimulate inclusive growth (Brandao
and Feder 1995; Feder and Nishio, 1998; De Soto 2000; Deininger, 2003). Such
programmes have become one of the most widespread World Bank global policy
models (Gilbert 2001; Markussen, 2008).
Neoliberalism also constitutes the prevalent framework of analysis for scholars
explaining socioeconomic systems in developing economies where international
financial institutions have been active (Robinson, 2011), and in the analysis of land-
titling projects specifically (Varley, 2010). Critics have argued that the global
proliferation of ‘best practice’ institutional reforms have constituted a strategy to
embed neoliberalism in socioeconomic systems across the globe (Fine 2001; Peck
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2010). The focus on deep institutional reforms, particularly by the World Bank, has
promoted a pervasive neoliberal governance in states and populations across the
global south, which often benefit elites and hurt the poor (Li 2005; Goldman, 2011).
Land formalisation projects have been a policy tool that has organised urban space
according to neoliberal theory (Roy 2005; Macfarlane, 2012).
In this chapter, I suggest that donor engagement in Cambodia’s land sector has
resulted in a global property rights system rooted in the theoretical frameworks of
institutional economics: I trace the global hierarchies of power in the generation of
development knowledge resulting in the Cambodian government’s pursuing land
titling. I then, however, seek to distinguish the hierarchies of power implicit in the
mobility of land titling as a globally replicated neoliberal development intervention,
from the policy’s potential outcomes at the local level. In this way, I hope to capture
the variety of effects of donor-funded land titling, including but not limited to the
policy’s neoliberal economic aspects.
I identify three effects of land titling in relation to Phnom Penh’s unplanned
settlements. First, I argue that in some cases entrenched power structures have
reasserted themselves through the LMAP, resulting in the continued exclusion of the
inhabitants of unplanned settlements from land ownership. Second, that the project
has enabled some previously excluded communities to obtain land titles by creating
spaces where the state and local residents interact cooperatively. Third, the donor-
funded intervention has enabled local communities and civil society to challenge
entrenched power structures by circumventing the state and appealing to the donor’s
compliance mechanisms in order to obtain legal ownership.
6.2. Neoliberal policy mobility and the LMAP
In recent years, country- and city-wide land-titling programmes have become one of
the World Bank’s most popularly replicated international development interventions
(Gilbert, 2002; Markussen, 2008). The policy has received support from a range of
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and has been implemented in a range of
settings across the globe (Hall et al., 2013). In the Southeast Asian region, two of
Cambodia’s three neighbours, Lao PDR and Thailand, received World Bank loans to
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implement country-wide land titling during the 1990s; in the early 2000s, Cambodia
joined this growing global trend (Hirsch, 2011).
6.2.1 Titling as a best practice international development intervention
The global proliferation of land titling and its application in Cambodia tie into wider
narratives of neoliberal knowledge generation. At the global scale, the emergence of
city-wide land titling as a mainstay of the global development policy roster reflects a
paradigm shift in development economics that occurred in the mid-1990s. Drawing
on the experiences of corruption that followed western-supported privatisation in
Russia, key figures at the World Bank, most notably then chief economist Josef
Stiglitz, argued that strong institutions are a key ingredient to create equitable and
efficient markets (Stiglitz, 2001). The mantra of market primacy and state
contraction associated with structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early
1990s were replaced with targeted state-building exercises. Building global-standard
institutions and promoting ‘good governance’ has come to define the global
development policy agenda (Fine, 2001; Stiglitz, 2001; 2003; Rodrik, 2006).
Donor interventions to improve governance structures often consist of best practice
frameworks promulgated by the global policy-making elite. City-wide land
formalisation has emerged as one such targeted institution building exercise. The
influential Hernando De Soto (2000) is often associated with the ascent of land
formalisation programmes up the global development agenda. His ideas about
institutional failure as the core constraint to an efficient and equitable land sector
chimed with the World Bank’s institutions focus.
Land titling projects aim to ‘correct’ land markets by installing formal institutional
frameworks to enforce property rights in a standardised and predictable manner
(Feder and Nishio, 1998; Deininger 2003). By requiring states to systematically and
universally issue land ownership titles in accordance with best-practice procedures,
titling in theory reduces opportunities for well-connected corrupt stakeholders to
capture assets from vulnerable citizens (World Bank, 2002a; Deininger, 2003). The
end result in urban areas – in theory – is an inclusive and equitable land market.
The global processes of development knowledge generation in which land titling is
rooted have been criticised as perpetuating hierarchies of knowledge and power that
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privilege the global policy-making elite. The fact that the good governance
orthodoxy is rooted in the theoretical debates of a vanguard of development
economists, many of whom are associated with the World Bank, has led to criticism
about the power relations that generate orthodox development knowledge. A
common criticism is that the generation of development knowledge is disconnected
from the reality it seeks to change. James Ferguson (1994) argues, in his influential
Anti-Politics Machine, that the World Bank tends to construct a technical discourse
about national economies that has little basis in reality and is used primarily to
justify policy interventions that fit the Bank’s theoretical – and western power’s
strategic – prerogatives. The parallel trajectories of institutional economics and the
global spread and identification of land titling as an urgent policy issue appear to
support the point about the primacy of western knowledge in setting the global
development policy agenda.
While ignoring local knowledge in policy generation, the World Bank has
simultaneously developed strategies to co-opt local stakeholders to aid project
implementation. A shift from laissez-faire development policies of the 1980s and
1990s to a focus on reforming institutions has enabled neoliberalism to adapt to a
range of local contexts and to ‘travel’ across the world (Peck, 2010). In urban areas,
such governance interventions have been active in ‘redefining the art of
government’, allowing World Bank neoliberalism to ‘shape’ state-citizen relations
according to economic theory (Goldman, 2012: 564). The World Bank’s global
mechanisms of knowledge generation, and the local participatory strategies that the
Bank employs, enables neoliberal policy frameworks – such as property rights
formalisation – to contribute to neoliberal governance, where both the institutions of
the state and other forms of socioeconomic interaction are defined by the principles
of neoliberal economics (Li, 2005; 2008).
6.2.2 Institutional development, policy mobility and the LMAP
Donor-funded land titling in Phnom Penh has followed the framework of global
policy generation and localisation of policy implementation. The land titling
framework has addressed a very real local problem in the high rates of land conflicts
and the tenure insecurity that have plagued the city’s poor, but the root causes and
the solutions of tenure security have been identified using land titling theoretical
knowledge.
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The Bank determined the root cause of tenure insecurity to be weak local tenure
regimes in dire need of structural reform (World Bank, 2002a). They suggested that
a ‘lack of formal recognition’ enabled the politically well-connected to dispossess
people of their land and that endemic land conflicts could not be reduced ‘without
better information on land use, clear policies and regulations, adequate capacity to
resolve disputes, and, ultimately, demarcation of boundaries generally accepted by
all’ (ibid: 5). The expected outcomes of systematic land titling included ‘increased
tenure security, access to credit and opportunities to increase investment and
productivity’; many beneficiaries would be ‘poor and vulnerable’ households (ibid.:
10).
Thus, the Bank engaged with salient local policy issues – powerful individuals
grabbing land and inequitable and inefficient land conflict resolution mechanisms –
in the context of established land formalisation theory. The causes of Cambodia’s
inequitable and inefficient land markets were found to be local institutions; the
solution was to be the application of a global institutional framework; and the
outcomes were determined by land-titling theory. Such discursive representations of
Cambodia’s land sector perpetuated a binary of local/bad and global/good, which has
been identified as a defining feature of land titling discourse (Varley, 2002; 2010).
While the binary between local and global exists very much in the generation of
Cambodia’s land policy, in implementation strategies were mobilised to lessen the
disconnect between local and global knowledge. A discursive attempt to frame
global policy models as locally generated has been a theme of World Bank
institution-building interventions, which have been keen to emphasise the local
ownership of policy reforms. A key tool used by the World Bank to marry global
theory and the interests of local stakeholders are Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs), which are developed by national governments with technical assistance
from the World Bank and other donors. These documents are a standard World Bank
tool to improve governance indicators by setting policy goals and performance
indicators and linking achievements to future lending, thereby incentivising
governments to adopt the reforms.
Cambodia’s strategy paper, published in interim form in 2000, framed land titling
theory within a discourse of local ownership: the foreword by the Minister for
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Economy and Finance, Keat Chhon, emphasised the government’s ‘ownership’ of
the plan and the ‘consultative’ process and engagement with local stakeholders that
led to the plan’s formation (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2000: 2). But while
invoking a participatory, ‘local’ discourse, the paper identified land reform aims that
could have been extracted from a World Bank land titling textbook. Key goals
included ‘land registration, cadastral mapping, GIS/LIS, land valuation, and geodetic
network’ - these issues required the ‘immediate attention’ of policy makers (Royal
Government of Cambodia, 2000: 20). In other documents, the Bank emphasised that
the government had ‘requested’ such interventions in Cambodia’s land sector, and
that it had been ‘overwhelmingly clear’ to government that weak land administration
was the leading cause of poverty in the country - again focusing on supposed local
demand rather than a top-down approach (World Bank, 2002a: 4).
The World Bank was not the only institution to encourage the Cambodian
government to implement land reforms. As noted in Chapter 3, the Asian
Development Bank made the promulgation of a new land law to replace the 1992
Land Law a condition of future funding in 1995 (eventually leading to the
emergence of the 2001 Land Law). In the latter half of the 1990s, the Finnish and
German governments funded pilot systematic land registration projects, which
included surveying, demarcating and registering public and private land and resulted
in 80,000 land titles being issued for private plots. The pilot projects, in five rural
provinces, were intended to develop technical expertise, institutional capacity and a
better understanding of the administrative challenges of systematically registering
land across the entire country; an academic paper was published describing the
technical aspects of the project to better inform technical best practice which noted
the pilots’ success in distributing a large number of land titles efficiently and
securing a positive response from project beneficiaries (Torhonen, 2004).
By 2001, the World Bank and other donors had laid the groundwork for significant
reforms and the time came for the Royal Government of Cambodia to begin
implementing them. In May 2001, the government issued a statement on land policy
where it pledged to ‘implement a coordinated set of laws, programs of work and
institutional arrangements regarding land’ through the Land Administration and
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Distribution Programme (LADP), a 15-year programme to reform Cambodia’s land
sector, of which the LMAP would be the first component27
The LMAP entailed the complete modernisation of Cambodia’s system of land
administration and management using global standard techniques for surveying and
registering land, building institutions that could effectively utilise this technology
and enforcing the property rights that were registered. The Cambodian government
was contractually obliged to implement the LMAP according to the World Bank
Project Appraisal Document: in March 2002 the government signed a credit
agreement with the Bank for 24.3 million USD to this effect (World Bank, 2002b).
Other donors included the German and Finnish governments, each provided
technical assistance amounting to 3.5 million USD, with the total cost coming to
33.9 million USD over the project’s five-year duration (World Bank 2002a; 2002b).
6.3 Policy possibilities of donor-funded land reforms
The World Bank’s agenda of institutional reform, contractually assured and
incentivised by the promise of future funding, resulted in the adoption of a global-
standard system of land administration by the Cambodian government. In turn, these
governance structures redefined the everyday socioeconomic interactions in
neoliberal terms. An important question then becomes ‘how have neoliberal
frameworks “redefined” state-society relations?’ In this regard, it is important to
consider the scope of possible policy outcomes of titling as predicted by planners
6.3.1 The possible outcomes of land titling
Proponents of titling view tenure in binary terms: either as local/ bad and
global/good (Varley, 2013; 2010). This dichotomy not only serves as a theoretical
tool, but also predicts policy outcomes at the local level. Neoliberal planners assume
that installing the rules for efficient and equitable land markets to flourish will result
in all market actors playing by these rules. That is to say, individuals transacting
within land titling frameworks will respond rationally to the systems of incentives
27 Statement of the Royal Government on Land Policy, Royal Government of Cambodia, 1 May 2001
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and disincentives embedded in the Bank’s theoretical models. This benefits all
market actions, including the poor.
The opposing view of titling sees the opposite tenure dichotomy: as local/good and
global/bad (Varley, 2013; 2010). Here, the hierarchical, uneven power structures that
have defined neoliberal policy mobility globally have been evident in representations
of the consequences of such policies at the local level (Bromley, 2009; Porter et al.,
2012). In this way, the policy possibilities of neoliberal development interventions
are reduced to their neoliberal economic fundamentals, and tied to the interests of a
global, neoliberal, policy making elite. The Bank’s focus on good governance and
the promotion of democracy, for example, have been viewed by critics as rooted in
economic theory, and therefore associated with capitalist logic of neoliberalism –
reproducing space in a way that serves global elites and excludes local communities
(Fine, 2001; Springer, 2009).
These opposing positions on land titling are grounded in their respective theoretical
analyses of institutional economics and/or neoliberalism. As previously discussed,
critics of the Bank’s best-practice doctrines have often drawn on the bank’s
theoretical focus, which, it is believed, pays little heed to on-the-ground causes of
poverty. By the same measure, however, there have been some concerns that
analyses of the localised outcomes of neoliberal policies are often coloured by
broader theoretical arguments (Robinson, 2011). As a result, the possibility for
positive policy outcomes for low-income residents at the local level from best-
practice, neoliberal policy has often been negated (ibid). There has been a tendency,
also, to universalise the outcomes of land titling, viewing global institutions as
agents of economic imperialism and therefore bad and the local institutions they seek
to replace as good (Varley 2010; 2013). Thus while the theoretical binary the World
Bank harnesses predict the inevitability of positive policy possibilities, the inverse
binary harnessed by criticisms of titling predict the inevitable negative policy
possibilities. Both analytical frameworks use theory to universalise land titling
outcomes, and, hence, risk misrepresenting the experiences of low-income dwellers
in land titling frameworks (Varley, 2013).
The work of geographer Simon Springer (2009; 2013) engages with donor-funded
titling in Cambodia – specifically the LMAP – and provides one example of the
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application of this binary distinction in an assessment of the policy possibilities of
titling. He argues that donor-funded land reforms cause evictions by simultaneously
excluding poor communities from obtaining land titles and weakening their
endogenous land rights by reinforcing a binary between formal and informal tenure
systems (Springer, 2013). Donor-funded laws and institutions are inherently
exclusionary, Springer argues, because of the capitalist logic that they embody.
NGOs that pressure governments to implement land laws correctly are misguided
and merely engineering consent for an inherently exclusionary legal regime. Indeed,
Springer starts his analysis of Cambodia’s donor-funded land laws by quoting Satan
bequeathing humanity the power to make their own laws, which gives some idea of
how he sees the power dynamics embedded in Cambodia’s post-2001 land laws and
the LMAP.
This kind of interpretation of the land law transposes the uneven power dynamics
that explain the prevalence of land titling at the global level directly to the outcomes
of the law at the local level. Or to put it another way, the outcomes and possibilities
of donor-funded land reforms for unplanned communities have already been
predetermined by the fact that these laws are impositions wrought on poor city
dwellers who will inevitably suffer because of them: they will be excluded from
formal ownership as elites use laws to formalise land. Thus, the uneven power
dynamics that defined policy mobility at the global and sovereign levels are
reproduced at the local level by donor-funded land titling.
The focus on theoretical analyses of neoliberalism, and predicting their effects on
low-income groups as inevitably negative, has in some cases precluded engagement
with researchers and populations in countries that are subjected to such policy
frameworks (Parnell and Robinson, 2013). Many researchers based in the global
south are engaged in policy debates which centre on identifying strategies to
empower the vulnerable who have been subjected to such neoliberal frameworks – or
as Ananya Roy (2005) puts it, to use the Master’s tools to occupy the Master’s
house. To speak to these literatures, an alternative approach is open to the
possibility that some aspects of donor-funded reforms can potentially benefit
unplanned communities. One such approach may be to view neoliberal modes of
governance not simply as a tool or strategy promoted by donors and the state to
shape state-society relations, but also a concept that potentially enables some
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elements of society, the NGOs and other actors that support them, to strategically
influence the state in ways that better represent the interests of the vulnerable.
Taking this approach, an important question becomes ‘which (if any) aspects of
donor-funded land titling could potentially by leveraged to the benefit of low-income
urban communities?’ To answer this question it is necessary to understand what
donor funded institutions and policies say about the land rights of unplanned
settlements. I shall now turn to this issue.
6.3.2 The LMAP as providing a legal basis for equitable tenure
A structural reading of the LMAP and associated reforms in Cambodia reveals
frameworks that offer opportunities for residents of unplanned settlements to become
legal owners of their dwellings. In this sense, the project has constituted a legal basis
for equitable tenure – on paper at least.
The key law that underpinned the LMAP was the 2001 Land Law, which installed
the regulatory foundations for titling in Phnom Penh. As noted in Chapter 3, the
promulgation of this law was a perquisite of ADB funding and was developed with
technical assistance from German government’s bilateral aid arm GIZ. In principle,
the2001 Land Law put those in unplanned settlements on the same legal footing as
those in planned areas. The law stated that the all tenure documents issued prior to
the promulgation of the 2001 law constituted proof of possession only – not
ownership. The law, therefore, immediately dismantled the legal binary that existed
between ‘possessors’ and ‘owners’ (see Chapter 5) by recognising the de facto
ownership of informal tenure documents until such a time that property rights could
be determined by cadastral officials. 28
The law also determined that all ownership claims would be assessed in the same
manner. Ownership could only be granted to ‘possessors’ if they met the criteria for
‘legal possession’ set out in the law. In Article 30 of the law, there was provided a
universally applicable process whereby ‘possession’ could lead to ownership, with
no distinction made between planned and unplanned areas:
Any person who, for no less than five years prior to the promulgation of
this law, enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession of immovable
28 Article 39, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
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property that can lawfully be privately possessed, has the right to request
a definitive title of ownership.
Paper documentation or the registration of a possession right with authorities was not
a prerequisite to convert possession to ownership, provided other evidence proved
that the conditions of Article 30 had been met.29 This, it was later established in sub-
decree, could include oral evidence submitted by occupants, their neighbours and
local authorities.30 Those who had occupied their land for less than five years prior to
2001, but had enjoyed peaceful, uncontested possession, could apply to extend their
possession until the five-year period was complete and ownership could be granted.31
Residents who had purchased their property from someone who had occupied it prior
to 2001 were also eligible for titles.32 The requirement that occupation of a plot must
have begun before 2001 to constitute legal possession was later superseded by
Article 162 of the 2011 Cambodia Civil Code, which stated that occupants with 10
years of peaceful possession could acquire ownership irrespective of when their
occupation began.33
In general, the provisions of the 2001 Land Law were of benefit to households living
in unplanned areas. The law provided them de facto ownership status until their land
rights could be assessed by officials associated with the soon-to-be-implemented
land-titling project. In addition, the criteria for converting possession into ownership
favoured unplanned communities in Phnom Penh because they were (theoretically)
able to convert previously weak possession claims into legally registered ownership.
The criteria for legal possession also favoured residents under pressure from
redevelopers or other powerful interests intent on capturing their property. To
successfully challenge residents, a developer or other powerful actor would have to
prove that their possession right constituted the stronger claim and met the criteria
for legal possession under Article 30 of the 2001 Land Law, which included openly
claiming ownership of the land for five years. If the residents had occupied the plot
for more than five years, then they could have the stronger claim to the land than the
29 Article 42, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
30 Sub-decree No 46 ANK.BK, Sub-decree on Process to Establish Cadastral Map and Register, Royal
Government of Cambodia, 31 May 2002
31 Article 31, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
32 Articles 16 and 43, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
33 Article 162, Cambodia Civil Code, Royal Government of Cambodia, 22 December 2011
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developer, even if the developer produced a pre-2001 ownership document for that
land.34
The LMAP’s systematic land registration constituted the primary route by which
Phnom Penh residents would have their property titled. The procedures for
systematic land registration, as defined in a 2002 sub-decree,35 required the governor
of Phnom Penh to declare an ‘adjudication zone’ in which survey officers would
have the right to enter any immovable property for demarcation purposes and
adjudication officers could summon concerned parties to present oral and
documentary evidence related to ownership of the plot in question. Each eligible
household would be provided with a land title showing the boundaries of their
property and listing the owners of the parcel (Figure 6.1).
A key legal issue relating to titling in unplanned settlements involved state-owned
property. As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the transition from socialism to
capitalism in the 1980s had resulted in many plots of urban land with no clear public
use being administered by various state entities. Under the donor-funded tenure
regime, households living on state land claimed by a ministry or official but with no
clear public use – classified in the 2001 Land Law as ‘state private’ land – would
have the right to convert their possession rights into ownership and to obtain land
title.36 This measure provided stronger legal tenure rights to residents of unplanned
settlements living on land administered by a ministry than existed under pre-2001
land laws.
34 Interview with employee at donor organisation 2, Phnom Penh, 7 November 2013
35 Sub-decree No 46 ANK.BK, Sub-decree on Process to Establish Cadastral Map and Register, Royal
Government of Cambodia, May 2002; the process of Systematic Land Registration in relation to
private property as defined in this Sub-decree is covered in detail in Grimsditch et al. 2011
36 Article 17, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
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Figure 6.1: LMAP title
Note: The document details the address of the plot, the location of the plot and provides
information about its boundaries. The owner’s name(s) are listed on the back of the
document.
Source: PhD fieldwork
For some residents, tenure remained legally insecure under the 2001 Land Law. Any
parcel located on ‘state public’ land or on land that belonged to a monastery was not
eligible for LMAP land title; this was unchanged from the 1992 Land Law.
Occupants of plots on state public land would be ‘forced to vacate the premises
immediately … [and would] not [be] entitled to any indemnity for any works and
improvements carried out on the immovable property’.37 The 2001 Land Law
envisaged that once all private parcels had been adjudicated and all state public land
demarcated, residents would be classed either as owners or, if found to be living on
state public land, as ‘illegal occupants’.38 Occupants whose tenure had been rendered
‘illegal’ because of the classification of their plots as state public land would be
37 Article 43, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
38 Article 34, 2001 Land Law, Royal Government of Cambodia, 30 August 2001
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resettled and provided with a formal ownership title. The legal situation of those
living on state public land improved in 2010, when Circular 03 was promulgated by
the land ministry. The circular provided a range of tenure solutions for those living
on state public land. These solutions included – where appropriate – the provision of
titles, usufruct rights or relocation. There has, however, been no evidence of this
circular being implemented anywhere in Phnom Penh. 39
6.4 Old power structures, new frameworks
The outcomes of projects that involve the state codifying property rights can be
mediated by uneven distributions of power embedded in the socioeconomic systems.
In cases where powerful interests are opposed to extending ownership rights to
unplanned areas, a reorganisation of the institutions of property rights does little
more than change the frameworks through which an uneven distribution of power is
expressed. Walt Ladejinsky (1977), an influential figure in post-second World War
land reforms in East Asia, asserted that distributing property rights counter to the
desires of elites was essentially a revolutionary act. Elites would see redistribution of
their land rights as an erosion of their political power and not tolerate it unless forced
to do so. Thus, even a progressive regulatory framework that promotes an equitable
system of property ownership can be undermined by power structures embedded in
state and society which will find ways around implementing such reforms.
In Phnom Penh, land titling has in some instances facilitated the continuation of an
exclusionary neoliberal mode of land governance, which has benefited the rich and
excluded low-income residents. Powerful stakeholders have ensured that reforms
have not been implemented to the benefit of households living in unplanned areas if
this act goes against their interests. Thus, the uneven power structures that caused
exclusion under Cambodia’s 1989-2001 tenure regimes have reasserted themselves
under the post-2001 donor-funded frameworks, resulting in the continued exclusion
of some unplanned areas from land titling.
39 Circular 03, Royal Government of Cambodia, 31 May 2010
131
6.4.1 Vested interests and titling
In areas where powerful actors have interests in urban real estate, the LMAP has not
been implemented according to the law and, consequently, residents have been
excluded from the project. In this regard, the military have been a particularly
important actor in the distribution of land ownership historically in Phnom Penh (see
Chapter 5), and have remained so under the LMAP. In areas of the city where the
military – or powerful figures associated with the military – have ownership claims,
residents have frequently been excluded from receiving titles.
The importance of the military in the distribution of land titles was demonstrated in a
2012 land dispute that pitted a local community against the Cambodian Air force.
The dispute, in Phnom Penh’s Dangkao district, gained international attention when
President Obama visited Phnom Penh to attend an ASEAN summit. Representatives
of some 210 households threatened with eviction displayed SOS messages pleading
for help from the US President on the roofs of their dwellings, which were located
under his flight path (Daily Telegraph, 15 November 2012). The community in
question had been excluded from land titling on the basis that the area was state-
owned land. However, NGOs considered the exclusion without legal merit and
observed that the community should have had their ownership claims adjudicated by
cadastral officials.
This case of exclusion is interesting because there appear to have been conflicting
powerful forces at work behind scenes. According to leaked US embassy documents,
Prime Minister Hun Sen personally asked officials on three separate occasions for
the community to be given land titles. On each occasion this request was thwarted by
generals who wanted the military to retain control of the land and who did not
therefore allow land titling in the area.40 It is hard to ascertain why exactly the Prime
Minister wanted this community to gain land titles, but the fact that he did and that
his requests were unheeded suggest two important points. First, the Prime Minister
had some strategic interest in providing titles to the community. Given the history of
Hun Sen’s government in Phnom Penh’s land sector, it is unlikely his interventions
were motivated by altruism. It is more probable that the government was under
pressure from donors, NGOs and others to implement titling according to the law.
40 US Embassy cables, 06PHNOMPENH1426, 9 August 2006
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Second, the fact that the generals felt that they could defy a direct request from a
self-styled ‘strongman’ Prime Minister who has ruled for close to thirty years shows
how much influence and power they still wield behind the scenes in Cambodian
politics.
This incident sheds light on the complex nature of the Cambodian state: it is not a
unified entity with a common set of goals. Instead, its actions are determined by a
number of powerful interests with, in this case, divergent agendas. While distributing
land titles to an unplanned community was desired by some elements of the state,
other elements were able to counter this. It also suggests that the laws associated
with the LMAP have made it a little less straightforward for the state to exclude
those from unplanned residents from acquiring ownership documents by providing a
legal incentive for government to provide titles to such communities.
In the course of my research, I found that areas excluded from land titling often had
connections to the military. Many of these areas had not received attention because
their exclusion did not result in an immediate threat of eviction. One case I
encountered was Village 15 in Tuek Laark Bai, comprising 900 households, where
residents had enjoyed peaceful possession for over two decades. The village
representative had no idea why LMAP officials left after adjudicating only a few
properties in the area in 2009.41 A commune official confirmed that the area had
been excluded from systematic titling because the land belonged to the Ministry of
Defence.42 Concerned by the exclusion, village officials were preparing possession
histories and collecting fingerprints from residents to petition the commune to
contact relevant authorities at the time of fieldwork. 43 Similarly, many unplanned
areas excluded from titling in Tonle Bassac commune had ownership histories that
involved the military. It is hard to know how many of these islands of exclusion exist
because the government have not permitted public access to the land register, even
though this is required in LMAP project documents. But given the political power
the military wields, it is reasonable to assume that there are other islands of
exclusion dotted around Phnom Penh.
41 Interview with Village Chief, Village 15, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Phnom Penh, 5 March 2013
42 Interview with Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, District Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, 6
February 2013
43 Interview with Village Chief, Village 15, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Phnom Penh, 5 March 2013
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6.4.2 Strategic exclusions
The new reality of tenure associated with the LMAP has resulted in a change in tact
from the brazen leverage of the law to disposes the urban poor in the pre-donor
period. The LMAP legally requires the state to convert the possession rights of many
households in unplanned areas to legal ownership documented with a title, thus
preventing elites from capturing these assets. In addition, the increased number and
capacity of NGO actors operating in Cambodia’s land sector means that
communities can enlist assistance of local and international advocacy NGOs to assert
their property rights and support their demand for land titles. Facing legal challenges
in courts and pressure from aid-giving countries and institutions forces the
government to adopt a veneer of legality in exclusions. Officials achieve this by
selectively implementing laws and procedures in a manner that, while not legalising
evictions, at least makes the legality surrounding them complex and murky. As US
officials have noted, this makes it is difficult for donors to intervene in cases because
there are rarely legally ‘clear cut’ and occur in contexts where ‘little legal guidance,
and less implementation, exists’.44
In order to subvert LMAP procedures that run counter to powerful interests in this
way, officials have developed a number of informal or extra-legal strategies to
exclude those living in unplanned areas from receiving titles. A key mechanism that
officials use to invalidate occupants’ (‘possessors’) property claims is arbitrarily
classifying and registering the land on which their dwellings are located as state
public land. As noted in the previous section of this chapter, state public land cannot
be privately owned. There are clear procedures in place to determine whether land
fits into the state public category. However, officials have manipulated the process of
classifying, demarcating and registering state-owned land, ignoring procedures
which were designed to ensure transparency in the process. In this way, many
residents living in areas with no discernible public use have had their possession
claims undermined by the state.
The well-publicised eviction of the Group 78 community is a good example of
authorities’ selective classification of land as state public being used as a tool to limit
access to titles. In this case, the Governor of Phnom Penh arbitrarily prevented
44 US Embassy Cables, May 2009, PHNOM PENH 000654
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residents from obtaining titles by asserting the site in question had a public
function.45 It was claimed the parcel was once the site of a pre-war bridge (Phnom
Penh Post, 16 June 2006). The use of the ‘state public land’ category in relation to
Group 78 was problematic in many respects. First, the established procedures for
classifying and demarcating state public land were not followed. Second, the claim
that the site housed a pre-war (i.e. 1960s) bridge suggests that the public function of
the parcel was at best tenuous and had not been in evidence for four decades by the
time of the governor’s intervention. Third, many residents had documents ratified by
local authorities proving long histories of peaceful possession, in some cases dating
back to the 1980s, indicating that the area had long been used for private residential
purposes. 46 Had the LMAP been implemented correctly, the residents of Group 78
would have received titles. By classifying the land as state public, the government
arbitrary, unfairly and without due process denied residents their right to titles, and
they were duly evicted.
A second mechanism officials have used to prevent those in unplanned areas
obtaining titles is ‘provisionally’ excluding households from the project. In these
cases, residents with long histories of possession and strong ownership claims were
not having their plots adjudicated by LMAP cadastral officials in the usual manner.
A clear example of this process occurred in the commune of Tonle Bassac, which
was declared an adjudication zone for systematic land titling in 2010. A letter from
the LMAP Municipal Project Management Office to the municipality detailed areas
in the commune to be provisionally excluded from systematic land titling and gave
brief reasons for the exclusions.47 The areas included:
- two unplanned settlements within the walls of monasteries, excluded because
residents were living on monastery property;
- two rows of planned housing behind the Senate and Ministry of Agriculture,
excluded because they were on state property;
- two unplanned settlements, excluded because they were located in a
‘development zone’;
45 US Embassy Cables, 09PHNOMPENH509, 27 June 2009
46 US Embassy Cables, 09PHNOMPENH509, 27 June 2009
47 Letter from Director of Phnom Penh LMAP Project Management office to Chair of the
Administrative Committee for Phnom Penh, 7 October 20
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- a large 1960s apartment complex designed by Van Molyvann known as the
White Building or Bouding, excluded for technical reasons.
In the exclusion of the settlements in the ‘development zone’ the hand of elites can
be viewed most clearly. The affected communities, known as T85 and T87 after the
military units whose families were first allowed to build makeshift dwellings in the
area in the 1980s, had suffered a long history of exclusion. On paper, the LMAP
should have benefitted these communities because many residents in the area had
documents issued by local authorities showing long periods of peaceful possession –
on average over 10 years – commencing before 2001, and, hence, very strong
ownership claims. Though there was no legal justification for excluding residents in
the two communities, powerful vested interests, in this case well-connected
companies linked to the two parcels, were able to co-opt the state to represent their
interests. In contravention of the law, residents were prevented from obtaining legal
ownership of the property.48
The final provisional exclusion listed in the Tonle Bassac letter was Bouding: a
rundown but culturally significant 1960s apartment block, home to 385 households.
This case shows the government’s strategic nous in framing exclusions as
‘provisional’ to avoid creating a large volume of land conflicts simultaneously,
potentially causing unrest and resulting in pressure from donors. Ostensibly
exclusion zones are only ‘temporary’ in nature and reflect administrative constraints,
implying procedural rather than political causes of exclusion,49 with the implication
that these constraints may later be removed.
According to the exclusion letter, Bouding was excluded from systematic land titling
for technical reasons. Taken at face value, this assertion has some merit. Until June
2009, three months before Tonle Bassac was declared an adjudication zone, there
was no legal mechanism for titling private plots in apartment blocks such as
Bouding. Sub-decree no. 126, on the management and use of co-owned buildings,
stated that individual owners of plots within co-owned buildings could only obtain
land title sporadically; it included no mechanism for properties in co-owned
48 Office of the Council of Ministers, Letter No. 07, from Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of the
Council of Ministers to H.E. Governor of the Municipality of Phnom Penh, 7 January 2007
49 Letter from Director of Phnom Penh LMAP Project Management office to Chair of the
Administrative Committee for Phnom Penh, 7 October 2009
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buildings to gain title through systematic land registration. Given these facts, it
seems plausible that the provisional exclusion from land titling was, indeed,
provisional: the legal instrument had not been created to title the households, but
once it had the community could obtain land titles. Community leaders seemed to
accept that the reason title was not given was because plots were in a co-owned
building. A village chief stated he believed people in the area would eventually
obtain land titles: ‘it may take a long time. Maybe people in this village will be
among the last people to get the titles’.50
The technical reasoning for provisionally excluding Bouding has provided officials
with a plausible reason for withholding land titles from a large, low-income
community living in an area with huge development potential. The Bouding plot
occupies 22,492 m2 of some of the most valuable real-estate in Cambodia.51 While
residents interviewed seemed to be cautiously optimistic that they might eventually
get land titles, a closer reading of the tenure status of Bouding gives less cause for
optimism. The sub-decree on co-owned buildings states that individual parcels can
only obtain legal ownership documents once the entire parcel of land has been
registered in the cadastre as a co-owned plot, which can occur during systematic land
registration. The fact that the entire co-owned plot was excluded from systematic
land titling in absence of any discernible legal or technical reason, thus precluding
any households obtaining individual land title, raises questions about the authorities’
intentions for the complex’s future.
6.4.3 Titling as political theatre
The LMAP framework has been strategically used by the government to forward
broader political aims. Specifically, by controlling the distribution of titles
temporally and spatially, the ruling elite has been able to maintain and consolidate
political power. In this regard, it is important to note that the significance of land,
both culturally and socioeconomically, means that titles are recognised by the elite as
an effective form of political currency. Much is made, therefore, of the act of
‘giving’ land titles to households, particularly to poor households in areas where
disputes have occurred, with high-ranking officials or even Hun Sen himself in
50 Interview with Village Chief, Village 2, Commune Tonle Bassac, Phnom Penh, 1 April 2012
51 Letter from Director of Phnom Penh LMAP Project Management office to Chair of the
Administrative Committee for Phnom Penh, 7 October 2009
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attendance. In other cases, Hun Sen has personally taken action at times against land
grabbers, redistributing their land to the landless to increase his political standing. He
forced prominent land grabber Lieutenant-General Chao Phirun (referred to in
Chapter 5.4.1) to hand back over 200 hectares of rural land to the state with the
intention that it be distributed to the land poor (Phnom Penh Post, 8 March 2007).
Far from being the benevolent acts of a paternalist leadership, however, the times
and places at which titles have been distributed appear to have been carefully
calculated to contribute to the political aims of the ruling party.
The opportunistic nature of politicians is best illustrated by a 2003 announcement
that authorities would work with a coalition of local and international civil society
partners to distribute titles to and upgrade 100 unplanned communities in Phnom
Penh. UN-HABITAT, one partner in the project, reported that at the launch of the
policy, Hun Sen said: ‘Why stop at 100 settlements? We propose to upgrade a
further 100 settlements every year for the next five years, so that in the end, all of
Phnom Penh's poor settlements will be improved and have land title’.52 On 8 July
2003, the Council of Ministers sent an official letter to the Governor of Phnom Penh,
requesting that three unplanned settlement sites be reclassified from state private
land to a ‘social land concession’, meaning that communities’ tenure was no longer
illegal and paving the way for the extension of formal ownership rights to
residents.53 Then, on 27 July, Cambodians voted in the general election. Hun Sen
and the CPP were returned to power with 47.35 per cent of the national vote. Soon
after the election result, a land dispute began between members of the communities
and a large real estate developer. The company had negotiated an agreement with
supposed community leaders to transfer property rights to the company despite the
fact that the leaders in question had no authority to broker such an agreement;
eventually the residents were violently evicted in an action many NGOs considered
illegal.54 The 100 settlement upgrading project was not heard of again.
Another example can be found in 2011. In that year, the Prime Minister personally
sanctioned the Order 001 project, the mandate of which has been to distribute titles
52 Cambodian Prime Minister launches slum upgrading campaign, 3 June 2003
http://ww2.unhabitat.org/cambodia.asp
53 Letter from Council of Ministers No. 875 Sar.Cho.Nor to H.E. Governor of Phnom Penh
Municipality, 8 July 2003
54 Advisor, Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), Phnom Penh, 10 September 2013
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to small-holders living in areas also claimed by concessionaires and other types of
state property. At the time the campaign was announced, there was considerable
speculation that this project aimed to build support for his own re-election in 2012
(Grimsditch et al., 2014). This is supported by the fact that after the election was
over the project never re-started, despite pre-election promises that survey teams
would return (ibid).
As well as these temporal variations in the distribution of titles, there have also been
spatial variations that are related to the government’s political aims. A land activist
with one of Cambodian’s leading human rights organisations revealed in an
interview with me that government had often used the distribution of titles to
influence election results in areas where the opposition party posed a threat to the
ruling CPP. 55 He reported cases where local officials have effectively held
populations to ransom by delaying land titling until after election results, with the
warning that voting for the opposition would result in their area being excluded.
The government’s political use of titling has not gone unchallenged. The ruling
party’s broken pledges to those to which it has promised titles has enabled
opposition leader Sam Rainsy to employ the issue of titling to challenge the narrative
of a benevolent Prime Minister with increasing success. Most recently, the
opposition has married the land issue with xenophobic rhetoric about Vietnamese
land grabbing, particularly in rural areas along the Vietnamese border. In a case that
led to his arrest, conviction and self-imposed exile, Rainsy argued that the
government failed to issue land titles to farmers in border areas because officials
were complicit in Vietnamese efforts to encroach on Cambodian territory. He even
offered to return from exile and face charges if the government allocated title to two
farmers who had helped him remove markers demarcating the Vietnamese border
that allegedly encroached on their land (Phnom Penh Post, 23 February 2011). For
some NGOs, however, Sam Rainsy’s political hijacking of land disputes has also had
a detrimental effect on community solidarity, action and outcomes, because the
55 Advisor, Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), Phnom Penh, 10 September 2013
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short-term interest of politicians in generating headlines conflict with the longer-term
objectives of building consensus in the community and with local officials.56
6.5 Negotiating for title
The LMAP has converted possession rights to ownership rights in some unplanned
settlements that, prior to 2001, were deemed unauthorised. In these areas, residents’
ownership had historically been defined as illegitimate. Since 2001, however, the
changing distribution of power in urban society, the changing legal frameworks
through which tenure is asserted and the stakeholders promoting the interests of the
poor within these legal frameworks, has meant residents in such areas have in some
cases received titles. In this way, the LMAP has provided opportunities for
previously excluded groups to obtain a permanent and legal right to the city.
6.5.1 Titling and the changing urban economy
The LMAP has occurred within a broader process of political and economic
transition in Cambodia. Three of the four pillars of the economy – tourism,
construction and garment manufacturing – demand a ready supply of urban workers,
so the urban poor can no longer be painted as an illegitimate group from an
economic perspective. Further strengthening the position of low-income urban
residents are a decade of decentralisation reforms that have transferred
administrative powers to the commune, thus increasing the political significance of
local elections, creating a pragmatic need to keep low-income urban sections of the
electorate on-side (Hughes, 2009). In some cases, the LMAP’s implementation has
reflected this changing context and has been successful in providing legal ownership
to a previously marginalised population.
As well as providing a framework to extend titles to those in unplanned areas, donor-
funded land titling has acted as a force in its own right by exerting pressure on
officials to follow the law. Although such forces have not been sufficient to counter
the strongest vested interests, in other places power structures have been renegotiated
56Interview with Advisor, Community Managed Development Partners (CMDP), Phnom Penh, 27
May 2013
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and the LMAP has facilitated legal inclusion of households whose tenure was once
deemed illegitimate.
An unplanned settlement located in Village 1 in Tuek Laark Bai, housing around 300
families, provides one example of the LMAP being implemented according to
project guidelines and to the benefit of the local population. Self-built housing began
to appear in the area in the mid-1980s, first on the banks of a lake; residents
gradually reclaimed the lake to create more residential space. The area was
nominally administered by the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, but the land served
no obvious public purpose and residents were allowed to remain there. When a large
building housing a restaurant and nightclub was built on one section of the land in
the late 1980s, however, a land dispute erupted between the restaurateur, who had
leased his plot from the Tuol Kork district authorities, and the Ministry of Culture
and Fine Arts.57
The Ministry of Culture wanted to evict all the residents and the nightclub and
convert the entire area into a tourist development – a dubious assertion given its
distance from the central historical district. A threatened eviction order against the
residents was never forthcoming and the cultural centre was not built. However, the
land remained under ministry control, and rumours circulated in the late 1990s to the
effect that it was to be sold to a private company.58 Whatever the exact legal status
of the plot, the status of the residents was clear: in the words of the commune chief
the settlement was ‘unauthorised’.59 Despite having similar ownership histories to
the residents of other exclusion zones, the inhabitants of Village 1 were not,
however, excluded when Tuek Laark Bai was declared an adjudication zone for
systematic land registration in 2009, and many households received title.
In the case of Village 1, the legal provisions of the LMAP were respected by
officials because the incentives to do so appear to have outweighed the incentives
against doing so. Residents were also fortunate that their area had not been the
subject of intense speculation by developers, and that the ministry responsible for the
57 UNTAC civil administration case TK07, Cambodia National Archives
58 Interview, Chief of Village, Village 1, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Phnom Penh, 21 February 2013
59 Interview with Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, District Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, 6
February 2013
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parcel was of relatively little strategic importance compared with the Ministry of
Defence, the Ministry of Interior and others.
6.5.2 The role of NGOs in negotiating for titles
In many cases, NGOs have been instrumental in bridging the gap between the
interests of the state and those living in unplanned settlements and, through this
process, gaining titles for residents of unplanned settlements. A proponent of this
strategy is Community Managed Development Partners (CMDP), an NGO that
works closely with the municipal- and commune-level authorities. CMDP are
involved in community mapping, mobilisation of resources for upgrading and
strengthening cooperation with local authorities in a strategy to enhance community
negotiation positions.
Building relationships between NGOs, communities in unplanned settlements and
government is epitomised by the work of the Urban Poor Development Fund
(UPDF). The organisation was founded in 1998 by a memorandum of understanding
between the Municipality of Phnom Penh, the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
and the Community Savings Network of Phnom Penh to mobilise resources for
upgrading unplanned settlements (Phonphakdee et al,. 2009). The organisation has
now become part of the state apparatus; it is based in the offices of the Municipality
of Phnom Penh, and the chair of the board is the city’s deputy governor, while Prime
Minister Hun Sen makes a regular personal contribution to the charity (ibid).
Given their strategy of cooperation, however, these groups are reluctant to take on
powerful vested interests. Neither CMDP nor the UPDF have been involved in
pushing for in situ land titles in areas where powerful interests are involved. In these
highly contested spaces, such organisations have been pursuing more modest aims,
such as enabling a smooth relocation process and appropriate services at the
relocation site. 60 Debates about the wisdom of securing land titles for unplanned
communities using a strategy of cooperation vis-à-vis a confrontation with
authorities has caused a fissure between advocacy NGOs, such as COHRE, Sahakum
Teang Tnaut and sectoral NGOS, such as CMDP and UPDF. Advocacy NGOs
argued that working with the government to relocate residents from controversial
60 Interview with Advisor, Community Managed Development Partners (CMDP), Phnom Penh, 27
May 2013
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areas, rather than promoting collective action, such as petitions and protests, helped
legitimise government actions.
Despite these criticisms, it appears that fostering cooperative relationships between
local authorities and residents of unplanned settlements has in some cases been an
effective route to them obtaining land titles. This type of relationship was evident in
the previously noted case of Village 1, Tuek Laark Bai and was an important reason
they received titles during the LMAP. The residents in the community had invested
jointly with local authorities to pave streets, and install electricity and water in the
years prior to the LMAP. Over time, the condition of housing in the area improved,
with much of the investment occurring in the 2000s.61 The fact that the area had been
upgraded in partnership with commune authorities conferred a level of legitimacy to
the settlement, which was represented in the language residents used to describe their
tenure security. Residents did not consider themselves as living in a ‘controversial
area’, although they did consider their housing ‘unorganised’.62 In the course of the
research, I found that the term ‘controversial area’ was used exclusively for areas
where residents’ status was uncertain and eviction seemed likely.
In areas excluded from land titling, pursuing a cooperative working relationship with
authorities was often viewed as a route to titles by residents. The chief of an
excluded village in Tonle Bassac expressed hope that residents in his settlement
would receive titles in the future because of the positive interactions they had
recently experienced with local authorities. He noted:
when officials came to distribute food to those who were being evicted at
Koh Pich, I overheard the Prime Minister’s wife ask to the Governor of
Phnom Penh if our community would be evicted next. He said we would
not since we already have paved roads and electricity. 63
In settlements where evictions have occurred, local authorities often behave
differently towards residents. In the case of Sambok Chap, also in Tonle Bassac and
perhaps the largest unauthorised settlement in Phnom Penh in the early 2000s, the
61 Interview with Chief of Village, Village 1, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Phnom Penh, 21 February
2013
62 Interview with Chief of Village, Village 1, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, Phnom Penh, 21 February
2013
63 Interview with Chief of Village, Village 9, Commune Tonle Bassac, Phnom Penh, 28 February
2013
143
interactions with local officials were characterised by indifference and violence.
Most residents lost their homes in 2001 in a large fire that destroyed most structures
in the settlement. An NGO worker who worked in the community at the time recalls
that Molotov cocktails were thrown into the riverside settlement from boats in the
nearby Bassac River as police looked on.64 After the fire residents were not given
help rebuilding and permanent building materials were prohibited. The local
authorities provided no electricity or paved roads (Menzies et al., 2008). All
households were eventually evicted and given plots of land in resettlement sites on
the city’s outskirts (see Chapter 9 for more details on this case).
6.6 Challenging established state land titling practices
The LMAP has also provided new ways in which marginalised communities can
assert their claims to homeownership. As a donor-funded intervention, titling has
provided additional policy spaces through which residents in unplanned communities
can pressure the state to apply the law in a manner that benefits them.
6.6.1 Global advocacy networks
The globalisation of land governance in Cambodia has meant that extra-sovereign
forces, particularly the World Bank, have influenced how land titling has been
implemented by the Cambodian state. The Cambodian government is heavily
dependent on technical and budgetary support from multilateral and bilateral donors
to effectively carry out its functions, which gives donors a degree of power to
influence policy and shape how it is implemented (Hughes, 2007; 2009). Appealing
to bilateral and multilateral donors either directly or through global housing rights
advocates, such as the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions or Amnesty
International, can augment traditional civil society activity by applying pressure to
the state simultaneously from above, by influencing donor interactions with
government, and from below, via more traditional grassroots campaigns.
Harnessing global aid networks to forward the interests of vulnerable residents has
been recognised as a strategy that can potentially lead to more equitable forms of
64 Interview with Advisor, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Phnom Penh, 23
November 2013
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neoliberal governance globally. James Ferguson (2004: 90) has argued that global
advocacy networks have enabled local interests to link to global civil society
movements to challenge what he calls the ‘vertical topography of power’ between
state and society. In traditional models of civil society action, groups work between
state and society to promote the interests of vulnerable groups. By linking the
interests of vulnerable groups to extra-sovereign groups, and particularly groups that
can influence government policy, civil society is able to subvert the ‘vertical
topography’ of power and challenge state policies from above. Anaya Roy (2005)
has noted the success of such approaches in India, showing how targeted advocacy
spurred the World Bank to pressure the Indian state to meet resettlement
requirements for a Bank-funded dam project. She grapples with the idea of
subverting neoliberal governance by working within the frameworks constructed by
what she calls the neoliberal ‘masters’, concluding that: ‘the master’s tools cannot
dismantle the master’s house, but perhaps when strategically used, they can allow
those on the outside to occupy the master’s house’ (ibid: 155).
6.6.2 The Boeung Kak case
The LMAP has linked the property rights of residents of unplanned settlements to
extra-sovereign powers that can apply pressure on the Cambodian state to respect the
rights of marginal populations. Systematic land titling in Phnom Penh was funded
by the World Bank and therefore had to conform to project environmental and social
safeguards, and be implemented according to Cambodian law and the procedures
detailed in project documents and specified in the credit agreement between the
World Bank and the Cambodian government. To ensure that project conditions were
met, the Bank and other donors monitored project implementation, producing dozens
of aide-mémoires, releasing public statements and putting behind-the-scenes
pressure on the Cambodian government to implement the project according to
project guidelines.65
In some cases, there is evidence that extra-sovereign forces have challenged the
vested interests of elites in relation to titling in unplanned settlements. The clearest
example of this occurring is in the Boeung Kak area, a 133-hectare site that included
65 Interview with Former legal officer, Bridges Across Borders South East Asia (BABSEA), 8 April
2013
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a lake and surrounding areas in the commune of Sras Chok (World Bank, 2010). By
the time the area was declared an adjudication zone for land titling in 2006, the
Boeung Kak site housed the largest area of unplanned settlements in the capital and
included dwellings for approximately 4,250 families in 10 villages on open land
around the lake or on stilts over the water (ibid.). The community claimed that
housing began to appear in the mid-1980s, with the population density increasing
over time as plots were subdivided and sold to new migrants (Grimsditch and
Henderson, 2009; World Bank, 2010).
The legality of residents’ tenure status and their eligibility for land title varied from
household to household. While many had strong ownership claims and lived on land
that they believed they owned and for which they had documents showing legal
possession, many of those living on stilts over the lake had a far lower degree of
tenure security. According to Article 15 of the Land Law, a lake is state public land
and therefore cannot be owned by an individual or other entity. Despite the fact that
those on stilts over the lake were living on land that was likely state public, they
should have still had their claims adjudicated had correct procedure been followed.
According to the Sub-Decree on State Land Management and the Procedures for
Establishing a Cadastral Index map, all households, whether on stilts on the lake or
on land surrounding the lake, should have had their property rights adjudicated by
Cadastral officials.
Had systematic land titling gone ahead according to the recognised procedure, one
would have expected a variety of tenure outcomes for Boeung Kak residents.
Households located above the low water mark would have expected their possession
to be converted to ownership if they fulfilled the criteria for legal possession.
Households on stilts over the lake should have had their property rights considered in
the demarcation of the borders of the lake, and if they were found to be living on
state public land, the LMAP resettlement framework should have been deployed
(World Bank, 2002a). Instead, when the commune of Sras Chok was declared an
adjudication zone the entire 133-hectare Boeung Kak site was declared an exclusion
zone where land titling would not take place. Officials claimed this was because the
entire area constituted state public land: the 43 hectares of dry land, it claimed, were
parkland, despite the fact that the supposed park had clearly not been in public use
for well over a decade and that it was not registered as state land (Grimsditch et al.,
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2012; World Bank, 2010). Once the property claims of the residents had been
voided, the government leased the entire 133 hectare site to a company called
Shakaku, headed by a ruling party senator called Lao Khin Meng. Lao had strong
links to powerful government figures and was described by US embassy officials as
one half of ‘one of the most politically connected couples in the country … [with]
access to at least 315,028 hectares of land for agribusiness’. 66
According to NGO observers the government-sanctioned lease agreement with
Shakaku was illegal.67 The law states that leases for state public land can only be
granted when the lease would not affect the public function of the area.68 Shakaku
planned to fill the lake and build a commercial centre, clearly voiding the lake’s
public function. In addition, the law decreed that state public land could only be
leased for a maximum of 15 years,69 but Shakaku had obtained a lease for 99 years.
In August 2008, the government attempted to retrospectively legalise the lease by
decreeing that the lake no longer had a public use, thus giving the government the
legal authority to convert the land to state private land, which, as the private property
of the state, could be leased. A sub-decree was issued that converted the entire 133
hectares into state private land, thus legalising the lease to Shakaku.70 The
reclassification as state private land meant that, paradoxically, settlers on stilts over
the lake acquired the right to convert their possession right to legal ownership – but,
unsurprisingly, this did not occur.
6.6.3 Challenging state land titling practices
Until 2009, the Boeung Kak case seemed to be the latest chapter in a familiar story,
concerning familiar stakeholders and issues. A well-connected tycoon was violating
the possession rights of residents, with the government displaying a disregard for
legal process and LMAP procedures. In 2009, however, an innovative advocacy
strategy was employed by a coalition of human rights NGOs. During this period, I
66 US Embassy cables, 7PHNOMPENH1034, 9 August 2007
67 Interview with Former legal officer, Bridges Across Borders South East Asia (BABSEA), 8 April
2013
68Article 16, Sub-decree No 129 ANKr.BK, Sub-decree on the Rules and Procedures on
Reclassification of State Public Properties and Public Entities, 27 November 2006
69 Article 18, Sub-decree No 129 ANKr.BK, Sub-decree on the Rules and Procedures on
Reclassification of State Public Properties and Public Entities, 27 November 2006
70 Sub-decree No. 108 S.E., Sub-decree on the transfer of Boeung Kak location from the State's
public property to the State's private property, 7 August 2008
147
was based with the Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE), which was
part of a coalition of groups representing community, so was well placed to
participate in, observe and document this strategy. The coalition developed an
advocacy plan that circumvented the usual state-society continuum along which
NGOs traditionally have operated. Instead of appealing to the government to halt
evictions, they directed their advocacy efforts to the World Bank. In doing so, the
coalition exploited the broad and sometimes divergent institutional apparatus of the
Bank, which included the country office team responsible for administering the
project, senior officials at the Bank’s Washington HQ to whom country-level
officials were responsible , and independence compliance mechanisms that
monitored and evaluated World Bank projects and programmes.
In Phnom Penh, the World Bank was directly responsible for funding systematic
land titling in the Boeung Kak area and other parts of the city (other donors provided
funding for titling in other parts of the country and other aspects of the project, such
as legal technical assistance). Advocacy NGOs, therefore, combed over project
documents to assess the legal and procedural basis – detailed either in Cambodia’s
laws, or in LMAP planning documents – for excluding households from land titling
in Boeung Kak. None was found. On that basis, the coalition drafted a letter in
partnership with the community requesting a review from the World Bank Inspection
Panel, a Washington-based independent compliance mechanism for the World
Bank.71 In the letter, the coalition asserted that all property claims in Sras Chok
commune should have been assessed and adjudicated in a transparent manner; failure
to implement the project accordingly affected households in Boeung Kak
negatively.72
While it was the government that had failed to implement the project, the Bank was
also culpable according to their own internal regulations concerning project
monitoring. The Bank’s Operational Directive 13.05 on Project Supervision notes
their responsibility for monitoring projects and ensuring that borrowers implement
71Interview with Former legal officer, Bridges Across Borders South East Asia (BABSEA), 8 April
2013
72 Letter from COHRE to the World Bank Inspection Panel, Re: Request for Inspection Panel review
for the Land Management and Administration Project, 9 September 2009
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projects according to prior agreements.73 The letter from the coalition alleged that
the Bank failed to monitor the project and as a result the project was not
implemented according to law and procedure. The Credit Agreement between the
World Bank and the Royal Government of Cambodia placed an onus on the state to
implement land titling according to law and procedure and on the World Bank to
ensure that they did so (World Bank, 2002a).
The Inspection Panel agreed that there were grounds for a review on the basis that
unplanned settlements had been excluded from land titling in contravention of
procedures detailed in World Bank project documents and the Credit Agreement
between the Bank and the Government. A review panel was formed, with Bank
representatives and an external expert, and in 2011 the review found that the
majority of the community’s grievances were justified (World Bank, 2010). After
negotiation with the government failed to resolve the issue of extending land titles to
households living in unplanned areas of Boeung Kak, the Bank suspended all
lending to Cambodia (excepting projects in progress).
Other regional powers were also important in applying pressure on the government.
A well-known Chinese investment company that had partnered with Shakaku for the
redevelopment project had a reputation built on a good record of due-diligence. The
company became the subject of much negative press because of its association with
the evictions, with the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh the target of protests from
Boeung Kak residents’ groups. This pressure was successful and, behind the scenes,
the Chinese company put pressure on the government to come to an arrangement
with residents, threatening to withdraw funding if the matter was not resolved 74
In addition, grassroots protest movements were effective in drawing the attention of
the Cambodian public to the plight of residents. A particularly successful protest
group, which received digital support from local advocacy NGOs, emerged from a
women’s sewing group led by local resident Tep Vanny (Brickell, 2014). The group
led protests across the city leading to their arrest and subsequent calls for their
release by human rights groups. Widely-circulated images of protesters being treated
73http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,
,contentMDK:20064744~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184
~isCURL:Y,00.html
74 Interview with employee at donor organisation 1, Washington D.C. (via skype), 11 December 2013
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roughly by police contributed to an attitude of resentment towards the role of the
authorities in the case and supported the narrative that the state and its elite
benefactors were committing an injustice.
The multi-pronged advocacy strategy employed by Boeung Kak residents and their
supporters resulted in positive outcomes for some of the residents. In August 2011
the government relented and promulgated a sub-decree that allocated 12.44 hectares
of land to the residents that remained at the site. By the end of 2011, over 800 plots
had been surveyed. The first batch of land titles was delivered to residents at a
ceremony presided over by the Governor of Phnom Penh and the Director of the
Land Management, Urban Planning and Cadastre Department – presumably in a bid
to extract maximum political capital from the event. Although some families in
Boeung Kak eventually received titles, the outcome for many residents has not been
positive. Around 3,500 families had been evicted prior to the 2011 deal and provided
with small plots in relocation sites on the city’s outskirts, far from livelihood
opportunities and with poor access to services.75 A further 90 families who had
remained on site have continued to be excluded from receiving titles under the new
agreement, including those represented by the activist Tep Vanny. Thus, while
Boeung Kak cannot be said to be a success story, it is a good example of how those
excluded from acquiring legal ownership can (in some cases) successfully assert
their rights in unexpected ways.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the LMAP as a best-practice land titling intervention that
has resulted in a variety of outcomes for low income residents of Phnom Penh. I
have, first, highlighted the policy mobility of the project, arguing that the World
Bank used a strategy that emphasised local ownership of the titling approach to enact
the deep reform of Cambodia’s land sector. I have gone on to assert that the outcome
of this intervention has been uneven in relation to the distribution of titles to the
75 Interview with programme manager, Sahakum Teang Tnaut (STT), Phnom Penh, 9 September 2013
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residents of unplanned settlements in Phnom Penh: some have benefitted from the
project and received titles, while others have been excluded.
In exploring these processes of inclusion and exclusion, I have sought to challenge
the view of titling as a projection of an intransigent neoliberalism across urban space.
I have argued that such a view limits the scope of titling’s policy outcomes to either
universally positive or negative. Instead, I have viewed the LMAP as a dynamic
framework through which the power relations associated with Phnom Penh’s land
sector have been expressed in a myriad of ways. This approach brings into view the
variety of interactions that a donor-funded land titling framework may facilitate, the
strategies of the different stakeholders to promote their own interests and the
project’s potential for redistributing power among them. In this context, the power
structures that characterise political and economic systems can simultaneously be
reasserted (see Chapter 6.4), renegotiated (see Chapter 6.5) or subverted (see Chapter
6.6).
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Chapter 7: Titling, Tenure Security and Housing Investment
7.1 Introduction
Proponents of titling suggest that the insecurity associated with illegal tenure limits
property investment (De Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Feder and Nishio, 1999).
They argue that titles confer legal ownership, thereby guaranteeing state protection
of codified assets from appropriation (Beasley, 1995). In doing so, titling
programmes provide recipient households with the security needed to invest in
home-based entrepreneurial activity (De Soto, 2000) and/or housing improvements
(Jimenez, 1983). The claim of a positive relationship between titles and housing
investment was highlighted in policy documents relating to Cambodia’s titling
project. Increased investment at the household level was identified as a key
performance indicator in the donor-funded titling project, the Land Management and
Administration Project [LMAP] (World Bank, 2002a). In this chapter, I assess
whether titles have met the expectations of planners to increase tenure security and
investment at the household level in Phnom Penh.
In the first section, I question whether representations of titling in the literature fit
the experience of the LMAP in Cambodia. To explore this question, I position city-
wide systematic titling in Phnom Penh in the context of key debates around titling
and investment to reveal points of similarity and disparity. I suggest that LMAP
planners extended arguments made about titling in self-built areas, which are well
documented in the literature, to planned areas. However, there exists little empirical
work on how titling affects tenure security and investment in planned areas.
I then go on to test claims made about titling, tenure security and investment in self-
built and planned areas of Phnom Penh using data from household surveys in Sites
1-3 and key informant interviews. I also draw on relevant sections of focus group
discussions that I conducted with residents in unplanned settlements in the Phnom
Penh district of Chbar Ampov as part of a consultancy project (see Chapter 4 for
details). I find a complex relationship between the distribution of titles and reported
investment. Titling seems to be related to increased investment in some contexts, yet
there is also evidence of frequent, substantial investments in the absence of titles.
These results suggest a more complex relationship between titles, tenure security and
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investment than anticipated by LMAP planners. I explore this complex relationship
by analysing how respondents’ de facto and perceived security has influenced
investment behaviour. I also broaden the scope of the analysis to reveal factors
unrelated to tenure security that have influenced reported investment, including
capital availability and the protection of property from crime or from environmental
hazards.
I conclude that, although titles are linked with investment, there are many additional
factors that have influenced respondents’ tenure security and/or their investment
behaviour. The complexity of investment decisions challenges the universalising
arguments made about titles and investment – that titling untitled property will
always lead to increased investment. Instead, I posit that a more context-oriented
approach is necessary to determine the constraints to property investment at the
household level.
I aim to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, I provide an example of titling
and household-level investment at the city-wide scale – a topic that has not been
addressed to date in the literature. In doing so, I hope to shed light on one of the
most globally replicated international development interventions. I provide a critical
appraisal of the LMAP’s achievements in relation to empirical accounts of titling in
the literature and attempt to account for the gap between project planning and
observed outcomes. Second, I provide empirical support to arguments that assert the
complex, varied and often context-specific determinants of tenure security and
investment behaviour.
7.2 Land titling, security and housing improvements
Systematic, city-wide, titling in Phnom Penh differs from the types of titling
presented in the literature on housing investment, which in the main relate to self-
built settlements with irregular tenure. As a city-wide intervention, the LMAP
expects to increase tenure security and investment in both planned and unplanned
areas. I suggest that extending titling arguments to planned settlements is at odds
with the conceptual underpinning of titling, which stresses changes in de jure tenure
security. The wider scope of city-wide titling projects in comparison to those
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targeting unplanned settlements also challenges predominant narratives about titling
and housing investment made in the literature.
7.2.1 Titling, tenure security and institutional reform
Titling has been the World Bank’s key policy tool to increase tenure security and
housing investment in urban areas since the 1970s (Doebele, 1987; Jones and Ward,
1994). The policy is rooted in institutional economics, which emphasises the role of
the state in protecting individual property rights as a precondition for investment
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; North, 1990; Rodrik et al., 2004). The logic is simple:
individuals or entities will not invest in an asset if it can be appropriated by others.
Therefore, the state must introduce institutional mechanisms that guarantee the
protection of assets if investment is to increase. Titling applies the two core
principles of institutional economics – secure property rights and institution building
– to land and housing markets (Besley, 1995). It does so by applying a binary
conception of tenure as formal/informal, where formal tenure equates to legal/state
protected/tenure security/investment and informal tenure equates to illegal/no state
protection/tenure insecurity/limited investment (Varley, 1987; 2002; 2010). The role
of planners is to remove informal tenure through institutional reforms, namely the
issuance of titles for informally (or illegally) held properties (Brando and Feder,
1995; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Feder and Nishio, 1998). In urban areas, issuing titles
to those with informal tenure is viewed as a guarantor of tenure security and a key
tool for catalysing housing improvements and/or home-based entrepreneurial activity
(De Soto, 2000; Field, 2005; Jimenez, 1983).
Critics, however, argue that there is limited evidence that titles are needed to
increase tenure security or encourage investment (Gilbert 2002; 2012; Payne et al.,
2009) Writing during a resurgence of titling programmes following Hernando De
Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, Alan Gilbert (2002: 8) noted that it was ‘well
recognised in the literature that security of tenure does not require the issue of full
legal title.’ Reviewing studies of titling a decade after De Soto’s thesis, Gilbert
(2012) found little empirical evidence that titling programmes increased tenure
security and/or investment in the intervening period. He concedes a possible
exception: the COFOPRI titling programme in De Soto’s native Peru, where
numerous studies have noted the link between titles and tenure security (Calderon,
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2004; Kagawa and Turkstra, 2002), on the one hand, and increased investment, on
the other (Field, 2005). Yet even in Peru some have disputed the foundational link
between titles, tenure security and investment, noting that other, more appropriate
policy interventions could have achieved better results (Fernandes, 2011).
Critics of titling do not dispute the importance of the state in determining tenure
security, but argue that titling is not the only – or even the primary – indication of
state recognition of individual ownership rights. For one thing, titles are not
necessarily indicative of state protection unless they represent genuine political will
(Cousins, 2008). Moreover, there are other actions of the state that are more
important than titles in determining tenure security. Indeed, Geoffrey Payne (2004:
173) observes ‘security of tenure depends not so much on legal status as on
residents’ perceptions of past and present government policy’. Payne’s observation
has been supported by empirical accounts of a variety of policies that have increased
tenure security across the globe. In Mexico, Ann Varley (2002: 455) notes that ‘most
residents base assessment of their security of tenure on processes indicating official
tolerance of their settlement’, with the provision of services highlighted as a key
indicator of state tolerance. In Vietnam, Annette Kim (2004: 300) emphasises the
crucial role the state played in increasing tenure security by adopting policies such as
‘higher land compensation rates, public demotions of officials who expropriate
without a solid public interest reason, and allowing citizens to criticise local
officials’ management of land in state-run newspapers’. In Colombia, Gilbert (2002:
10) argues that tenure security ‘depends less on the exact legal status and more on
occupants’ perceptions of the probability of eviction and demolition (enforcement);
as well as the availability of services and passage of time’. If the state provides
conditions of security then residents will invest irrespective of whether or not they
have titles. In Mexico City (Varley, 1987) and Bogotá (Gilbert, 2002), for example,
it was found that people would buy land with only a receipt of sale and start
improving it without having their property rights clarified through official land titles.
The varied determinants of tenure security and investment have led to calls to
broaden the debate from the legal tenure focus stressed by proponents of titling to
include a greater range of factors (Van Gelder, 2009; 2010). To capture the range of
factors that influence tenure security, Jean Louis Van Gelder forwards a tripartite
model, which includes de jure, de facto and perceived security. De facto conditions
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here refer to the actions of the state that determine residents real tenure security i.e.
promulgation and enforcement of policies relating to tenure security of particular
sub-groups of the urban population. De jure refers to the legal conditions of tenure
security, which is represented as an illegal/informal/untitled/insecure or
legal/formal/titled/secure binary by titling proponents, and as a ‘spectrum’ of legality
in empirical accounts by Varley and others. As Varley (2002) has shown in Mexico
and Payne and Khemro (2004) in Cambodia, for example, there are often a variety of
tenure systems in developing country cities which embody a variety of formal and
informal actors and operate on a continuum of legality rather than a binary of
legal/illegal. Van Gelder (2010) asserts that de facto and de jure conditions affect
investment through the proxy of residents’ own assessment of these conditions. For
Van Gelder (2010), residents’ perception of tenure security, which can be influenced
by de facto and/or de jure conditions, is the primary driver of investment.
Factors that are not directly related to tenure security may also have significant
effects on household investment decisions. Gilbert (2012), for example, points out
that many of those without titles are low-income households and lack the financial
resources to invest in housing or entrepreneurial activity irrespective of their tenure
status. In some cases, using titling logic to address investment constraints in such
areas may result in skewed policy implications. For example, in reality residents
without titles but with strong tenure security may not invest because of a lack of
financial capacity. However, viewing the investment behaviour of such households
through the lens of titling theory would miss this investment constraint: households
that lack title for their plot are believed to suffer tenure insecurity by default, which
would be assessed as the key constraint to investment. The disconnect between
titling theory and reality means that titling policy may misdiagnose the problem and
prescribe an inappropriate policy remedy that fails to produce the desired result
(Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al., 2009).
7.2.2 City-wide titling
Almost without exception studies of titling, tenure and investment at the household
level have focused on unplanned settlements. Much of the early literature on titling
focused on the cities of Latin America, where large illegal settlements are often
situated in peripheral areas. In these cases, the aim of policy makers was to extend
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the rules of a pre-existing tenure system to pockets of illegality (Varley, 1987).
Increasingly, however, titling programmes have not been confined to unplanned
settlements. According to Jones and Ward (1994: 37), since the late 1980s an
‘important reappraisal’ of World Bank urban policies shifted lending from project-
based (e.g. informal settlement upgrading) to city-wide land reforms intended to
increase the economic efficiency of urban areas. As part of this shift, nation-wide
systematic land titling programmes (covering both rural and urban areas) have
become a ubiquitous World Bank approach, with billions spent on such programmes
each year, particularly in areas where weak ‘formal’ institutions for registering
ownership rights exist (Holstein, 1996; Markusson, 2008).
Systematic land titling programmes have spread across the globe to Asia (Hirsch,
2011), post-socialist countries (Ho and Spoor, 2006) and Africa (Briggs, 2011). In
urban areas, the approach usually involves titling all property that is not registered in
the national cadastral database, whether in unplanned, self-built areas or in planned
residential areas. One of the earliest and largest systematic titling programmes, the
Thai Land Titling Project (TLTP), for example, did not focus only on self-built
unplanned settlements, but also involved clarifying the property rights of those in
planned areas by unifying disparate mechanisms of ownership, including rights
registered with different local, municipal and provincial authorities, into a single
cadastral database (Rattanabirabongse et al., 1998). The Thai project is regarded by
the Bank as a success story, credited with increasing security and investment across
the economy (Bowman, 2004). The programme has become a best-practice model
replicated across the globe, including in Cambodia’s LMAP, where its success is
cited as part of the rationale for the Cambodian project (World Bank, 2002a).
Despite the proliferation of nation-wide titling projects, there has been little analysis
of what effects such programmes have (or even are expected to have) on tenure
security and household-level investment across urban areas. While the debates
around titling and self-built areas are comprehensive and well known, there is little
attention paid to how titling may work outside unplanned settlements, in planned
residential areas where residents may not have formal ownership documents (i.e.
titles), but that are also targeted by systematic titling projects.
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It is also unclear how arguments relating to titling in unplanned areas can be
transferred to planned areas. In unplanned areas it is argued that titling increases
tenure security by legalising ownership claims (Van Gelder, 2010; 2009). Yet
planned areas, almost by definition, are legally recognised by the state even if
residents have not applied for or received full legal title. Residents of such areas may
enjoy high security of tenure but will still be targeted by systematic titling
programmes if they do not have a title for their land. The rationale for and outcomes
of titling in such places are little explored in the literature, yet such activities account
for significant technical and financial resources of developing country governments
and so must be interrogated.
City-wide titling also has implications for tripartite representations of tenure
security, which consider titling as a de jure intervention in contradistinction to a de
facto tenure intervention. Systematic titling programmes are a major undertaking on
the part of government, which can typically take years or even decades to complete –
the systematic titling programme in Thailand lasted twenty years, for example. The
existence of such a programme can simultaneously act as a condition of de jure
security for households that have received titles and de facto security for those that
expect to gain them. In planned areas, where residents are considered legitimate
owners, the existence of a systematic titling programme could significantly increase
de facto security by signalling the state’s intention to strengthen ownership rights.
7.2.3 City-wide titling in Phnom Penh
Cambodia’s LMAP presents the opportunity to explore the relationship between
city-wide systematic titling, tenure security and property investment at the household
level. LMAP planners predicted that any household without title – whether in a self-
built or planned area – would, after intervention, benefit from ‘increased tenure
security … and opportunities to increase investments and productivity’ (World Bank,
2002a: 10). Some areas of Phnom Penh falling within the LMAP project areas were
unplanned areas resembling the islands of illegality discussed in the titling literature.
I was able to identify such areas through extensive key informant interviews with
local officials (commune and village chiefs) across Phnom Penh. Examples include
survey Sites 2 and 3 and Chbar Ampov, where pre-LMAP tenure did not provide
state protection of property. Sites 2 and 3 were considered by authorities to be
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located on state-owned land and, therefore, to be ‘unauthorised’ or illegal
settlements.76 The authorities did not usually grant documents recognising the
ownership claims of residents in such areas. Also included in systematic titling were
many planned residential areas. While many in such areas did not have full
ownership titles, they had a variety of other documents showing state recognition of
ownership claims and correspondingly high levels of tenure security. Survey Site 1 is
typical of a planned residential area of Phnom Penh expected to benefit from the
project. Site 1 was even included in a World Bank-funded baseline study with the
intention that panel data would be collected after titling for comparison. 77 It was
expected that titles would increase residents’ security of tenure, which in turn would
increase investment (World Bank 2002a).
LMAP policy makers made no distinction between titling in planned areas like Site 1
and unplanned areas. Instead, they deployed a dichotomous conception of tenure as
formal/secure/increase investment vs informal/insecure/ limited investment.
According to the Bank, some 75 per cent of land parcels in Phnom Penh were
untitled at the time the project was launched including a range of settlement types
(World Bank, 2002a). This 75 per cent consisted mostly of parcels in planned areas.
A closer look at pre-LMAP tenure in planned areas, however, suggest a more
complex links between tenure documents, security and investment than assumed by
the LMAP formal/informal model.
In Site 1 most residents had strong legal claims to their land under both the 1989
sub-decree that privatised land ownership in Phnom Penh and the 1992 Land Law
that followed shortly thereafter. These laws gave all Phnom Penh residents who did
not live in unplanned areas the right to own their property (see Chapter 5). The laws
also provided households with the opportunity to apply for titles. A CDRI survey of
pre-LMAP tenure shows that prior to systematic land titling most households in Site
1 had already applied for titles under 1989 and 1992 legislation and most had
obtained some document (though typically not a full land title) conferring a level of
official recognition of their ownership rights (Table 7.1). Around 4 per cent of
households had applied for and obtained a commune-issued receipt for their
76 Interview with Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, District Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh, 6
February 2013
77 For unspecified reasons no post-titling follow-up survey was conducted.
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application for ownership. This document meant that the commune-level authorities
recognised the ownership claim of the applicant. The majority – ninety per cent – of
households took an additional step in the application process at the district level (the
authority between the commune and below the municipality) and applied for a
survey paper, which included details of plot size and boundaries. Seven per cent of
all households had completed the application process and obtained land title.
Therefore, 94 per cent of households in Site 1 had applied for and been deemed
eligible for a land ownership right guaranteed by a state entity. The remaining 6 per
cent had obtained a receipt of ownership transfer stamped by commune authorities,
which did not constitute any official recognition to their claim of ownership.
Table 7.1: Pre-LMAP tenure documents Site 1
Tenure document Share
Pre-2001 land title 7.2%
Survey paper for pre-2001 land title (Slab
Moan) 82.6%
Commune-issued application receipt for pre-
2001 land title 4.3%
Letter of ownership transfer (commune level) 5.8%
Total 100.0%
N 94
Source: CDRI survey of pre-LMAP tenure
The case of the LMAP and investment in Site 1 presents an interesting counterpoint
to examples of titling and investment in the wider literature, which focuses on
islands of informality. The language used by the Bank – suggesting that increased
investment in planned areas like Site 1 would be one of the ‘benefits associated’ with
titles – implied that a relationship between titling and increases in city-wide
investment at the household level was well supported in the literature. However,
there is little or no previous research into how titling in such areas affects investment
behaviour. There is, therefore, a disconnect between the claims about household
investment made in the titling literature and those made in LMAP documents
concerning planned urban areas.
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In addition to the lack of precedent in other contexts, LMAP planners also conducted
little research on pre-LMAP tenure systems in Phnom Penh. Although the Bank did
commission a baseline study in 2005, which included data on tenure and investment,
the project had already been running for three years by that point. No analysis of pre-
LMAP tenure systems and the security they offered was conducted prior to project
planning. Instead, planners represented pre-LMAP tenure through a binary of
titled/untitled as determinant of tenure security/insecurity. Close examination of
tenure systems in the survey sites, however, questions a key assumption
underpinning this binary that all those without titles suffered tenure insecurity. Can
arguments used in relation to titling in unplanned settlements be applied to Site 1
when the fundamental assumption of titling – that informal tenure is associated with
tenure insecurity – is not present? Exploring the question of titling, tenure security
and investment in planned areas, neglected by the existing literature, is important
because a key aim of the LMAP was to improve these two indicators in such areas.
Analysing project goals against project outcomes has important implications about
how other such programmes are planned and implemented around the globe.
7.3 Patterns of investment and titling
In the previous section, I have argued that both the orthodox titling literature and
LMAP policy documents asserted the presence of title as the primary determinant of
tenure security and investment. In this section, I explore the effects of title on tenure
security and property investments in both planned and unplanned areas. I assess
frequency and scale of investment in relation to the distribution of titles across and
within survey sites. I find that while there have been both frequent and large reported
investments in the absence of titles, titles seem to be related (in some areas) to more
frequent and larger-scale investments.
7.3.1 Titling and the distribution of investments across survey sites
The overall distribution of investment across the survey sites suggests that titles are
not a precondition for investment. The majority of respondents in both titled (Sites 1
and 2) and untitled (Site 3) areas reported making investments in their property
(Table 7.2). However, respondents in Site 3 reported property investments most
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frequently, despite the locality being regarded by authorities as an illegal settlement
and excluded from systematic titling. Similarly, focus group participants in Chbar
Ampov estimated that around 50 per cent of households in their community had
invested in their property, despite the fact that no residents had received titles.
Table 7.2: Households reporting investments Sites 1-3
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
Have invested 59.8% 60.9% 66.7%
Have not invested 40.2% 39.25% 33.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 92 64 48
Source: PhD fieldwork
To measure variations in the scale of property investment across the survey sites, I
used the proxy of building quality. During fieldwork, it became apparent that
indicators associated with the quality of structures were more useful in determining
the scale of investments than measuring the capital value of investments. Often
respondents seemed unsure of and/or reluctant to disclose the total cash amount of
their investments. Housing quality, on the other hand, was the tangible end result of
a respondent’s cumulative property investments. Housing in the survey sites covered
a variety of structures, which can broadly be categorised as professionally built and
self-built (Table 7.3). These categories were not mutually exclusive. Construction of
self-built housing was often carried out by construction workers – who were
frequently residents of the sites themselves. However, professionally built dwellings
were easily identifiable because of the common shop-house design they shared,
which indicated a level of professional design and planning beyond not found in self-
built housing (Figure 7.1).
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Table 7.3: Housing types Sites 1-3
Description Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
Pr
of
es
sio
na
lly
bu
ilt
Wooden
house
Large, professionally designed and built
wooden structures. Living spaces
elevated on stilts to protect from floods
and to keep cool. Predominant housing
type in Site 1 before 1979.
6.5% -- --
Mixed wood
and brick
house
As ‘wooden house’, but ground floor
converted into brick/concrete living
area.
7.6% -- --
Shop-house Professionally designed and built
housing common in central urban areas.
Often terraced. Ground floor open-plan
living space often used as commercial
premises during day.
60.8% 29.7% 22.9%
Villa Large, detached, professionally
designed and built structures.
3.3% -- --
Apartment Singe unit in co-owned pre-Khmer
Rouge professionally designed and built
structure.
19.6% 14.1% --
Warehouse Professionally designed and built
commercial unit without residential
space.
1.1% -- --
Se
lf-
bu
ilt
Wooden self-
built
Predominantly made of wood and/or
other low-quality materials (e.g. thatch,
tarpaulin, corrugated iron). Self-built
with/without assistance of construction
workers but not professionally designed.
Often modified over a period of years
1.1% 7.8% 27.1%
Mixed
materials self-
built
As above but structure includes some
concrete and brick, usually as
foundations/ground floor.
-- 45.3% 37.5%
Concrete/
brick self-
built
As above but structure predominantly
concrete/brick.
-- 3.1% 12.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 92 64 48
Source: PhD fieldwork
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Figure 7.1: Examples of housing types in the survey sites
Notes: Left to right, wooden self-built, mixed-materials self-built, shop-house professionally
built)
Source: PhD fieldwork
At the aggregate level, the distribution of housing types across the survey population
– though varied – suggests substantial investments by residents in all sites
irrespective of the distribution of titles. Untitled Site 3 and Chbar Ampov, which
were unoccupied peripheral areas in 1979, had become densely populated and
included a variety of house types by the time I undertook my fieldwork. In Site 3,
around three-quarters of the properties were self-built, with over one-quarter
constructed from wood or other less durable materials (Table 7.3). However, nearly
one-quarter of dwellings were shop-houses, indicating that some residents had
invested significant resources in constructing a professionally designed and built
dwelling. In Chbar Ampov, most houses were of poor quality, constructed from
non-durable materials. Some respondents, however, had strengthened the
foundations of their properties with concrete.
In the titled Sites 1 and 2, there was evidence of more substantial investments in
property. In Site 1, a residential area constructed by urban planners in the 1960s and
the only planned survey site, respondent housing was almost without exception
professionally built (Table 7.3). Most of these professionally built structures were
constructed in the post-Khmer Rouge period. Before these investments, housing in
the area had mostly consisted of wooden structures located in large plots and built in
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the 1960s and early 1970s; a few of these structures remained at the time I conducted
the fieldwork still remained. The high proportion of respondents living in shop-
houses or apartments – over two-thirds of Site 1 respondents – implies large-scale
investment in the area over the past three decades (i.e. post-Khmer Rouge).
The range of housing in titled Site 2 also suggests substantial property investment by
residents. It should be noted that prior to 1979 there was no housing in the area, only
a lake and scrub land. By 2013, the area was densely populated with residents
housed in a range of structures (Table 7.3). Just under one half of respondents lived
in shop-house properties. The remainder lived in self-built dwellings, which were
usually good-quality structures made with more durable materials, such as brick-
built walls and concrete floors. The most prevalent dwelling type was ‘self-built
mixed materials’, which accounted for the homes of around 45 per cent of
respondents; these structures tended to be solidly built. There were few properties
made only of wood and/or other low-cost materials.
Overall, the frequency and scale of investment across survey sites suggest that areas
where residents received titles saw larger investments than those where residents did
not. While suggestive, there findings are by no means conclusive. Variations in
investment behaviour could be the result of the different socioeconomic
characteristics of the residents of the respective sites and their different (pre-LMAP)
tenure status. I shall now focus my analysis on Sites 1 and 2, where residents of the
respective sites had similar socioeconomic and pre-LMAP tenure characteristics.
7.3.2 Pre- and post-titling investments in areas where titling occurred
Data regarding pre-and post-titling investments in titled Sites 1 and 2 show that a
substantial number were made prior to titling in project beneficiary areas. Records of
investment over time in Sites 1 and 2, where (some) residents received titles in 2008
and 2010, respectively, reveal a number of investments made before these dates
(Figure 7.2). Over 50 per cent of investments reported in Site 1 and over 70 per cent
in Site 2 were made prior to titling (N=59 and N = 41, respectively). Titling does
appear, however, to have coincided with a spike in reported property investment in
Sites 1 and 2 between 2011 and 2013. In Site 1 there were 2.5 reported investments
per year pre-LMAP compared with 4.7 post-LMAP, and in Site 2, 2 and 3 reported
investments per year, respectively. The increased frequency of investment post-
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LMAP suggests that titles may have had a positive effect on respondents’ propensity
to invest.
Figure 7.2: Number of reported investments by year Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
Breaking down investments over time in Sites 1 and 2 by scale reveals that many
substantial property investments were made prior to residents receiving title. Over
two-thirds of reported investments made prior to land titling in Site 1 involved
respondents building a new structure or undertaking major reconstruction of their
property for residential, business or rental purposes (Table 7.4). Just under one-fifth
of investments involved minor modifications to facilitate commercial activity. The
remainder also involved small modifications, but in this case to improve living
conditions. The proportion of investments reported as ‘major’ in this area was
greater in the pre-LMAP than post-LMAP period in Site 1 and about equal in Site 2,
suggesting that pre-LMAP tenure did not constitute a barrier to large-scale
investment in the area. However, there was a much longer reference period during
which ‘major’ pre-LMAP investments were observed (1979-2007 rather than 2008-
2013 for post-titling). Viewed as investments per year, there was a far higher
frequency of ‘major’ investments in the post-LMAP period than the pre-LMAP
period in both sites.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 1 titled Site 2 titled
166
Table 7.4: Pre- and post-LMAP investments Sites 1 and 2
Scale of investment
Site 1 Site 2
Pre-LMAP Post-LMAP Pre-LMAP Post-LMAP
Major (re)construction
to improve household
living conditions
35.5% 21.4% 33.3% 33.3%
Major (re)construction
for residential and rent
or business
32.3% 32.1% 6.7% --
Modify property to
start on-site business
19.4% 35.7% -- 25.0%
Upgrade property to
improve household
living conditions
9.7% 3.6% 53.3% 33.3%
Upgrade property to
improve living
conditions and to rent
3.1% 7.1% 6.7% 8.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 31 28 30 12
Source: PhD fieldwork
The data for pre- and post-titling investments in Sites 1 and 2 suggest that pre-
LMAP tenure did not constitute an insurmountable barrier to large-scale investment
in either site. However, after titling both the frequency of investments in general and
the frequency of major investments in particular increased in both sites, suggesting
that titling was associated with increased investment. It is important to note that a
proportion of respondents in both sites did not receive titles post-LMAP. To
investigate the effects of title on investment at the individual household level, I shall
now view post-titling investments in Sites 1 and 2 by recipient and non-recipient
respondents.
7.3.3 Post-LMAP investments by recipient and non-recipient households
In Sites 1 and 2 only a proportion of households received title because of the nature
of LMAP procedures, making it possible to compare investment patterns in
households with and without titles. This comparison is similar to Van Gelder’s
natural experiment (2013), where there exists an uneven distribution of titles across
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households with similar socioeconomic characteristics. As Van Gelder (2013: 2)
notes, this situation means that the ‘allocation of property rights is orthogonal to
dweller characteristics and therefore exogenous’. In other words, the effects of title
on investment can be isolated from other factors because conditions are the same
across the respective sites. Disaggregating post-LMAP investments (post 2008 and
2010 in Sites 1 and 2, respectively) in this way reveals that those without titles
invested more frequently per household (Table 7.5), suggesting that those with title
were no more likely to invest than those without.
Table 7.5: Households reporting post-titling investments Sites 1 and 2
Source: PhD fieldwork
With regard to scale of investment, however, there are clear differences between the
investment behaviours of respondents in receipt of title and those not. Respondents
with titles tended to make larger investments than those without (Table 7.6). Nearly
two-thirds of investments by recipient households involved major reconstruction for
residential and/or capital-generating purposes, compared to one quarter of
investments reported by non-recipients.
The differences in investment behaviour of recipient and non-recipient households in
titled areas strongly indicate that titles increased the probability that such households
would make large-scale investments in upgrading their dwelling. Proponents of
titling would argue that this relationship is the result of de jure changes in tenure at
the household level. While this conclusion seems plausible on the basis of data
presented, there could be other factors that also explain the observed patterns of
investment. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall attempt to delink titles from
investment to address the varied determinants of respondents’ investment behaviour.
Proportion of households who invested Share
Respondents with title 21.6%
Respondents without title 36.3%
Total 100.0%
N 156
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Table 7.6: Post-LMAP investments made with titles Sites 1 and 2
Scale of investment Investment
made without
title
Investment
made with title
Major (re)construction
to improve household
living conditions
18.8% 29.2%
Major (re)construction
for rent or business
6.3% 33.3%
Modify property to
start on-site business
43.8% 25.0%
Upgrade property to
improve household
living conditions
25.0% 4.2%
Upgrade property to
improve living
conditions and to rent
6.3% 8.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N 165 24
Source: PhD Fieldwork
7.4 Investment and perceptions of tenure security
As we have seen, planners believe that titles give homeowners the confidence to
invest in upgrading their dwellings by legally protecting their ownership rights
(Field, 2005; Jimenez 1983). However, others have argued that residents’ perceived
tenure security is the fundamental factor influencing investment decisions (Van
Gelder, 2009). Perceived security refers to residents’ own judgement of their tenure
situation, which is often based on broader considerations than an appraisal of their
legal status. Many studies have emphasised that the condition of de facto tenure
security often provides residents with a perception of strong tenure security – even in
the absence of de jure tenure. De facto security can be determined by the policies or
actions of governments towards low-income settlements in a given locality over
time, the socioeconomic characteristics of residents and the prevalence and nature of
land conflicts (Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2005; Varley, 1987).
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7.4.1 Interactions with powerful interests
A variety of interactions with the state and/or other key stakeholders (such as
tycoons) were important in determining respondents’ security of tenure. A crucial
determinant of tenure security related to eviction orders and/or land conflicts.
According to a local official, residents in Site 1 enjoyed a high level of security
because they have not faced competing ownership claims from powerful interests.78
Respondents would often note that the area was not a ‘controversial area’. As noted
in Chapter 6, the term ‘controversial area’ was significant as it denoted residents’
perceived security in relation to land conflicts affecting other Phnom Penh localities
where the state and/or powerful business interests allied against the claims of
residents. Respondents in Site 1 believed that they were the rightful owners of their
land and had no reason to suspect their ownership claim would be challenged and,
therefore, no reason to fear that assets that they had invested in would be
appropriated. Similarly, residents in Chbar Ampov, while recognising their
settlement was ‘unorganised’ (i.e. self-built), asserted that there had been no
competing ownership claims from powerful interests, and did not consider their
settlement a ‘controversial’ area.
In contrast, residents in Sites 2 and 3 had been party to disputes over their right to
own – and even occupy – their land. Respondents in Site 2 reported that during the
1980s and early 1990s the authorities’ refusal to recognise their ownership rights and
talk of planned redevelopment in the area led them to feel insecure. These threats,
however, had diminished by the 2000s. During a key informant interview, an elderly
and long-time resident of the area, intimated, ‘there were rumours of eviction in the
1980s and early 1990s but since then we have had no one telling us we are not
allowed to live here’.79 Residents’ perceptions of tenure security were based on
‘rumours’ of an eviction; when the rumours ceased, residents ceased to worry, even
though their tenure was illegal until they received titles in 2010. By the time I visited
in 2013, residents no longer considered their tenure at risk.
In Site 3, the threat to residents’ tenure was clear and present. Community members
had been informed by authorities that they lived illegally on state-owned land and
78 Interviews with chiefs of Village 1, 2, 4, 7 and 10, Site 1, various dates February-April 2013
79 Interview with Resident, Site 2, Questionnaire number 103, Phnom Penh, 21 July 2013
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would be evicted; they remained under the threat of eviction when I visited the area
in 2013. Numerous other unplanned settlements on the same stretch of railway line
had already been removed in well-publicised evictions by the time I interviewed
respondents, setting a strong precedent for the evictions of all communities on tracks
earmarked for rehabilitation. These factors caused residents to perceive their tenure
security as very weak, which in turn limited investment in housing. One respondent,
who appeared despondent and distressed by their predicament, noted: ‘why should I
spend money on my house now when the government say that I am here illegally and
they want to destroy my house?’80
Negative interactions with the state did not, however, necessarily preclude housing
investment. For example, several large investments were reported by Site 3
respondents whose tenure status was precarious. I asked one woman, who had told
me she felt scared that she would soon be evicted, why she nonetheless invested
20,000 USD in constructing a shop-house. She responded that she ‘had taken a risk’
and felt that the property might strengthen her bargaining position with the
authorities if/when an eviction notice was served.81 While the government are not
legally obligated to compensate people who live illegally on state land, they will
often offer a sum based on appraisal of the value of the structure to be demolished.
7.4.2 Positive relationships with local authorities
In other cases, positive interactions with the state had increased respondents’
perceived security of tenure and, in turn, affected their propensity to invest. Service
extension seemed to be a particularly important catalyst to perceived security and
investment in Site 2 and Chbar Ampov. In Site 2 key infrastructure was funded
through a partnership between commune authorities and a community savings group.
This arrangement demonstrated a degree of official acceptance of residents’ right to
live there. Joint community-state investments are a strategy often used by NGOs
working in Phnom Penh’s unplanned settlements, with the dual aim of upgrading
service infrastructure and building a cooperative relationship between communities
and local authorities (see Chapter 6). During the 1990s and 2000s, residents in Site 2
felt increasingly more secure because joint investments to extend sewage and
80 Interview with Resident, Site 3, Questionnaire number 164, Phnom Penh, 15 October 2013
81 Interview with Resident, Site 3, Questionnaire number 141, Phnom Penh, 3 October 2013
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drainage to their area and to pave the roads signalled their changing relationship with
local authorities.82 Thus, while titles legalised residents’ ownership claims,
community perceptions of official recognition of their tenure rights had already been
high for a long while. Much property investment detailed in Section 2 of this chapter
occurred in the 2000s, during the period when services and utilities were extended to
the area.
Similarly, in Chbar Ampov, the community cultivated strong relationships with local
authorities. The commune had funded construction of a dyke to protect the flood-
prone site and had built up the road by over a metre to make it more flood-proof.
Focus group participants identified these key investments as catalysts for their
housing investment. One participant even argued that the substantial investment of
public funds in the area made eviction less likely.83 In comparison, in some areas
where residents were threatened with eviction, officials would refuse to invest in
services and prevent residents from building structures from brick and concrete (see
Chapter 6).
Residents in Site 1 had the clearest sense that their settlement was viewed as
legitimate by the state. Crucially, many had pre-LMAP tenure documents that
conferred a high level of tenure security. In addition, respondents’ perception of their
security of tenure was strong because they identified as an organised, planned
community in contradistinction to the inhabitants of ‘unorganised’ or unplanned
areas. This self-perception as being legitimate urban residents in the eyes of the state
ties into arguments made in Chapter 5 about how legitimate and illegitimate urban
residents were constructed by the state in policy documents and laws of the 1990s.
Given this confident perception of their ownership rights it seemed to Site 1
respondents as highly unlikely – even incomprehensible– that evictions would affect
them, either pre- or post-LMAP.
82Interview with Resident, Site 2, Questionnaire number 122, Phnom Penh, 22 September
83 Focus Group Discussion, Chamrouen community, Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 17 February 2014
172
7.5 Investment motivations beyond tenure security
Arguments linking titles and investment highlight security of tenure. However,
security is not the only consideration informing investment behaviour. In the survey
sites residents mentioned a variety of other factors during interviews. These included
protection against potential intruders or hazards such as floods and fires, as well as
the availability of capital to fund housing improvements.
7.5.1 Protection from crime
A key concern and motivation for upgrading across all sites related to personal
security. In the early 1980s, as Phnom Penh repopulated following the Khmer
Rouge, migrants found a city where conflict and instability resulted in a legacy of
run-down housing. A survey conducted in 1983 noted that the Khmer Rouge had
destroyed or badly damaged up to 80 per cent of the city’s housing in the period
1975-1979; during this period the entire civilian population of Phnom Penh had been
relocated to rural areas (Beng Hong, 1984). After the Khmer Rouge fell, these
dilapidated units were occupied by migrants to the city, most of whom were low-
income farmers and refugees who had been displaced by war (Khemro, 2001;
Khemro and Payne, 2004; Mysliwiec, 1988).
In Site 1, some of the first residents to move to the area recalled that the dilapidated
structures they had occupied offered little protection from the lawlessness that
reigned across the city in the 1980s and 1990s.84 Some of the earliest residents in
Site 1 reported occupying large wooden houses that had been constructed in the pre-
Khmer Rouge era but were forcibly vacated during the exodus from Phnom Penh,
their former residents presumed murdered. By the time migrants began to occupy the
area in the early 1980s, the houses had fallen into disrepair and the large plots on
which they were built had grown dense with foliage.85 Concerns over personal
security compelled residents to build concrete structures, which were considered
much safer. One elderly female respondent noted:
I lived in this house when I came to Phnom Penh in 1979. It was a
wooden house at that time. During the Pol Pot era a high-ranking official
84 Interview with resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 23, Phnom Penh, 11 June 2013
85 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 15, Phnom Penh, 6 June 2013
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lived in this house and it was considered a beautiful house. When I could
afford it I built a concrete house in its place. I did this because of my
personal security; there were a lot of thieves around during the night and
a wooden house provides little security. 86
The modern shop-houses that replaced wooden structures in Site 1 and, to a lesser
extent, Sites 2 and 3 were practically impregnable: all windows were barred, all
doors had steel shutters and all vehicles were parked in the ground floor
living/commercial space at night. Lower-income respondents in Sites 2 and 3 and in
Chbar Ampov added bars to their windows and erected boundary walls protected
with barbed wire or broken glass embedded in cement.
Increased personal security was also viewed as a driver of positive change in itself,
particularly in low-income areas. Site 2 was once viewed as an undesirable, sparsely
populated and dangerous place to live. As the area became more populated, it came
to be perceived as safer, prompting further migration to the area and yet more
housing investment. One respondent, who had moved to Site 2 from a rural area of
Takamao province in 1981, emphasised the issue of personal security in her
perception of the settlement’s development over time:
In the 1980s the area was not safe and most of the buildings were small
shacks. A nightclub was opened on the land and sex workers who worked
in the nightclub lived in the area; this made it more dangerous. The
nightclub shut down in the late 1980s and the area became safer and a
nicer area to live in. More people came to live here during that time and
people improved their houses and built additional rooms for their
families.87
7.5.2 Fire and natural hazards
Residents in all three survey sites and in Chbar Ampov stated that an important
reason for upgrading their properties from wood to concrete was the threat of fire. In
Site 1, respondents noted that house fires were common during the 1980s – electrical
fires from poorly-maintained equipment, fires resulting from the spilling of hot coals
86 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 14, Phnom Penh, 6 June 2013
87 Interview with Resident, Site 2, Questionnaire number 192, Phnom Penh, 1 November 2013
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and, in one case, from a hand-grenade explosion. In densely packed unplanned areas,
the threat of fire was even more severe because it could spread easily from house to
house and fire engines were unable to enter narrow streets to tackle blazes. A fire in
Site 3 in 1998 had destroyed many homes, for example, and residents had been
obliged to rebuild from scratch. 88 Those who lived in wooden or other poor-quality
dwellings were most at risk of fire damage and thus had the most incentive to
upgrade their homes.
Flooding was also cited as a reason to strengthen and modify housing by respondents
living in flood-prone areas. Respondents in Site 2 and focus group participants in
Chbar Ampov were particularly affected by floods, as both areas were former
wetland areas. Respondents in Site 2 often stressed ‘building up the ground’ to a
higher level than the flood waters as their first and most important housing
investment.89 The effect of flooding over time had diminished in Site 2 because
authorities had installed drainage and paved roads. In Chbar Ampov, however, there
was no drainage and flooding was still a problem, causing five deaths by drowning
in the two years prior to fieldwork and contributing to a recent cholera epidemic.90
Respondents saw elevating their living space above the flood water line as a crucial
investment to protect life and property. Those who could afford it had erected
concrete pylons on which living spaces sat 2-3m above ground-level during the dry
season. The next investment priority was laying concrete foundations in which the
pylons could be set. Those set in earth were liable to be weakened by floodwaters,
potentially destabilising elevated living areas.
For some respondents – including those reporting particular concern about their
security of tenure - the need to protect life and property against environmental
hazards outweighed fear of eviction. One respondent in Chbar Ampov had invested
in erecting concrete pylons, laying concrete foundations and strengthening her living
area; but she said she did not feel she had strong ownership rights as she had no land
ownership documents. When I asked why she had invested, she replied ‘today I
88 Interview with Resident, Site 3, Questionnaire number 89, Phnom Penh, 14 July 2013
89 Interview with Resident, Site 2, Questionnaire number 145, Phnom Penh, 3 October 2013
90 Focus Group Discussion, Chamrouen community, Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 17 February 2014
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worry about the flooding and protecting my house and family, and tomorrow if they
try to evict me I will worry about that.91
7.5.3 Availability of capital
A major determinant of investment across all three sites was the availability of
capital. In Site 1 there was greater availability of capital relative to the other survey
areas. A key mechanism through which capital was accrued by some of the earlier
residents was through sub-division and sale of their plots. One informant, who had
lived in Site 1 since 1981, asserted that substantial development occurred in the area
after private property was introduced and ownership transactions were made legally
possible in 1989, noting the 1990s as a period of particular change.92 During the
1990s sub-division and sale of property occurred as land prices increased, attracting
new residents who often bought vacant plots of land and invested in building new
homes. According to the survey data, around 70 per cent of Site 1 respondents had
acquired their property through purchase, with the median year of purchase being
1993.
Changes in plot dimensions over time give an idea of the scale of the sub-division
and housing investment in Site 1. Many of the original residents had occupied large
plots when they migrated to the city. One elderly man who moved into the area in
the early 1980s remarked how different it was then: houses occupied large plots
surrounded in areas of grassland and scrub. The long-time resident was one the few
people that I interviewed who still lived in a traditional wooden house in ample
grounds. He stated his plot was 500 m2 – a size, he asserted, that was considered
average in the 1980s.93 By the time of my survey, however, large plots such as his
were the exception rather than the rule. By 2013, repeated sub-division meant the
median plot size had reduced to 70 m2. Plots in the area had been subdivided so
much that side-streets, known as ‘z’ streets, had been built to provide access to
homes built on the smaller plots resulting from subdivisions (Figure 7.3). It seems
possible that the previously noted increase in investment post-LMAP in Site 1 was
91 Focus Group Discussion, Chamrouen community, Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 17 February 2014
92 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 62, Phnom Penh, 30 June 2013
93 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 3, Phnom Penh, 21 May 2013
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also caused by increased capital availability, since residents already had high
security of tenure. In the next chapter, I chart the role credit played in this process.
Figure 7.3: Street map of Site 1
Note: ‘z’ streets marked as red dots
Source: Open Street Map
The availability of capital was also a determinant of housing investment in low-
income Sites 2 and 3 and Chbar Ampov. In these sites scarcity of capital constituted
a constraint on upgrading. While there was some evidence of sub-division in
unplanned areas, the capital generated was limited by comparison with that
generated from the same process in Site 1 because as peripheral and/or unplanned
settlements the land values were lower. There was no evidence that the process freed
up capital for property investment in the unplanned sites. For some, capital
availability was the overriding determinant of investment behaviour. When I asked
the village chief whether he thought land titles had encouraged investment he replied
‘people invest if they have money – it doesn’t matter whether they have title or not’.
The chief was amused by the suggestion that there existed a more significant
constraint to housing improvement than availability of capital.94
94 Interview with Village Chief, Village 2, Commune Tonle Bassac, Phnom Penh, 1 April 2012
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7.6 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter leads to three key conclusions relating to titling, tenure
security and investment. First, there is convincing evidence that the LMAP
contributed to increased housing investment in project beneficiary areas. Increased
investment by recipients was visible both across and within survey sites. Across
survey sites, it was clear that residents in titled areas invested more in housing and
home-based entrepreneurial activity than residents of areas excluded from titling.
Within survey sites that had been titled, the number and scale of investments
increased post-LMAP and residents who received titles as a result of the LMAP
invested greater resources in their property.
Second, the links between titles, security and investment in Phnom Penh are more
complex than described by titling models. It not clear that the increased investment
associated with LMAP was caused by titles alone. Rather, titles worked as one of a
number of factors affecting residents’ perception of their security of tenure, which in
turn affected their investment behaviour. In addition, there were factors other than
tenure security, such as availability of capital, which played an important role in
respondents, investment decisions. The relative importance of the multiple
determinants of tenure security and investment was closely related to the
circumstances of the individual and the area where they lived.
Third, it is of crucial importance to note that those with the highest tenure insecurity
and lowest levels of investment were excluded from the LMAP (Site 3 and Chbar
Ampov). The benefits of the project were limited to areas like Site 1 and 2, where
residents enjoyed high de facto security prior to the LMAP.
These conclusions have important implications for the planning of systematic titling
projects. The LMAP’s characterisation of the title/untitled distinction as the primary
indicator of tenure security often misrepresented the nature of the residents’ tenure
status. Rather than uniform, the relative importance of titles influencing
respondents’ investment behaviour was highly context dependent in the survey sites.
Policy makers should also be sensitive to the complex links between titling, security
and investment in a variety of contexts, rather than assume that providing titles to
households will always increase investment. In this regard, conducting research into
the nature of tenure documents, tenure insecurity and housing investments prior to
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implementing a titling project may yield information useful for the planning process.
In Phnom Penh, such an approach would have, perhaps, led to the project focusing
resources on areas of high tenure insecurity and low investment where titles would
potentially pay the greatest dividends in terms of increasing tenure security and
investment.
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Chapter 8: Titles and Access to Credit
8.1 Introduction
Titling projects aim to provide recipients with legal ownership documents that
formal credit providers will lend against. With this barrier to access removed,
planners expect the provision of formal credit to increase in areas where property
rights have been formalised (De Soto, 2000; Feder and Nishio, 1998). In this chapter,
I suggest that the relationship between titles and borrowing activity is not always as
uniform as titling theory predicts. In exploring titles and credit activity, I draw on
data from the three Phnom Penh survey sites and key informant interviews. I also use
data from focus group discussions with residents in the peri-urban commune of
Chbar Ampov. These discussions were conducted as part of a separate project, but
yielded important information about microfinance borrowing in low-income
populations (see Chapter 4).
Following this introduction, I contrast representations of titling and credit markets in
the literature with respondents’ experiences of borrowing in the survey sites. I
suggest the binary of formal/informal categorisation of lenders used in the literature
is not sufficient to describe lending practices in the survey sites, which exist more on
a continuum of lenders embodying a variety of lending practices. I then go on to
explore how titles have intersected with these diverse lending practices, highlighting
a range of borrowing behaviours that are closely linked to households’
socioeconomic characteristics. I find that titles have been incorporated in the credit
seeking strategies of some respondents, but appear unimportant for others, who have
been able to obtain formal credit without using titles as collateral.
Through this analysis, I hope to contribute to the literature in four ways. First, I
critique the formal/informal distinction as a framework to assess the effect of titles
on borrowing. I suggest that the distinction is limiting in the case of Cambodia
because of the presence of lenders who do not fit well into either category. Second, I
explore how titles have affected the reported credit activity of respondents located in
planned as well as unplanned areas. Third, I provide empirical support for arguments
that dispute the primacy of collateral in accessing formal sector loans, revealing a
range of factors that also contribute to credit activity. Fourth, I offer an account of
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how titles interact with the lending practices of microfinance companies, which are
fast becoming the ubiquitous credit source in many developing economies.
8.2. Titles, trends in borrowing and the structure of credit markets
In this section, I explore the characteristics of credit markets in the survey sample. I
find that formal sector borrowing has increased substantially over time, whereas
credit activity in the informal sector has been low. I then explore the different types
of formal and informal sector lending and the role of titles in facilitating these
divergent borrowing practices.
8.2.1 Titles and aggregate borrowing trends
Before exploring titles and credit in the survey sites, it is useful to outline briefly
how formal and informal lending institutions are defined in the literature, and how
titles are thought to intersect with these different forms of borrowing. ‘Formal
credit’ refers to ‘official’ sources of credit (Bromley, 2009; De Soto, 2000; Payne et
al., 2008). While no definitive criteria are offered for what constitutes ‘official’
credit, the term is usually used in reference to banks and other lenders licensed by
the state to lend money. By contrast, ‘informal’ or ‘alternative’ sources of credit are
not ‘official’ credit providers. Proponents of titling often conflate informal
borrowing with high-interest moneylender loans (De Soto, 2000). However, studies
have highlighted an array of informal loan sources available to low-income urban
residents, including friends and family, community savings groups or rotating credit
and savings associations, community-based micro-credit organisations and Non-
Governmental Organisations (Payne et al., 2008).
According to the classic argument associated with authors such as Hernando De Soto
(2000), households without titles have no choice but to borrow from informal lenders
at usurious interest rates, because formal lenders will not lend in the absence of
secure collateral. With titles, recipients can access formal sector credit at lower
interest rates, rendering informal lenders largely redundant and resulting in the
formalisation of credit markets (De Soto, 2000; Feder and Nishio 1998). Empirical
studies have shown, however, that titles have little effect on access to formal credit
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in low-income communities, which continue to rely on informal or alternative
borrowing mechanisms (Gilbert, 2012; Payne et al., 2008, 2008; Varley, 1987).
Using these conventional definitions of formal and informal credit, a striking aspect
of borrowing in the survey sites is the lack of loans obtained in the informal sector,
either before or after titling (Table 8.1). I was surprised by the relative absence of
informal loans, particularly in Site 1, because baseline data I obtained for the same
area from a 2005 CDRI survey of pre-LMAP tenure systems (which included some
of the same households as I interviewed in 2013) showed substantial informal credit
activity during the period 2003-2005. In my questionnaire, I had attempted to obtain
data relating to this kind of historical borrowing. I had asked respondents to report
and provide dates for all credit activity since they first moved to the property. Most
respondents had lived in Site 1 since the mid-1990s, so I expected to hear reports of
informal loan activity.
Table 8.1: Borrowing activity Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
The only explanation for the absence of such loans in respondents’ accounts of their
borrowing is that they had simply forgotten about the loans or did not consider them
important. The informal loans reported in Site 1 in the 2005 survey were relatively
small – a few hundred dollars at most – and had been obtained in the period before
formal credit was widely available. During the 2013 survey, the response to
questions about informal credit was normally ‘I have not borrowed from
moneylenders but from the bank’. Another possible reason for the seeming
Credit Activity Share
Received formal credit 28.3%
Received informal credit 2.5%
Received formal and informal credit 1.0%
Did not seek a loan 66.7%
Turned down for a loan 1.0%
Turned down for formal credit but received informal credit 0.5%
Total 100.0%
N 204
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underreporting of historic informal loan activity was that formal credit had almost
completely replaced informal credit in the survey sites and most people associated
loans with formal loans.
While formal sector borrowing was prevalent, there were ‘alternative’ forms of
credit in the form of savings groups operating in Site 2 and Chbar Ampov. However,
these groups did not appear to support private lending to individuals. Instead, loans
were used to fund infrastructure upgrading, neighbourhood security patrols and other
community-oriented activities.
A second striking aspect of the data was that respondents who had accessed formal
sector credit had frequently done so without using a title as collateral. Breaking
down credit activity by site over time reveals that a proportion of formal borrowing
occurred before either Site 1 or Site 2 had been titled, or, in the case of Site 3, in the
absence of titles (Figure 8.1). In Chbar Ampov too, focus group participants asserted
that residents had been able to access formal credit despite not having titles. Again,
this is at odds with the belief that titles are a precondition for accessing formal credit
(Feder and Nishio, 1998).
Figure 8.1: Formal loans over time Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
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Titling in Sites 1 and 2, however, did coincide with a period of rapid growth in
formal credit disbursement. In Site 1 there was a three-year lag between titling in
2008 and increased activity from 2011, which may have been the result of the
financial crisis that beset the country in 2009 (Figure 8.1). After 2011, however,
there was a steep rise in the number of formal sector loans reported by respondents.
In Site 2, there was also a sharp increase in borrowing after titling occurred in 2010.
While the experiences of respondents in Sites 1 and 2 suggest titles may have been a
factor in changing borrowing patterns, the reported credit activity of respondents
from Site 3 raises questions about this interpretation. In Site 3 there was a similar
spike in loans from 2011 despite the fact that no respondents had received titles.
Similarly, in Chbar Ampov, focus group participants reported that, although they did
not have titles, residents had borrowed from formal credit institutions with
increasing frequency since 2005.95
Data concerning the collateral used to access formal sector loans also suggest a
complex relationship between titles and borrowing patterns. There is evidence that
titling played some part in the changing borrowing behaviours of some respondents:
titles were used as collateral for a number of loans from 2011-2013 (Figure 8.2). In
most cases, however, a tenure document other than title was sufficient collateral to
access formal credit and, in some cases, the lender disbursed loans without any
tenure document reported as collateral. These results do not give any strong
indications that titles caused an increase in credit growth, but suggest a more
complex relationship, where titles may be tied up in the extension of formal sector
credit, but cannot fully explain it.
95 Focus group discussion, Vealsbov community, Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February 2014
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Figure 8.2: Documents used as collateral for formal sector loans Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
8.2.2 Titles and the different types of formal sector credit
Proponents of titling treat ‘formal credit’ as a homogeneous group of lenders with
standardised lending criteria. In this uniform landscape, title is predicted to have a
uniformly positive outcome in removing collateral constraints to credit access (Feder
and Nishio, 1998). Empirical studies that question the role of titles in increasing
access to formal credit have not offered an alternative perspective, because the
lenders in these particular empirical settings have often included large, established,
public or private banks (Field and Torero, 2003). In Phnom Penh, however, the
ambiguous relationship between title and lending hints at a more complex landscape
of formal credit provision than typically encountered in the literature.
A clearer view of the role of titles in access to formal sector credit emerges when the
different types of ‘formal’ borrowing reported are disaggregated. Respondents
reported obtained loans from one of two types of formal lender: microfinance
institutions or banks. The widespread use of commercial microfinance institutions
has emerged only recently and do not therefore feature in the titling literature. In
Cambodia these lenders are licensed by the government to lend money at interest and
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thus fit into the category of ‘formal’ credit. According to an expert on Cambodia’s
banking sector, the key difference between banks and microfinance institutions is
that the former are licensed to provide loans, accept deposits and provide means of
payment (e.g. bank cards), while the latter are licensed only to provide loans.96 The
microfinance sector has rapidly expanded in Cambodia in recent years, and is now
viewed as a key source of credit for low-income households (Bylander, 2014;
Bylander and Hamilton, 2015).
The characteristics of bank lending and microfinance lending differed considerably
in the survey sample. Bank loans were usually obtained from one of the large high-
street banks, including Canadia Bank, ACLEDA, ANZ Royal and ABA. Those
borrowing from microfinance institutions reported a bewildering variety of lenders.
In Chbar Ampov, for example, a community with 46 member households reported
loans from at least eight separate microfinance institutions.97 Across the country, the
Microfinance Association of Cambodia lists 47 licensed loan operators on its
webpage.
The relationship between titles and these different types of formal credit was uneven.
Analysis of the type of collateral used to access loans shows that titles were more
important in obtaining credit from commercial banks than microfinance institutions
(Table 8.2). Around 84 per cent of commercial bank loans were obtained with a title
used as collateral. In contrast, around 90 per cent of reported microfinance loans
were obtained without title collateral. Despite this overall trend, a substantial number
of microfinance loans were also supported by titles, and commercial bank loans by
documents other than a title. In general, microfinance loans were smaller and
subject to higher rates of interests in comparison to bank loans, which were
commonly associated with loans of tens of thousands of dollars. The results also
highlight the importance of titles within the categories of bank and microfinance
lending: when titles were used as collateral by customers of either banks or
microfinance companies, the sums borrowed tended to larger and the rates of interest
charged lower. I will now examine the role of titles in these different forms of
lending in more detail.
96 Programme Coordinator (Economics unit), Cambodia Development Resource Instituted (CDRI),
Phnom Penh, 8 July 2013
97 Focus group discussion, Vealsbov community, District Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February
2014
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Table 8.2: Formal sector loans and loan collateral Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
8.2.3 Titles and bank loans
To assess the impact titles have had on the lending activity of Cambodia’s banks, I
requested and was able to secure interviews with leading figures in the banking
sector. Through these interviews, I learnt that having a land title as collateral was a
key requirement for the disbursement of larger loans. Established, well-known banks
based their lending practise on global banking norms and would usually not accept
any tenure document other than title as collateral.98 Many would not accept ‘soft
titles’ – tenure documents issued by local authorities – in the absence of a land title.
As the head of mortgages for one of Cambodia’s largest banks noted:
we don’t touch soft title because there’s an unknown factor. The
unknown factor is that someone else might claim possession rights or
98 The exceptions were small loans offered by the microfinance business of ACLEDA, Cambodia’s
largest lender. However, the bank required title for sums over 10,000 USD (Interview with Vice-
President and Head of Mortgages ACLEDA, Phnom Penh, 5 September 2013).
Title No document Other tenuredocument N
Commercial
bank
Share 84.0% -- 16% 25
Mean
amount 21,000 USD -- 3,375.00 USD 24
Mean
interest rate 1.31% -- 2.00% 22
Microfinance
institution
Share 10.4% 12.5% 77.1% 48
Mean
amount 6,070 USD 2,133 USD 2,718 USD 48
Mean
interest rate 1.4% 1.77% 1.91% 36
All
Share 35.6% 8.2% 56.2% 73
Mean
amount 18,129 USD 2,133 USD 2,459 USD 72
Mean
interest rate 1.32% 1.78% 1.98% 58
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ownership rights or any types of right at all to that land. If anyone has got
another claim on that land it could go into a court case that could go
anywhere up to five years.99
From the bank perspective, titles remove uncertainty about plot ownership because
they constitute definitive legal proof of the ownership claim of an individual or
organisation. Only one entity, the General Department for Cadastre and Geography
at the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction, can issue
titles; the details of the plot owners are also digitally stored in the land registry,
maintained by the same department. Banks have confidence in the integrity of this
institution: they believe it can be trusted not to issue multiple ownership documents
for one plot. Titles are considered ‘99 per cent safe’. 100
The provision of titles to larger sectors of the population has, therefore, resulted in
increased lending by banks. Assessing the change that titling has made to the
expansion of credit markets in Phnom Penh, an influential figure in Cambodia’s
financial industry noted:
the ‘big end ‘of town in Phnom Penh has tended to have hard titles and
they have been able to access credit with it at a pretty cheap rate for a
while. What has happened now is smaller borrowers – who used to have
a hard time getting credit – now have title and are beginning to access
credit more and are a very attractive market for banks who are competing
to get them as clients.101
Bank loans have not extended as far as to residents of unplanned residents, however,
even in cases where residents have land titles as collateral. There are two key
reasons for this. First, the explosion in small microfinance companies catering to
low-income borrowers means that breaking into this market is difficult for larger
banks. Instead, most established banks market themselves, as one banker put it, to
‘middle market’ customers and do not engage with low-income borrowers.102 The
exception to this trend is ACLEDA, which is Cambodia’s largest bank with an
established microfinance arm. Second, the more formal lending criteria at larger
99 Interview with Head of Mortgages, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 25 June 2013
100 Interview with Head of Mortgages, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 25 June 2013
101 Interview with former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2013
102 Interview with former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2013
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banks means that many low-income borrowers do not meet the bank’s requirements
to obtain a loan, even if they have sufficient collateral. For many banks an
applicant’s ability to pay back the loan is ‘the most important lending
consideration’.103 Many low-income households may lack financial record-keeping
relating to income and expenditures, making it difficult for lenders to assess whether
or not a loan applicant would be able to meet repayment requirements.
The reluctance of banks to lend in unplanned areas was reflected in the survey data.
Only one respondent in an unplanned site was able to use their title to access a large
(over 10,000 USD) loan. The respondent owned a large plot of land and derived an
income from renting to 16 tenants. Even in this case, the loan was obtained from a
microfinance company rather than a bank. Two other respondents had tried to use
their title as collateral for a large bank loan but were turned down on the grounds that
they could not provide evidence of their ability to repay the loan. Not surprisingly, a
reason Site 2 respondents often gave for not attempting to use their title to get a bank
loan was that they did not think they would be able to prove to the bank that they
could pay it back. Thus income rather that collateral was a constraint to respondents
with title attempting to access bank loans in Site 2.
These supply constraints are not unique to Cambodia. A number of studies have
noted similar bank lending practices across the developing world (Gilbert, 2012,
2002; Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2009). They too stress non-collateral lending
requirements as key barriers to low-income households accessing bank loans.
8.2.4 Titles and microfinance loans
Commercial banks disburse credit and enforce contracts in line with orthodox
notions of formal credit providers found in the literature. The lending activity of
microfinance institutions, however, differs from common representations of formal
credit in several respects. Through interviewing microfinance lenders, I learnt that
many microfinance companies do not use the same ‘official’ procedures as banks to
administer loans, such as executing repossession orders through the courts. Instead,
microfinance companies harness local institutions, such as commune and village
103 Interview with former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2013
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authorities to guarantee loans and enforce loan contracts.104 Enforcing loan contracts
is achieved by mobilising local institutions to put pressure on the household to meet
repayments, including, in some cases, obliging households to sell their house if they
cannot service their debt.105
The use of local institutions to enforce contracts means that there is little need for
microfinance companies to use titles as collateral. Focus-group discussions with very
low-income communities in the peri-urban commune of Chbar Ampov revealed that
participants with no tenure documents could access microfinance using identity cards
as collateral. They reported that brokers would visit their community and go from
house to house actively trying to sell loans to respondents – ‘100 per cent’ of
households had taken up these loan offers. Many had borrowed from more than one
lender to pay outstanding debts. In other areas, respondents accessed loans with
bespoke documents provided by the village or commune office.106
The conditions attached to some microfinance loans have more in common with
informal moneylender loans than bank loans. Loans usually involve small sums lent
at high rates of interest. In Chbar Ampov, for example, focus group participants
reported that the average loan was 250-500 USD at rates of 2.5-3 per cent interest
per month, equating to an APR of 35-45 per cent.107 These high rates constitute a
major expenditure for low-income residents: one elderly woman who worked as an
informal garbage collector noted that she spent 23 USD a month on repayments.108
Such high interest rates – while not as high as those charged by moneylenders – are
not what one would typically understand as a low-interest formal credit.
While many microfinance lenders incorporate informal lending procedures, it is
important to stress their diversity. There were also examples of microfinance lending
that more closely resemble formal credit. Loan characteristics reported by
respondents in Site 2, for example, were very different from those reported by focus
group participants in Chbar Ampov. In Site 2 the loans were larger, and interest rates
104 Interview with Branch Manager, Y.C.P. Microfinance, Phnom Penh, 3 September 2013
105 Interview with Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 84, Phnom Penh, 13 July 2013
106 Focus group discussion, Vealsbov community, District Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February
2014
107 Focus group discussion, Vealsbov community, District Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February
2014
108 Focus group discussion, Vealsbov community, District Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February
2014
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lower, and a tenure document was used as collateral for three quarters of the loans
reported (and title, for one in four loans) (Table 8.3). Often, loans in Site 2 were
from well-known lenders such as ACLEDA’s microfinance arm. Such loans were
not available to very low-income groups or those with insecure property rights.
Focus group participants in Chbar Ampov, for example, reported that they were
refused credit from ACLEDA because they lacked tenure documents that the bank
would accept as collateral and were unable to satisfy the lender of their ability to
service a loan.
Site 2 provides an interesting insight into the difference titles make for low-income
residents of unplanned settlements where microfinance is ubiquitous. Among
respondents, titles seemed to be associated with larger loans at lower interest rates,
though the sample was small (Table 8.3). Given that the distribution of titles in Site
2 was not related to household socioeconomic characteristics (see Chapters 4 and 7),
it appears that title may facilitate access to larger, lower-interest loans independently
of borrowers’ socioeconomic characteristics. Title-recipients may obtain preferential
loans conditions because they are able to access the services of reputable lenders.
Table 8.3: Collateral used for microfinance loans Site 2
Source: PhD fieldwork
The lending practices of microfinance companies in the survey populations appear to
challenge the formal/informal categorisation of lenders. Microfinance loans
constitute ‘formal’ credit because the institutions in question are regulated by the
state. However, in a context of unorthodox ‘formal’ lending practices, some reported
microfinance loans are at odds with common understandings of formal credit in the
titling literature. The use of local institutions to enforce contracts has less in common
with lending practices of banks, and more with the lending practices of
Title No documentrequired
Tenure
document
other than title
N
Share 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 16
Mean amount 5,088 USD 1,950 USD 3,125 USD 16
Mean interest rates 1.55% 1.95% 1.86% 16
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moneylenders. This divergence between accounts in the literature and the experience
of respondents suggests that a reconceptualisation of credit markets in cities of the
global south and the role of titles in mediating borrowers’ access to them may be
necessary.
8.2.5 Titles and moneylender loans
While moneylender loans were not common in any of the Phnom Penh sites I visited,
in research I have conducted as a development worker in other Cambodian cities, I
have encountered very high levels of debt to moneylenders. In some cases, default
and repossessions had occurred when title had been used as collateral for a loan.
These cases of repossession, which were facilitated by ‘formal’ titles but enforced by
‘informal’ moneylenders, also challenge the application of the formal/informal
binary in relation to Cambodia’s credit markets.
I found many cases of moneylender loans in a low-income community in the city of
Kampong Cham where titles had been used as collateral. Focus group discussions
revealed that residents were unable to access microfinance and instead borrowed
from an informal moneylender, who operated from a stall at the local market. 109
The community had all received titles and without exception had used them as
collateral to obtain loans from this moneylender, for which she charged ten per cent
interest per month. Seven of 43 households in the community had defaulted and had
their property repossessed but even though title had been used as collateral,
repossession was not enforced through the courts. Instead, the moneylender obtained
a document signed by the village chief, which stated that ownership of the property
had been transferred to her and attached the document to the title. Legally speaking,
the moneylender did not in fact own the property after this ‘repossession’, because
the only way to transfer ownership is through the land ministry after paying a four
per cent transaction tax.
Irrespective of the legality of the repossession, the consequences for the borrowers
were dire. One elderly woman with terminal diabetes had borrowed money using her
title, but mounting medical costs meant she could not afford repayments. Eventually
109 Focus Group Discussion, 42 Knong community, Kampong Cham, 24 February 2014
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she lost her home and when I visited the community she was accommodated in a two
meter squared thatched structure with no electricity, water or sanitation system.
The experience of Kampong Cham residents suggests that titles have little effect on
how moneylenders repossess the assets of low-income defaulters; local institutions
rather than the courts are used to execute repossessions. In this context, titles may in
fact be of benefit to vulnerable borrowers, because those who have had their titled
plot repossessed through local procedures remain the legal owners of ‘repossessed’
plots. Having to go to court to repossess property – and incurring the associated costs
– may be viewed as undesirable by moneylenders, particularly when loan amounts
are small. Moreover, low-income borrowers may benefit from titles by accessing
loans at reasonable interest rates from well-regulated microfinance lenders as has
been observed in Site 2, which is far better than the moneylender alternative.
Moneylender loans offered far worse terms than any microfinance institution and
offered little scope for government oversight or regulation.
8.3 Socioeconomic characteristics and household borrowing
In this section I explore respondent borrowing in relation to key household
socioeconomic indicators. In doing so, I question the assertion that credit activity is
primarily a function of collateral, as posited by proponents of titling. As I have
suggested in the previous section of this chapter, titles and other forms of collateral
are important in credit activity, but their effects are mediated by other factors, such
as ability to service loan repayments. In this section, I explore these other factors that
mediate borrowing in more depth. First, I assess how indicators related to household
economic characteristics affect their loan activity. I then focus on household
demographic characteristics, highlighting gender of household head as a key variable
that affects credit activity.
8.3.1 Household economic characteristics and credit activity
The literature suggests that a household’s economic characteristics can have
important implications for its borrowing activity. In particular, a number of studies
have asserted that for low income households accessing formal credit may be
difficult irrespective of collateral requirements because they do not have the income
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to meet repayments (Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; 2004). The results from the survey
populations support the point that a household’s economic status influences their
borrowing activity, although the results suggest a more complex relationship
between economic status, titles and borrowing than asserted in the literature.
To assess the links between economic status and borrowing I differentiated
respondents’ wealth by their housing characteristics and the location of their
dwelling.110 I found that in general, better-off households living in professionally
built housing borrowed larger amounts, paying less interest and using title as
collateral more often compared to lower-income residents living in self-built
dwellings (Table 8.4; see Chapter 7 for discussion of ‘self-built’ and ‘professionally
built’ housing). However, those living in self-built accommodation borrowed far
more regularly than those living in professionally built structures.
The location of a respondent’s home was also linked to the supply of credit. Like
building quality, the location of respondents’ dwellings varied significantly and was
associated with their economic status. Site 1 was a desirable, planned residential area
close to markets, schools and hospitals; Site 2 was centrally located and had received
titles and state assistance in infrastructure development, but remained, in the words
of one resident, an ‘unorganised’ area;111 Site 3 was state-owned land adjacent to the
city’s main railway line, with predominantly poor-quality housing and unpaved
roads– self-evidently an undesirable residential location. Borrowing activity varied
markedly between locations. Respondents in Site 1 borrowed the least frequently,
but obtained higher loan amounts, at lower rates of interest (Table 8.6). The
proportion of respondents reporting credit activity was higher in Site 2, and higher
still in Site 3. Average loan amounts were lower in Site 2 than Site 1, and lower still
in Site 3, while interest rates were higher in Site 2 than Site 1, and higher still in Site
3.
110 Indicators directly relating to wealth include household assets, income and expenditure. However,
because of time constraints and difficulties with accurately measuring such indicators, proxies were
used. After considering a range of proxies, including education attainment and livelihood activities, I
decided housing quality and location provided the best indication of economic status, because, for
most respondents, land and housing was their most valuable asset.
111 Interview with Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 90, Phnom Penh, 16 July 2013
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Table 8.4: Housing type and borrowing Sites 1-3
Professionally
built
Self-built Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
Received credit 27.1% 41.9% 27.1% 29.7% 45.8%
Did not receive
credit
72.9% 58.1% 72.9% 70.3% 54.2%
Mean loan size 12,351 USD 2,813 USD 15,542 USD 3,783 USD 2,073 USD
Mean interest rate 1.64% 2% 1.67% 1.77% 1.94%
Borrowers using
title as collateral
53.3% 15.8% 76% 36.8% --
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 129 74 92 64 48
Note: ‘Received credit’ refers to the percentage of households that reported one or more loans either
currently or on any previous occasion. Mean loan size and mean loan interest refers to all loans.
Source: PhD fieldwork
The trend between housing quality, location and loan activity was also in evidence in
Chbar Ampov. Residents there appeared to be the worst-off finically relative to
respondents in Sites 1-3: their dwellings were often low quality and were located in a
flood-prone area far from the city centre, with high rates of poverty and very limited
infrastructure. Focus group participants reported far higher rates of borrowing than
Sites 1-3: it was reported that all households in their community had accessed loans.
The loan amounts were smaller than in Sites 1-3 – on average 250 USD per loan –
and interest rates higher at around 2-3 per cent per month. No households in Chbar
Ampov had a land title to use as collateral.
The survey data also revealed that a household’s economic characteristics had an
impact on how loans were used. Respondents living in professionally built housing
often used their titles to access loans to make a one-off large investment in their
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property. Over half the borrowers living in such structures had used credit to invest
in their home, either to upgrade their accommodation and/or to generate capital from
their home (Table 8.5). These respondents sought large bank loans for which title
was a prerequisite. By contrast, those living in self-built dwellings usually took out
smaller loans for off-site business activities for which titles were not a requirement.
Such activities usually involved buying goods wholesale to sell or investing in
agricultural land owned by the family. A portion of these smaller loans were also
used to upgrade self-built homes (Table 8.5).
Table 8.5: Housing characteristics and loan use Sites 1-3
Professionally
built
Self-built Site 1 Site 2 Site 3
Develop property to
improve living
conditions
13% 17.1% 6.9% 12.5% 23.5%
Develop property to
provide rental
accommodation
15.2% 2.4% 20.7% 4.2% 2.9%
Develop property to
improve living
conditions and provide
rental accommodation
15.2% -- 17.2% 4.2% 2.9%
Invest in starting on-
site business 15.2% 2.4% 24.1% -- 2.9%
Off-site business
investment 39.2% 61% 31.1% 58.3% 61.8%
Other 2.2% 17% -- 12.6% 5.9%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 46 34 29 24 34
Source: PhD fieldwork
Location was also strongly associated with loan use. Typically, respondents from
Site 1 borrowed to invest in the economic functions of their home (Table 8. 5),
possibly because of the greater scope for home-based commerce in the area. Site 1
was a commercially vibrant district located on busy city-centre streets lined with
shops, restaurants and cafes – one survey street even hosted a lively market. In
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addition, there was a strong rental market in Site 1, because the area was close to the
Royal University of Phnom Penh and conveniently located for other service-industry
jobs in central Phnom Penh. In Sites 2 and 3, home-based economic opportunities
were much more limited. While there was some demand for rental units, this was
limited compared with Site 1. Moreover, the warren-like structure of Sites 2 and 3
and their location away from main thoroughfares meant there was little commerce
aside from a small number of shops serving local needs. Respondents often
borrowed smaller amounts to pursue off-site business opportunities (Table 8.5)
Location had particular significance in borrowing patterns for residents of Chbar
Ampov. There, microfinance loans had become a coping mechanism to deal with
localised flooding. During times of flood, credit was readily available from visiting
brokers acting for microfinance institutions. Loans were usually used to buy food or
for health care or to purchase housing materials following flood damage.
Microfinance institutions had become entrenched in the livelihood strategies of
Chbar Ampov residents during times of flood; many had accrued multiple loans
concurrently and some used new loans to pay old debts. Some households, however,
had used loans to build houses from brick or to strengthen the foundations of their
home to make them less vulnerable to flood damage. As previously noted, all loans
in Chbar Ampov were obtained without titles.
Focusing in on the loan activity of those living in self-built housing in Sites 2 and 3
reveals large variations in borrowing patterns according to asset wealth, represented
by the construction quality of a respondent’s dwelling. Those who lived in self-built
dwellings made from wood took loans averaging less than 800 USD, while those
living in mixed material self-built properties borrowed on average 3,500 USD; those
who lived in brick/concrete self-built housing borrowed most – 4,100 USD on each
occasion (Table 8.6). In addition, borrowers who lived in better quality (mixed
material and brick/concrete) houses borrowed more often to upgrade their living
conditions than those in low-quality (wood) houses. That loans were used to upgrade
living conditions lends some support to argument linking credit and housing
improvements (Field and Torero, 2003). However, titles were relatively unimportant
in securing these loans for upgrading of self-built homes in the survey sites: they had
only been used as collateral for one out of the seven such loans.
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Table 8.6: Loan use by construction quality of self-built housing Sites 2 and 3
Wood Mixed
Materials
Brick/concrete
Develop property to improve living
conditions 9.1%
20.0% 20.0%
Develop property to provide rental
accommodation --
4.0%
--
Invest in starting on-site business 4.0% --
Off-site business investment 63.6% 56.0% 80.0%
Other 27.3% 16.0% --
Mean loan size 777 USD 3,426 USD 4,100 USD
Mean interest rate 2.29% 1.80% 1.73%
Used land title as collateral 18.0% 18.0% --
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 11 25 5
Source: PhD fieldwork
8.3.2 Employment status and credit activity
The employment status of respondents – as self-employed or in wage labour – also
had an important effect on their borrowing activity. One might expect self-employed
applicants to have a harder time obtaining formal credit due to difficulties
convincing lenders of their ability to service debt. Those self-employed in low-
income occupations, such as informal garbage collectors or hawkers, might have a
particularly hard time obtaining loans because of their low and variable incomes, and
the lack of documentary proof of their earnings (Payne, 2001).
In some respects, the survey results conform to expectations that those in wage
labour can access formal sector credit more easily. Out of respondents who had
accessed bank loans, those in wage labour accessed larger amounts more frequently
than those who were self-employed (Table 8.7). Presumably, better-off households
in wage labour were more easily able to satisfy banks of their ability to pay back the
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loan and, hence, could borrow larger amounts. This finding supports information
provided by key informant interviews with bankers cited earlier in this chapter: that
proof of a potential customer’s ability to service is the key factor on which lending
decisions are based.112
Table 8.7: Borrowing and employment type by lender Sites 1-3
Received bank loan Received MFI loan
Wage-labour Self-
employed
Wage-labour Self-
employed
Per cent of households 14.1% 11.5% 12.7% 20.7%
N 71 87 71 87
Mean loan size 21,909 USD 15,350 USD 1,925USD 3,224 USD
Mean interest rate 1.20% 1.50% 1.83% 1.95%
Borrowers using title as
collateral
90.9% 80.0% 9.1% 8.0%
N 11 10 12 27
Source: PhD fieldwork
In comparison, amongst those who took out microfinance loans, self-employed
respondents reported borrowing more often and in larger amounts than those who
drew a regular income. Often, those who were self-employed in low-income Sites 2,
3 and Chbar Ampov were more vulnerable than those in wage labour because of
their unsecured and unpredictable income. For such respondents, credit appeared to
act as a livelihood support mechanism in the absence of any state-provided social
protection. In Chbar Ampov, for example, focus group participants noted that 80 per
cent or more of working-age people living in their community worked as informal
garbage collectors – a very low-income profession – yet all households in the
community had accessed microfinance loans. In addition, during the flood season,
when garbage workers could not ply their trade for long periods and thus had very
limited income, borrowing was highest.113 Microfinance loans were readily
accessible for vulnerable households because providers often conducted only
rudimentary checks of an applicant’s ability to repay the loan. Microfinance lenders
112 Interview with Head of Mortgages ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 25 June 2015
113 Focus Group Discussion, Veaslbov community, Chbar Ampov, Phnom Penh, 13 February 2014
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would often only check if an outstanding debt was already on their books in which
case a loan application would be rejected. However, with no centralised system
aggregating microfinance borrowing, indebted applicants simply borrowed from
another of the many lenders operating in their area. Because microfinance
institutions conducted only basic assessments of an applicant’s ability to service
debt, their lack of proof of income – or lack of income in general – did not constitute
a constraint to borrowing.
The differences in loan availability between waged and self-employed respondents
were mirrored in differences in loan use (Table 8.8). Borrowers in waged
employment used loans to improve living conditions three times more frequently
than those who were self-employed. The relatively high proportion of waged
respondents investing in home improvements, rather than capital generating
activities, suggests that for this group loans were not as important in livelihood
strategies as they were for the self-employed. About three-quarters of self-employed
borrowers invested in capital-generating activities. Often these investments were
small-scale off-site business investments, suggesting that loans were important to
sustaining livelihood activities of lower-income groups. In addition, over 15 per cent
of self-employed borrowers used loans for ‘other’ purposes, including health,
education and debt repayments. In Chbar Ampov, residents’ jobs as low-paid, self-
employed garbage workers had a significant impact on their credit activity: loans
were usually used to meet income shortfalls, particularly in the wet season when
work was not available and expenditure was high.
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Table 8.8: Employment type and loan use Sites 1-3
Source: PhD fieldwork
8.3.3 Household structure and credit activity
There was been little discussion in the titling literature of how attributes of the
household – such as gender or age of household head – affect credit activity.
However, household structure has important implications for livelihood strategies
and may therefore be linked to borrowing activity, including use of title to access
credit.
I assessed a variety of household indicators against credit uptake. Household size
had no discernible relationship with loan uptake and use, with the proportions of
respondents reporting borrowing and other loan characteristics, such as interest rates,
use of title collateral and loan amount, remaining constant irrespective of number of
household members. A possible reason for this was that the majority of households
had five, six or seven members, a small range in which to observe any differences.
Similarly, age of household head appeared to have only a marginal effect on
borrowing patterns. Gender of household head, however, had a substantial impact
Wage
labour
Self-
employed
Develop property to improve
household living conditions
28.6% 10.5%
Develop property to incorporate
rental units
14.3% 7.9%
Develop property to improve
living conditions and incorporate
rental/ business units
7.1% 10.5%
Invest in starting on-site business 10.7% 2.6%
Off-site business investment 39.3% 52.6%
Other -- 15.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
N 28 38
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on reported credit activity (Table 8.9). Respondents from female-headed households
reported borrowing more often, and borrowing larger sums at lower rates of interest,
than was the case for couple headed-households or male-headed households.114 They
also tended to use titles as collateral more often. In Chbar Ampov, however, focus
group participants did not note any differences in borrowing patterns based on
gender of household head.
Table: 8.9: Gender of household head and borrowing Sites 1-3
Couple Female Male
Received credit 32.7% 40.4% 11.1%
Mean loan size 4,858 USD 15,109 USD 3,000 USD
Mean interest rate 1.77% 1.52% 1.65%
Borrowers using title as
collateral
34.0% 45.5% --
N 147 47 9
Source: PhD fieldwork
There is evidence that the high proportion of women-headed household accessing
formal-sector credit is a relatively recent phenomenon. Data from a pre-titling CDRI
survey in Site 1 (there is no baseline data available for Sites 2 and 3), suggests that in
2005, relatively few female-headed households obtained bank loans compared to
couple-headed households (Table 8.10). Instead, women-headed households
obtained loans most frequently from moneylenders and, as a result, borrowed far
smaller sums at high interest rates than their couple-headed counterparts. The mean
sum obtained by women-headed households was 577 USD per loan, in comparison
to 6,538 USD per loan in couple-headed households. Interest rates reported by
couple-headed households were on average 0.95 per cent per month compared to
2.77 per cent per month in female-headed households.
114 ‘Couple-headed’ household refers to those where respondents identified a husband and wife or
siblings as joint household heads. ‘Female-headed’ household refers to those headed by a woman
without a resident partner. In most cases the women in question were widows. ‘Male-headed’
households refers to those headed by a man without a resident partner.
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Table: 8.10: Gender of household head and borrowing pre- and post-titling Site 1
Notes: Male-headed households were not defined as a distinct group in the 2005 survey so
2013 data relating to male-headed households have not been included in this comparison
Source: PhD fieldwork and CDRI survey of pre-LMAP tenure
After titling, female-headed household borrowing in Site 1 shifted to microfinance
lenders and banks, and mean loan size soared - from 577 USD to 33,111 USD
between the 2005 and 2013 surveys, while monthly interest rates declined from 2.8
to 1.3 per cent. The small sample of loans obtained by female-headed in Site 1
indicates that titles were important for such households accessing large formal sector
loans. Of the nine female-headed households in Site 1 that obtained a loan, eight
used their land title as collateral to borrow money from a bank, including loans of
90,000 USD, 70,000 USD, 50,000 USD, and 30,000 USD, two loans of 20,000 USD,
12,000 USD and 3,000 USD. The one female-headed household not to use a land
title as collateral – the plot not titled because it was a co-owned plot – borrowed
3,000 USD from a microfinance institution.
Across all survey sites, gender of household head was also linked to loan use. Both
couple-headed and female-headed households borrowed with similar frequency to
invest in the capital-generating potential of their home, though more of the former
invested in improving their living conditions (Table 8.11). Respondents from
female-headed households borrowed for a broader range of reasons, including
meeting the cost of their children’s education, health and repaying existing loans
(represented in the ‘other’ field in Table 8.11). Borrowing to cover household
expenditures suggests that a substantial proportion of the reported loans to female-
Gender of
household
head
Loan source
Total N
Bank Microfinance
institution
Money-lender Friends or
family
Pr
e-
LM
A
P Couple 26.9% -- 3.8% 69.2% 100.0% 26
Female 7.7% -- 53.8% 38.5% 100.0% 13
Po
st
-
LM
A
P Couple 57.9% 10.5% 10.5% 21.1% 100.0% 19
Female 77.85% 11.1% -- 11.1% 100.0% 9
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headed households may be to alleviate economic hardship after covering essential
costs, rather than productive loans.
Table 8.11: Gender of household head and loan use Sites 1-3
Couple Female Male
Develop property to improve
household living conditions
21.0% 8.3% --
Develop property to incorporate
rental
6.5% 16.7% --
Develop property to improve
living conditions and to
incorporate rental/business units
9.7% 4.3% --
Invest in starting on-site
business
9.7% 4.2% --
Off-site business investment 51.6% 41.7% 100.0%
Other 1.6% 21.0% --
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N 62 24 1
Source: PhD fieldwork
Loans seemed to be particularly important for female-headed households because
they tended to earn money from their own businesses rather than waged
employment, and so often needed a source of capital to sustain or expand their
income-generating activities. In unplanned areas (Sites 2 and 3), loans were usually
small amounts from microfinance institutions used to sustain or expand capital-
generating opportunities outside the home. Credit was particularly important for
these female-headed households because they more often relied on informal
activities for income – mainly hawking and other forms of street selling. Around 95
per cent of women household heads in Site 2, and 90 per cent in Site 3, were self-
employed in the informal sector, compared to around 63 per cent of the heads of
couple-headed households in both sites.
While in unplanned Sites 1 and 2, the heads of female-headed households worked
outside the home, in Site 1 much of the economic activity of female-headed
households was home based. Around 70 per cent generated income from their
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property, either by renting rooms or running a business from their home. Given their
reliance on their home to generate income, there was a strong incentive for women
heads of household to maximise their capital-generating potential through
investments in their home. Couple-headed households in Site 1, on the other hand,
often enjoyed a dependable income from regular employment and thus had less
incentive to borrow. The most frequently cited occupation of the head of household
in couple-headed households was employment in the public sector, accounting for
nearly 40 per cent of respondent households. One female respondent in a couple-
headed household remarked ‘why would we need to take a loan out when my
husband has a regular income?’115 Many households worried about the risk of
losing their property: an oft-heard sentiment was ‘I would not use my title to access
credit unless it was in an emergency’. Couple-headed households appeared to have
little incentive to take such a risk.
The importance of titles in obtaining loans to support the livelihoods of women
household heads in Site 1 is illustrated by the case of Savin. Savin reported that she
was a widow who purchased a property in a side street (a ‘z’ street) in the area in the
1990s. She had previously been interviewed in 2005 as part of the CDRI pre-LMAP
tenure survey, and I was able to locate this transcript in the CDRI office archives. At
that time, she told CDRI field researchers that she was the head of a household of ten
and lived in two-storey, three-roomed house. She used the ground floor to run a
small gambling business, which was her primary source of income. In the year prior
to the 2005 survey, she had taken three loans from moneylenders to expand her
business: one of 1,200 USD, another of 1,000 USD and a final loan of 800 USD,
each with a monthly interest rate of five per cent. In the 2005 survey she ‘strongly
agreed’ with the assertion that she had not accessed formal credit because of
collateral requirements.116 By 2013, when Savin was interviewed again during my
fieldwork, she had received a land title. She had acquired title in 2008 and was
upbeat about its usefulness for accessing credit. No longer running a gambling
business, she had a small grocery shop on the ground floor, operated a motorbike-
parking business and rented rooms to tenants. She reported that in the year of the
survey (2013) she had borrowed 50,000 USD from ABA bank using her title as
115 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 70, Phnom Penh, 7 July 2013
116 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 19, Phnom Penh, 8 June 2013
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collateral at an interest rate of 1 per cent per month.117 She borrowed this money to
develop rental accommodation to take advantage of the increasing demand from
migrants and students at the nearby university. Using this money she had added a
further three floors to her house – making a total of five floors – and converted the
accommodation in order to let it. During the latter stages of building she ran out of
money and had to borrow 20,000 USD at around 2 per cent per month interest rate
from a family member. She reported that she had twenty tenants renting rooms,
generating 800 USD per month from her rental activity.
While land titles have afforded opportunities to some female-headed households,
there are also risks associated with accessing large, title-facilitated loans. The risks
of such borrowing were well demonstrated in an interview I conducted with another
recent widow, who was called Nee. She was 55 years of age and a public high
school teacher – normally a relatively poorly paid job yielding only 100-150 USD a
month in 2013 values – who had bought a house on a large plot in 1984. She had
recently split her property into two separate plots and transferred ownership of one to
her son. Together, they had taken bank loans from ACLEDA against both properties,
using the (separate) titles as collateral: the two loans totalled 100,000 USD. When
applying for the loans, they had told the bank that they would build a new property
with accommodation for tenants, as many others in their neighbourhood had done.
However, whereas Savin was able to get a return of 800 USD a month on an
investment of 70,000 USD, Nee only obtained 350 USD per month from her tenants.
Her son had used some of the money that was obtained ostensibly for housing
improvements on paying for his college degree, leaving a smaller pot from which to
invest.
The reason for the differing fortunes of Nee and Savin can largely be put down to
business acumen. Savin had built a no-frills structure crammed with rooms that she
filled with migrant workers and students. Nee, on the other hand, had built a large,
ornate, double-fronted house and provided accommodation for just one family, and
her son had diverted some of the money to other ends. Both Nee and her son have to
work hard to make the repayments and it was clear during our meeting that the debt
weighed on her mind.
117 Interview with Resident, Site 1, Questionnaire number 54, Phnom Penh, 27 June 2013
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8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that representations of credit markets in the titling
literature do not match respondents’ experiences of borrowing in the survey sites.
According to the formal/informal binary structure of credit markets, which underlies
the titling model, the uneven distribution of titles in the survey population is a
constraint to formal credit extension. However, I found no such clear divide between
formal and informal lenders, but rather a spectrum of lending activities
encompassing both formal and informal lending practices. ‘Formal’ microfinance
institutions have used ‘informal’ means of enforcing loan contracts and thus lessened
the need for title as collateral. Therefore, possessing an ‘informal’ tenure document
does not preclude access to ‘formal’ microfinance loans. By the same measure,
having a ‘formal’ title does not automatically provide the recipient access to all types
of formal sector credit: less well-off respondents who had acquired a title were still
unable to obtain a bank loan because of their low and/or irregular income.
The impact of having a title has not, therefore, been as straightforward as suggested
by earlier work. Instead, household socioeconomic characteristics have defined
credit activity in a context of diverse lenders and the uneven availability of titles.
Consequently, tiles have made a difference to the borrowing of some recipients, but
not others. Titles have primarily used to access certain types of credit: large loans
demanded by middle-market customers to invest in their property. Within the middle
market, those who use their property for capital-generating purposes and have
received title have both the incentive and the means to acquire large loans. Women-
headed households appear prominent in this group because they often use the home
for capital-generating activity. In this subgroup, some have used titles to increase
their income and asset base significantly. In some cases, taking out such large loans
against their property may leave them at risk of default and, potentially, repossession
in the future.
For less well-off respondents, title was not so important for loan-seeking households.
Credit was widely available and easily procured from microfinance institutions,
often without the need to satisfy formal collateral requirements. Microfinance loans
included a variety of loan types and uses. In unplanned Sites 2 and 3, such loans
were often used for off-site investments in income-generating activities and to a
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lesser extent for home improvements. These microfinance loans shared many of the
characteristics of ‘informal’ loans: they were small, high-interest and easily acquired,
and they seemed to be associated with poverty rather than prosperity. Indeed,
residents in Chbar Ampov, the most marginal of all the sites, reported the widest
coverage of microfinance loans: all households in the site were reported to be
borrowers.
The increasing availability of both titles and microfinance across Cambodia poses
important questions about the vulnerability of low-income defaulters. Titles are
thought to increase security to lenders because legally codified assets are easier to
seize in case of default. Therefore, titles should make it easier for lenders to
repossess the assets of vulnerable defaulters. The survey results do not, however,
support this hypothesis. In some cases, microfinance companies seem to find it easier
to recover their money by pressuring respondents to sell their land, rather than the
potentially costly process of going to court and transferring ownership. In some
cases, titles may increase security for low-income defaulters by legally codifying the
property rights of vulnerable residents, as highlighted in the case of moneylender
repossessions in Kampong Cham. In such cases, titles provide security by making it
more difficult for creditors to seize assets. These finding runs counter to the orthodox
interpretations of titling and credit in two respects. First, titles are typically thought
to provide security to lenders rather than defaulters, but my findings suggest that in
some cases the reverse is true. Second, it is believed that lenders disburse credit
when they are certain they can legally seize defaulters’ assets, but my findings that
the absence of such conditions may not restrict lending if borrowers can enforce
contracts through other means. Overall, the findings suggest that current
understanding of titling and credit markets are limited and are a topic in need of
further investigation.
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Chapter 9: Titling and Urban Transition in Phnom Penh
9.1 Introduction
Since city-wide titling began in 2001/2002, the social fabric of Phnom Penh city has
changed markedly. Tens of thousands of lower-income households have been
displaced; in their place stand modern condominium and commercial developments.
This chapter explores how titling has intersected with this urban transition. In doing
so, it presents a case study account of a ubiquitous international development
intervention that has restructured property relations across cities in the global south,
and provides insights into the impact of the intervention on low-income
communities.
In this chapter, I hope to speak to key debates about titling and urban transition in the
literature. First, I look at the LMAP in relation to debates about titling and transition
based on exclusion – where unplanned settlements are systematically excluded from
obtaining ownership and their parcels transferred to ‘productive’ owners (Yiftachel,
2008). In doing so I return to the commune of Tonle Bassac to assess its most recent
transition – from site of low-income unplanned settlements to high-end
condominiums – and analyse the role of titling in this process.
Second, I explore the LMAP in relation to discussions on titling and transition based
on the inclusion of unplanned settlements. These studies assert that formalisation
results in processes of gentrification or downward raiding as housing costs increase
and low-income title recipients are bought out by better-off incoming residents
(Payne, 2001). I examine these debates by presenting a household-level analysis of
transition in communities that have received title, drawing on questionnaire
responses from Sites 1 and 2. I assess if titling has been related to property
transactions and/or if it has affected people’s perceptions of their property’s value.
Third, I view titling in Phnom Penh in the context of debates that emphasise
alternative tenure solutions to secure low-income urban groups place in the city that
do not involve the provision of individual land titles. I present a case study of the
Dey Krahorm community, where a communal tenure solution was implemented by
authorities instead of titling.
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Finally, I consider why LMAP titles have come to be associated with tenure security
in Phnom Penh. I note how the social and cultural aspects of the LMAP have
resulted in the project’s high policy mobility, suggesting that LMAP titles have
become deeply integrated into many aspects of Cambodian life. I draw on survey
data to demonstrate how these social and cultural shifts have been represented at the
household level.
9.2 Tenure security and market-based evictions
According to its proponents, a key role of titling is to extend the benefits of
economic development to include households living in informal areas. Registering
informal property turns ‘dead capital’ into a fungible asset that can be used to access
credit and services and sold to realise its formal-sector market value (De Soto, 2000).
Titles are believed to encourage entrepreneurialism, to drive up living standards and
to enable low-income recipients to participate in land markets on equal terms
(Deininger, 2003). Critics argue, however, that the interaction between market and
low-income communities resulting from titling is inequitable. Titling should be
viewed not as an attempt to improve the lot of low-income communities ‘but as an
action orientated around control and power’ (Porter, 2011: 118). In this view titling
projects reproduce the rules of neoliberal capitalism across urban space and, in doing
so, leave low-income owners vulnerable to forces that displace them from central
urban locations (McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2005)
9.2.1 Titling and market-related displacements
City-wide land formalisation can cause displacement by excluding low-income
populations from formal ownership (Springer, 2013; Yiftachel, 2009). In this
process, unplanned settlements are strategically excluded, but only to be formalised
at a later date, once low-income populations have been removed. The purpose of
such exclusions is to facilitate the smooth transfer of large parcels of urban real-
estate to economically ‘productive’ urban uses, such as condominiums, malls or
other characteristic urban landscapes of global capitalism. Often, the funding for
large-scale projects comes from transnational companies wishing to invest in assets
that are secured by the same global-standard regulatory frameworks that have
excluded unplanned settlements (Goldman, 2011).
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Displacement can also occur by the inclusion of low-income groups in titling. Most
studies charting this process have focused on unplanned settlements that have been
subject to formalisation projects (Durand-Lasserve, 2007; Payne, 2001). In these
cases, individual households in unplanned settlements receive titles only to then be
displaced by a process of ‘downward raiding’ by middle-income buyers (Payne,
2001: 423). There have been few empirical studies capturing this process in action
(Gilbert, 2012; Lemanski, 2014), although there are examples of population
transitions where formalisation has been implemented as part of upgrading or
rehousing interventions (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010; Lemanski, 2014). It is not clear
from the literature, however, whether titling as a standalone intervention engenders
social transition in the areas affected.
By the same logic, it is thought that landlords may put up rents after titling, thus
forcing out low-income tenants. There are, however, no available examples of rental
price increases occurring as a result of titling alone, but rather when titling has
occurred as a package of reforms. An often-cited example (Briggs, 2011; McFarlane,
2012; Payne, 2001) is a case study of Cairo presented in a 1992 doctoral thesis by
Daef (1993 cited in Payne, 2001), which found that 26 per cent of low-income
tenants in an unplanned settlement that received titles as part of an upgrading project
moved out because of increased rents. Again, it is not clear whether titling alone is
responsible for increased rental costs. Aside from this, I could find no other
examples of increased rental costs associated with titling.
The expectation of inclusion may also encourage market-induced displacement.
Homeowners yet to receive title may be targeted by unscrupulous individuals who
grab or purchase their property before title secures and increases its value (Goldman,
2011; Hirsch, 2011). The point here is about access to information: low-income
households may not be aware that the legal status of their property is going to change
and prices increase; individuals with better information may exploit this knowledge
gap for financial gain. In Mumbai, for example Goldman (2011) notes that informal
brokers purchase plots of land that are likely to be reclassified and dramatically
increase in value, displacing poor residents with limited access to information in the
process. As a result, the transition from low-income urban areas to high-tech
company industrial area occurred rapidly, with middlemen cheating low-income
residents out of the potential transaction revenue.
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In response to the threats posed by titling, a growing literature has put forward
customary and/or communal tenure as an alternative approach to securing tenure for
those in unplanned areas (Hunt, 2004; Khemro and Payne, 2004). Various studies
have noted that customary tenure systems insulate low-income groups from market
forces. Many of these studies have focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, where strong
endogenous tenure systems have evolved over decades and draw strength from the
cultural norms they embody (Bromley, 2009; Toulmin, 2009). Strengthening such
tenure systems, for example through a government-supported moratorium on
evictions, protects low-income communities from property appropriation and
insulates them from market-related displacement (Payne, 2005).
9.2.2 How does titling in Phnom Penh relate to titling and urban transition
debates?
The literature suggests that low-income urban populations are removed from urban
spaces by market processes operating at two scales. In city-wide titling projects,
centrally located, low-income communities are simply excluded and removed. In
community-scale titling, inclusion in the project can change the social fabric of low-
income settlements over time by replacing the original residents with higher-income
groups. The LMAP has elements of a city-wide project and one that is targeted at
certain unplanned settlements and therefore relates to both these strands of debate.
As a city-wide project, the LMAP has aimed to systematically title every eligible
property in the city. In giving the state the power to reorganise property rights on this
scale, the project has provided opportunities for elites to distribute ownership
documents to represent their interests. In Chapter 6, I detailed how these interests
frequently involved preventing those in unplanned settlements gaining titles. I
described the informal processes by which the state excluded certain unplanned
communities from titling. In this chapter, I will explore how these informal
processes have also been mobilised to transfer urban real estate to a neoliberal elite,
hastening an inequitable urban transition.
As a donor-funded project, the LMAP required the government to systematically title
all areas where residents had legal ownership claims. In this way, the Cambodian
state is to some extent been constrained in its ability to exclude, and some unplanned
areas have received titles (see Chapter 6). Therefore conditions for community-scale
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market-induced exclusions as a mode of urban transition are present in Phnom Penh.
Here we can view a different mechanism through which titling may promote
neoliberal displacement: by providing unplanned settlements with titles, increasing
housing costs and initiating a process of ‘downward raiding’ and/or pricing out low-
income tenants. By presenting an analysis in the context of inclusion in titling, this
chapter addresses the lack of empirical data about titling as a standalone intervention
in the process of urban transition. In addition to exploring the process of change in
unplanned areas, the city-wide LMAP also presents a case to view transition through
inclusion in planned (though not necessarily high-income) areas.
In addition to titling, there have also been alternative tenure interventions targeted at
Phnom Penh’s unplanned settlements. Such projects, which have been promoted by
the government and supported by civil society, aim to secure tenure for low-income
groups through community-based interventions as opposed to titling. The presence
of these alternative tenure interventions enable contrasts to be made between the
different tenure mechanisms and the process of transition.
9.3 Exclusion from titling and displacement: a case study of transition in
the commune of Tonle Bassac
In this section, I explore how titles have intersected with rapid urban change,
returning again to the commune of Tonle Bassac. First, I detail the characteristics of
transition in the commune. I then suggest that evictions of low-income communities
have resulted from their exclusion from the titling project. I argue that titles have
encouraged large capital inflows into the commune, resulting in rapid land-use
change and putting additional pressure on remaining communities. Finally, I assert
that titling has acted in parallel with a number of other regulatory instruments that
have contributed to the commune’s inequitable transition.
9.3.1 From low-income residential area to site of global capitalism
Over the past two decades the socioeconomic character of Tonle Bassac has changed
beyond recognition. The commune, as detailed in Chapter 5, was first associated
with urban modernity in pre-Khmer Rouge 1960s; many of the city’s most iconic
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buildings were located there. However, by the mid-1990s it had become associated
with urban poverty and was home to large number of unplanned settlements. Today,
Tonle Bassac has regained its former position at the vanguard of Cambodia’s urban
development. The vast majority of the low-income communities have been evicted
and replaced with high-rise residential and commercial areas catering to Cambodia’s
elite and to the international market.
The change from low-income local communities to high-income global investors
over the past two decades has been stark. Two references to the Bassac area
effectively demonstrate this transition. The first is geographer Gavin Shatkin’s
impressions of the area in 1990s:
by 1994, an estimated 120,000 people, or approximately 12–15% of [Phnom
Penh’s] population, were living in squatter encampments. In particular, one
stretch of land along the riverfront, commonly known as Bassac, has been
transformed from a vacant patch of land in 1989 to a teeming settlement of
bamboo, thatch and wood shelters housing some 2700 families today.
(Shatkin, 1998: 390)
The second is from global real estate agent Frank Knight, offering condominium
properties for sale in developments where unplanned settlements once stood:
Phnom Penh's Hottest Growth Corridor – where prosperity converges with
the surrounding of three rivers, namely the Mekong River, Bassac River and
Tonle Sap River. Local amenities within 10 minutes walking distance
include restaurants, cafes, pubs, Aeon Mall, Sofitel Phnom Penh,
Cambodiana Hotel, Elite Golf Club, Dream Land and educational
institutions such as Canadia International School, Ican International School,
Panasastra University and Zaman International School. (Frank Knight,
2016)
During the transition from low-income residential to high-income elite practices,
NGOs have reported the eviction of dozens of communities, including around 10,000
households have been displaced since donor-funded interventions began in 2001
(this number includes some households that returned and were evicted again) (Table
9.1). These evictions have caused significant depopulation of the commune as it has
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changed transitioned from a residential to a commercial area. According to official
census data the population of Tonle Bassac declined from around 45,000 people in
1998 to just over 30,000 in 2008 (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2008, 1998).
This decline was in contrast to the overall trend in the city: during the same period,
the population of Phnom Penh grew from around 1 million to 1.3 million, according
to census data (ibid.).
Table 9.1: Evictions from the Tonle Bassac area, 2000 to present
Year Number of households evicted
2001 5,338
2005 32
2006 4,368
2007 100
2009 298
Total 9,694
Source: STT, 2016
The mode of land-use transition from low-income to elite in Tonle Bassac has been
characterised by violent eviction of low-income communities. Homes have
frequently been destroyed and riot police have been deployed to remove residents.
One former resident recounted his experience of eviction from the commune:
commune officials informed me that my home was located on land that
belonged to a company, and that the company had decided to develop the
land. I was given three days’ notice to demolish my house; we were
transported by truck with our belongings here. I returned to Sambok Chap
later but the land was protected with a high fence. I asked two guards by
the gate who owned the land; they said it belonged to a company but I dare
not say the same.118
The fear and sense of powerlessness evicted residents feel cannot be overstated. The
resettlement sites are on the outskirts of the city: far from their livelihoods, with no
schools, health centres or markets to buy food and without sewage, electricity and
118 Interview 2 with former Sambok Chab resident at Sen Sok resettlement site, 15/2/2013
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running water (Bugalski and Pred, 2009; Grimsditch et al., 2012). Their former
homes in Tonle Bassac have been transferred to a globally-connected elite.
9.3.2 Titles, exclusions and dispossession
In Chapter 6, I described how residents in Tonle Bassac’s unplanned settlements
were excluded from titling under LMAP (and in Chapter 5 how they were excluded
under pre-LMAP tenure). To recap briefly, from 2001 onwards residents were able
to apply for titles, but those who did so were denied them by the local authorities.
When the area systematically titled in 2010, unplanned settlements that remained
were again excluded on spurious grounds. Exclusion, however, has only accounted
for half of the story of Tonle Bassac’s transition. While unplanned settlements have
been excluded and their occupants evicted, the land has nonetheless been formalised
– titles have been distributed to an elite group of tycoons and developers.
A striking example of how exclusion has been used as a vehicle for urban transition
can be viewed in a land conflict involving the 7NG company and residents living in
an unplanned settlement. The 7NG company includes in its property portfolio the
plot labelled ‘Sambok Chap’ – formerly a well-known unplanned settlement in the
Bassac commune (Figure 9.1). In the Google Earth image used on their website, the
dwellings of residents of Sambok Chap can clearly be seen. The case involved a
conflict between two parties, the company and residents, neither of which had
LMAP title.119 Legally, then, neither officially owned the property. The only legal
route through which either party could invalidate the other’s claim was by obtaining
legal ownership of the area by meeting the criteria for legal possession under the
2001 Land Law. These criteria included living on the plot for 5 years without
contested ownership with their possession known to the public and a number of other
points detailed in Chapter 6.
119 US Embassy Cables , 06PHNOMPENH1086_a, 9 June 2006
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Figure 9.1: Screenshot from redeveloper website
Source: 7NG, 2013
Residents in Sambok Chap were potentially eligible for ownership titles because
they met the criteria for legal possession. Ironically, the developers even identify the
land parcels by the name of the community, thereby highlighting the strong
association between these parcels and the communities that occupied them and
establishing that the communities’ existence was known to the public, – something
which is important when it comes to establishing legal possession under the land
law. Despite the strong claims of the unplanned settlement residents, all were
evicted as developers mobilised their political capital and connections. The Sambok
Chap community was eventually evicted by Sour Srun company –owned by the
same holding group as 7NG – in 2006. Although it had only a weak legal claim over
the land, the Sour Srun company enjoyed strong links to the political elite,
outweighing legal considerations. According to a US Embassy cable, the company
‘is believed by many to be a front for Canadia Bank, whose General Manager Pung
Kheav Se is an advisor to [Prime Minister] Hun Sen.’120
120 US Embassy Cables , 06PHNOMPENH1086_a, 9 June 2006
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9.3.3 Titles and large-scale investment in Tonle Bassac
While unplanned communities have been excluded and evicted during the process of
titling, foreign investment has flowed into the commune. This, in turn, has led to
very high property prices in the area. Condominium properties advertised from
100,000 USD upwards with global real-estate firms such as Frank Knight and
CBRE. High property prices, in turn, have increased pressure on the remaining
unplanned settlements by strengthening incentives for elite capture.
There is evidence that titles are directly linked with increases in large-scale
investment in Tonle Bassac. According to figures in Phnom Penh’s business sector
with interests in land, titles provide security to a range of foreign investors by
providing them the security to make large property investments.121 Prior to titling
and the associated 2001 Land Law, investments in property were usually made by
Chinese investors or others with personal connections to powerful figures capable of
securing their investment. While such investment arrangements are still in evidence
(as I shall discuss shortly), stronger land laws and titles have increased investment
from other sources, such as British, Japanese, South Korean and Australian
companies.
An example of titles facilitating large-scale foreign investment in the commune is the
recent development of Aeon Mall. Aeon is a transnational Japanese company that
owns large malls across Japan and has recently expanded into Southeast Asian
nations, including Vietnam and, latterly, Cambodia. In 2013 Aeon began a 200
million USD project in Tonle Bassac by acquiring a 68,000m2 plot in the commune
(Aeon, 2014). This purchase was facilitated by an LMAP land title which provided
the company the security it needed to invest.122 By 2015, the plot had been
developed into Cambodia’s largest mall, with 108,000m2 of retail space housing over
100 international retailers and including parking space for 1,400 cars. A year later,
Aeon mall acquired its second plot of land in Phnom Penh – a 100,000m2 parcel on
the city’s outskirts on which it plans to build an even larger mall (ibid.).
As well as providing the security to invest, titles have played another important
function in the Aeon Mall development: providing the company collateral with
121 Interview with Country Manager, Hong Kong Land, Phnom Penh, 25 October 2013
122 Interview with Former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2015
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which they have accessed finance to fund the development. Aeon were able to use
their title to acquire a loan to fund the construction of the mall from a Cambodian
bank.123 Many large developments in central Phnom Penh have been funded in this
way. Loans to the construction sector grew between 5 and 30 per cent per year
between 2010 and 2012 (International Monetary Fund, 2013) and, according to data
from the National Bank of Cambodia, by June 2014 banks had about 625 million
USD invested as loans to fund construction projects (across Cambodia, but with
many located in Phnom Penh), accounting for approximately 8 per cent of all lending
in the country (National Bank of Cambodia, 2014: 23). One banker told me that
access to credit was the driving force behind large scale developments in central
Phnom Penh: ‘the real story about titles and investment is about access to finance’,
both for domestic and for foreign developers.124
9.3.4 The rise of China and extra-legal land transactions
While titles have provided a new route for low-income communities to be displaced
and international investment to flow into Tonle Bassac, in practice, a number of
large-scale investments have been made outside of the titling framework. In such
cases, large parcels of land have been arbitrarily classified as ‘state public’ by the
state and then transferred from public to private ownership via trust networks
between high-level government officials and the private sector elite, evicting poor
residents in the process (see Chapter 6.4 for details of this process). In the course of
my work in Cambodia’s development sector, I came across many projects where this
mode of transfer had occurred. Three of the best known examples are related to the
long leasing of the major Phnom Penh lakes, Boeung Kak and Boeung Tumpun, and
the island of Koh Pich in the Bassac river. In these transfers, public land has been
long leased for private investment purposes in questionable legal arrangements.
An important driver of investments outside the titling framework has been the
emergence of Chinese companies, who often partner with Cambodian tycoons to
invest in large-scale redevelopments, providing the necessary capital, technical skills
and construction experience. The changing regional geopolitical and economic
landscape has contributed to the increasingly overt presence of China in Phnom
123 Interview with Former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2015
124 Interview with Former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2015
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Penh’s redevelopment. In particular, the rise of China’s economy in recent decades
has been associated with a trend of increasing foreign direct investment into Phnom
Penh’s booming property market (Jalilian, 2013). The Chinese government has been
keen for its companies to invest in Cambodia to strengthen important strategic
geopolitical relationships. Promoting Chinese investment in Cambodia has been
viewed as important in currying political favour with the Cambodian government,
which is seen as particularly important because Cambodia can be counted on to
support China in ASEAN discussions about disputed islands in the South China sea.
The importance of this relationship was demonstrated as recently as July 2016:
ASEAN were to publish a statement condemning China for asserting its sovereignty
over islands claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, but the publication of the
statement was vetoed by the Cambodian government (25 July 2016, The Phnom
Penh Post).
An important route that Chinese investment enters the Phnom Penh property market
is through informal networks between tycoons and government officials. Dominant
in these networks are ethnic Chinese Khmers. In particular, US diplomats note the
role of sa prominent ethnic Chinese Cambodian tycoon, who they suggest ‘uses her
contacts in China to attract foreign investment from Chinese companies such as
Wuzhishan LS and Jiangsu Taihu’.125
A good example of joint Cambodian and Chinese investments in relation to untitled
property can be found in the population displacement and large-scale redevelopment
of Koh Pich or ‘Diamond Island’. Until 2009, the Island of Koh Pich in the Bassac
river was home to a number of families. However, the government noted that as an
Island, Koh Pich was by default state public property under the law and could not be
owned or leased for a period of more than 15 years. In a Cambodia Daily (22
November 2005) article, the deputy governor of Phnom Penh is reported as saying:
‘If [the residents] don’t agree [to move], the forces will be used because it is the
property of the state—not private [property]’ After evicting residents the government
passed a law to reclassify Koh Pich as ‘state private’ land – a land classification that
signifies state ownership but permits the property to be leased on a long-term basis
to private entities. The land was subsequently leased to the Overseas Cambodia
125 US Embassy Cables, 09PHNOMPENH515, 27/07/09
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Investment Corporation (OCIC), a company owned by a well-connected tycoon.
Here we see that even under a system of land use rights and state-owned assets, the
political and economic elite are able to bypass legal restrictions, to their own
advantage.
The transfer of property rights to developers did not stop with OCIC. After the lease
was acquired, some plots were sold to Chinese investors. One such transaction was
described by the deputy Chairman of OCIC in a New York Times article (5 May
2014). He noted that a prime plot in Koh Pich had been ‘sold’ to Chinese
development company Jinxiang investments for ‘close to $100 million’. According
to the 2001 Land Law, selling state land in this way is punishable by 5 years in
prison; though this outcome for the tycoons involved seems unlikely. In any case,
such ‘sales’ could not have been registered with a title and so suggest that there are
other extra-legal mechanisms of acquiring ownership through which large
investments are facilitated. Hence, the property transfers on Koh Pich indicate that
titles are not the only means by which ‘formal’ transfers of ownership from low-
income communities to elites have been achieved: there are also ‘informal’ channels
resulting in the same outcomes.
The scale of Chinese investment on Koh Pich development is immense. According
to the New York Times article (5 May 2014), a number of prominent Chinese
companies, are jointly investing a total of USD 700 million in the redevelopment
project on the plot purchased by Jianxiang investments, including :
three 33-story condominium towers supporting a 650-foot infinity-edge
pool, a shopping mall, hospital, an international school, two pedestrian
shopping streets — plus two additional 29-story condominium towers. In
a nod to Chinese superstition, which considers the number four unlucky,
the buildings will not have 4th, 14th, 24th or 34th floors.
These huge investments are particularly notable because the legality of lease and
land transfer with which they are associated is questionable. The fact that investors
have acted in this manner illustrates how strong political and personal relationships
are between the ruling elite, prominent tycoons and Chinese investment companies.
Even in the absence of definitive legal ownership titles, these relationships are
sufficient to guarantee investments of hundreds of millions of dollars.
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9.4 Inclusion in titling and market-related displacements
I now turn to the second mechanism whereby titling can induce urban transition: I
assess whether market-related displacements have occurred in areas that have
received titles. I draw on household surveys in both planned and unplanned
settlements to assess whether titling has resulted in changes in property prices and
transactions. I also explore the difference titles have made to the availability of rental
accommodation.
9.4.1 Titling, house prices and property transactions
The process of gentrification or ‘downward raiding’ occurs when higher-income
groups buy property from lower-income residents. Titles potentially intersect with
the two key steps in this process: first, increasing the value of people’s property;
second, formally registering property provides the security necessary for higher-
income group from outside the community to purchase property.
Survey results from two communities in the central communes of Tuek Laark Muoy
and Tuek Laark Bai present mixed evidence about how far titles might stimulate
house price increases. In Site 2 – an unplanned settlement where a portion of
residents received titles – around 40 per cent of recipients believed the value of their
property increased as a result of titling (Figure 9.2). When queried by how much,
most replied that the price had increased ‘a little’. The majority of respondents,
however, seemed unsure of the effect of titles. Sixty per cent of respondents were
either not sure whether titles had any impact, believed that there was no impact or
thought that there was a price increase, but that it was occasioned by and did not
exceed the 4 per cent transaction cost levied on titled property. The results in
planned Site 1 were almost identical to Site 2: 38 per cent of households believed
that titles increased the price of their dwelling but the rest were either unsure,
thought it did not do so or put the increase down to tax. The results provide no
strong indications that titles were associated with rising house prices in either the
planned or unplanned area, but suggest that titling may have caused some modest
increases in people’s perception of the economic value of their property.
222
Figure 9.2: Perceptions of title’s impact on property price Sites 1 and 2
Note: Site 1 n=63, Site 2 n=52
Source: PhD fieldwork
There is also little evidence of rapid population change occurring in either planned
Site 1 or unplanned Site 2 as a result of titling. The average respondent acquired
their property in 1989 in Site 1 and 1994 in Site 2, meaning they had lived in their
property for a period of 23 and 19 years respectively at the time they were
interviewed in 2013. In addition, the reported year of purchase is spread evenly
across time in both sites and does not seem to be related to titling (Figure 9.3). Of the
total of 123 households in Sites 1 and 2 that reported purchasing their property, only
5 said they had done so after titling and only 3 purchases involved the legal transfer
of a land title. Furthermore, the dates of purchase reveal no spikes around the time
settlements were titled. In both sites, the primacy of historical market conditions in
determining patterns of transactions is evident in the distribution of reported
purchases over time. Peak periods of transactions occurred in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as the creation of formal property markets and influx of foreign capital
caused a rapid increase in property prices (Chapter 5); the increases in the 2000s
were associated with a property bubble that began in 2004-2005 and burst with the
onset of global financial crisis in 2008-2009.
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Figure 9.3: Reported purchases by date Sites 1 and 2
Source: PhD fieldwork
There are indications that while titles have not yet resulted in population changes,
however, they may do so in the future. Across all sites, over 40 per cent (of 109
respondents with title) expressed a belief that property title was ‘moderately or very
important’ to secure a potential buyer. Although a sizeable minority of respondents
emphasised the importance of titles in transactions, the majority seemed less
convinced: 15 per cent reported that title made no difference to a potential buyer; a
further 15 per cent thought that the 4 per cent property tax would hinder the sale, and
30 per cent were unsure of the impact of titles if they were to sell their property.
These results do not suggest that titling resulted in overnight change, but that titles
may contribute to a longer-term shift in the socioeconomic makeup of the survey
populations.
Another source of market exposure that may contribute to population change in the
future is the changing nature of household debt. As was explored in Chapter 8,
households in receipt of a title were more easily able to access large loans than other
households. As a result, in Site 1 and 2, a number of households had obtained large
loans from banks or microfinance companies. At present there were no indications
that these loans had resulted in defaults. However, should there be another economic
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crash such debts could be a source of tenure insecurity if repayments cannot be met
and properties are threatened with repossession. There is also the possibility that
borrowers may sell their property to meet mounting debt obligations.
A key aspect of the gentrification argument is that increased housing prices result in
population changes – but does this always occur? The history of property price
increase in Site 1 and 2 questions the assumption that property price increases
necessarily result in population displacement. While there is no baseline data
available for Site 2, data for Site 1 show that the average purchase price for a
property in 1992 was around 170 USD per square metre (CDRI 2007) – we can
reasonably assume that prices in unplanned Site 2 were lower. According to data
from real-estate companies, property prices have increased dramatically over the past
two decades: in 2014 houses on main streets in Site 1 could be worth over 2,000
USD per square metre, while in Site 2 the properties were worth a minimum of 1,200
USD per square metre (VTRUST, 2014: 5). There has, then, been a huge increase in
price over these two decades, reflecting the growth of Phnom Penh’s property sector
during this period. Yet despite rapid house price increases in these areas, most
residents had not sold up. As previously mentioned, the average household had lived
in their home for around two decades. Moreover, residents in the two sites remained
in low-income occupations, as low-level public sector employees or small business
owners. Around a quarter of homeowners in both sites had retired, again suggesting
the slow population change in the area. Moreover, despite the price rises many had
no intention of selling their home. Respondents frequently noted strong social and
economic ties to the area, citing their dwelling’s proximity to livelihoods and
services, such as schools, markets and pagodas, as important reasons. Others noted
that property prices were high across the city so there was no incentive to move.
There were some indications in Site 2 that titles had made rapid population change
less rather than more likely. As noted in Chapter 6, prior to titling the unauthorised
settlement was located on land that belonged to Ministry of Culture. Residents noted
that prior to titling there were rumours that the parcel was going to be sold to a
company to develop; there were reports of visits by representatives of developers
trying to purchase the parcel. Since titling had occurred, however, these rumours and
visits from company representatives had ceased – presumably because the allocation
of individual titles meant the plot could not be acquired in a single transaction with
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the Ministry of Culture. This rendered acquisition of the area more complex – and
likely more costly – for the developer.
9.4.2 Titling and low-income tenants
A second route through which titling can contribute to the market-related
displacement of low-income groups is by encouraging landlords to increase rates
thereby pricing out low-income tenants. The local dynamics of rental markets in
Sites 1 and 2 has meant that this has not occurred. Instead, the volume of rooms for
low-income tenants has increased over time in response to increasing demand. There
were a total of 27 tenants reported as residents in dwellings’ of respondents in 1998,
rising to 205 by the time of the survey in 2013 (Figure 9.4). In both sites tenants
were predominantly young, low-income service sector workers and/or students of the
nearby Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP). Correspondingly, the costs of
rental rooms in both Sites 1 and 2 were low. The average rate per person per month
was the same in both sites – around 34 USD. There had also been few reported
changes in the rental prices over time. Over 80 per cent of landlords (n=32) across
both sites reported no change in their room price since beginning renting rooms.
Those that had were long-time landlords who reported raising their room rates in
response to changes in the rental market over time.
Figure 9.4: Number of tenants in Sites 1 and 2
Source: PhD fieldwork
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Rather than decreasing the availability of low-income rooms, titling directly
contributed to a sharp increase in the availability of low-cost rooms in Site 1 by
enabling respondents to access large bank loans with which they built rental
accommodation. Renting had become a prevalent income-generating strategy in Site
1: around 27 per cent of households reported renting rooms with the average
landlord first doing so in 2008 – the year the area was titled. As detailed in Chapter
8, many loans obtained with title were used to take advantage of the increasing
demand for rental rooms in the area. In Site 2, titles had less of an impact because
of the different dynamics of the rental market. Only around ten per cent of
respondents let rooms (seven out of 68 households) in Site 2. This lower figure
reflected the smaller size of properties in the unplanned area, which provided less
scope for development of rental units. In Site 2 it tended to be earlier residents, who
had reclaimed larger plots of land from the former marsh area, who had space for
rental accommodation. In this context, titles seemed to be less important in providing
the finance for rental units. The average landlord had started to let accommodation in
2004 – six years before titles were distributed to residents.
9.5 Securing tenure through customary mechanisms
In previous sections of this chapter, I have assessed the risks that titles can pose to
the tenure security of low-income groups. In this section, I present a case study of
the experience of Dey Krahorm community, providing an example where an
alternative community-based intervention was used to secure tenure instead of titles.
9.5.1 Dey Krahorm land conflict
Social Land Concessions were promoted as a mechanism to increase tenure security
and improve living standards in unplanned settlements as part of the government’s
2003 100 Settlements upgrading scheme. One of the largest communities to ‘benefit’
was Dey Krahorm in Tonle Bassac (mentioned earlier in relation to the 7NG
company dispute). Dey Krahorm was established during the 1990s on a 4.7 hectare
green-field site behind the iconic Bouding (Catalla, 2000). According to the
government, 1,220 families lived on the site when, in 2003, it was selected to
become a ‘Social Land Concession’ enabling onsite redevelopment (Licadho, 2008).
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The concession stipulated that a portion of the community’s land parcel was to be
granted to a private developer for commercial purposes and the rest of the land
‘given’ to the community for residential purposes. In return for receiving its plot the
developer agreed to build apartment accommodation for all households on the
portion of the parcel belonging to the community. There was however no plan to
distribute titles as part of this process. Instead, the community would presumably
keep local institutional tenure arrangements, which would have likely been similar to
those described in a similar unplanned Tonle Bassac settlement in Chapter 5, but the
tenure of the entire parcel would be protected by law as a Social Land Concession.
While the government claimed to be ‘giving’ the land to the community, residents
already had a strong ownership claim under the 2001 Land Law and should have
been eligible for titles. NGOs noted that Dey Krahorm residents satisfied the criteria
for converting their possession claims into ownership (Licadho, 2008). Many had
lived peacefully on the parcel for over a decade and had official documents to prove
it. Despite these strong claims to individual ownership, a decision was taken by the
government to pursue an alternative tenure mechanism and collective ownership.
Under the Social Land Concession, Dey Krahorm residents ceded their individual
property rights to a body of elected community representatives. However, during
negotiations with the developer, as a result either of coercion from the company or of
bribery, these representatives agreed that all households would give up their property
in exchange for apartment accommodation provided by the developer at a site 20
kilometres from the city centre. This action was clearly against the interests of
residents.
The authority of the community representatives to make such a deal was disputed by
NGOs. However, the government took no action against the developer and legal
appeals proved fruitless. Eventually, all households were evicted by the company –
with the support of the police – in one of the most violent evictions in Phnom Penh’s
turbulent history of land conflicts. Many homes were bull-dozed with residents still
inside. Evicted families were provided with sub-standard accommodation at the
resettlement site, a long way from their livelihoods, school and key social support
infrastructure. As a result, when I visited the site in 2015, many dwellings had been
abandoned.
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9.5.2 Weaknesses in the Social Land Concession mechanism
The community-centred Social Land Concession approach failed to ensure tenure
security for residents for a number of reasons. First, it was assumed that the interests
of community members were similar and that the community representatives would
fairly represent these interests. This turned out not to be the case: through either
greed or coercion community leaders betrayed the interests of other community
members. When this occurred, there were no institutional safeguards, such as clear
and enforceable laws governing how Social Land Concessions would be
implemented or rules detailing the rights of community members, the obligations of
contracted parties and/or procedures to solve disputes.
Second, it was assumed that the government would enforce the stated purpose of
Social Land Concessions to the benefit of low-income communities. In this regard,
the experience of Dey Krahorm highlights once again the primary importance of
political calculation and networks of trust over the rule of law. The Social Land
Concession mechanism used to secure tenure for Dey Krahorm residents was a little-
used policy framework designed to increase access to land for poor communities.
Allowing an agreement made within this framework to be undermined by a tycoon
did not incur significant political and economic costs for the government and fitted
the pattern of transferring land in Tonle Bassac from low-income urban residents to
developers that I have already described. While the government could afford to
undermine the Social Land Concession mechanisms, evicting households with titles
would have been more difficult politically. Indeed, it is of note that there have been
tens of thousands of households evicted in Phnom Penh since titling began in 2002,
but there has not been one reported case of a household with title being evicted in
Phnom Penh.
The disparity between the security of those who had titles and those using alternative
tenure mechanisms has not been lost on other communities facing eviction. The
experience of Dey Krahorm (and other Social Land Concession cases) has been well
documented in Phnom Penh over the past decade; their legacies continue to this day.
In 2016, newspapers reported residents of Borei Keila – a sister project to Dey
Krahorm – were still protesting the outcome of the project 13 years after it began
(Phnom Penh Post, 9 June 2016).
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In contrast, titles are seen as the positive tenure outcome that residents under threat
of eviction desperately seek. Residents in unplanned communities were aware of
how, in the absence of titles, communities like Dey Krahorm and the infamous case
of Boeung Kak had been forcibly evicted (see Chapter 6). In each of these conflicts,
communities faced with eviction pushed for titles because they saw titles as the gold-
standard of tenure security. Media representations of titles had filtered down to
communities in areas of high tenure insecurity. For one respondent in an area slated
for development, titles were the only way their tenure could be secured: ‘The only
thing we want is land titles; we have approached the commune office and asked
many times about this issue but so far we have not received them’.126
The case of Dey Krahorm suggests that the Social Land Concession can be viewed
as another mechanism to transfer real estate to developers by excluding low-income
communities from titling. Instead of ownership titles, residents were provided with a
second-class tenure framework that enabled elite capture of the plot. According to
one NGO, this was a deliberate act – a government-sanctioned theft of a plot of real
estate worth an estimated 44 million USD by a private company with close links to
the political elite (Pred, 2011). Ultimately, the Social Land Concession became yet
another framework for property to be transferred from low-income residents to a
political and economic elite intent on developing it into a ‘productive’ space.
9.6 Policy mobility and cultivating the mystique of title
The preceding discussion in this chapter has assessed the tenure risks associated with
titles for low income groups. The evidence suggests that titling does not cause any
substantial increase in tenure insecurity and is preferable to other forms of tenure
intervention from the perspective of low-income residents. In this section, I explore
in more depth why titles are considered an important indicator of tenure security by
recipients and, indeed, non-recipients, highlighting the social and cultural impact of
the LMAP. This analysis ties in arguments made by Tania Li (2005; 2007) about the
ways ‘liberal’ governance mechanisms gain traction in society. She argues that
liberal policy interventions become truly important in shaping a society when they
126 Interview with Village Chief, Village 16, Commune Tonle Bassac, 8 February 2013
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are integrated into every-day interactions of that society. This process does not only
occur in political, social and economic spheres, but also cultural exchanges. A trend
of deep societal integration is, I suggest, in evidence in the implementation of the
LMAP in Cambodia, and accounts for the importance placed on titles by Phnom
Penh’s population.
9.6.1 LMAP titles and Khmer politics, culture and society
How the LMAP has been experienced by Phnom Penh’s citizens is linked to the
significance of land in Cambodian culture and society. Living in Cambodia for an
extended period, I became aware of the many ways that titling was married to every-
day cultural processes and events by the state. The government perpetuated a
mystique around LMAP titles by holding ceremonies that showcased vulnerable
populations receiving them. They espoused the benefits of titles on widely-
subscribed state-sponsored radio programmes. They even aired state-sponsored
titling-themed karaoke songs on television. Similarly, donors have characterised the
project as the dawn of a new reality for equitable land ownership. In Phnom Penh, I
visited an event hosted by project partner, GIZ, who had commissioned famed
Vietnam War photographer, Tim Page, to curate an exhibition about the LMAP. The
installation, called ‘Cadastral Convoy’, captured images of households gaining ‘real
ownership rights’. The photographs captured cadastral officials measuring and
demarcating land parcels and ended with pictures of smiling recipients proudly
holding their titles aloft. The event was reported in the national papers with much
zeal. The historical significance of the LMAP process was even compared to that of
the Vietnam War:
Reputed to be one of the inspirations for Dennis Hopper’s wild-eyed
Colonel Kurtz acolyte in Apocalypse Now, Page’s photography of the
region’s conflicts have since become iconic. Page is now engaged in
what he considers to be his most challenging project to date:
documenting the gradual transfer of land titles to rural and urban
Cambodian families. (13 July 2012, The Phnom Penh Post)
Page noted his own experience of taking the photographs, emphasising the
importance attached to titles by recipients. This sense of importance was no doubt
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enhanced by the presence of a professional photographer capturing events for a
national exhibition in Phnom Penh. Page was quoted in The Phnom Penh Post (12
July 2012):
“It’s the first time I’ve seen nothing but happy faces,” he says. “They
print out these giant maps, which has printed out all these little plots with
numbers, all the parcels of land, and then each person gets a little piece
of paper with their name, their number, and what land they have. And all
of a sudden they say,” – here he leans in to whisper – “‘you mean this
piece of land, is mine?’
The LMAP should also be understood in the context of the changing social contract
between state and society that has occurred in Cambodia over the last decade. During
the 1980s and 1990s, the Cambodian government’s interaction with society was
limited to providing the basic functions of personal security (Hughes, 2003). As the
country has developed, recently graduating to lower-middle income country status,
the roles of the government has changed, and state administrative actions (such as
providing citizens with ID cards, registering vehicles and businesses and paying
taxes) have become more prominent in people’s every-day lives. In this context,
titling provides a framework where the state can administer the land sector to a
greater degree, and potentially open up new opportunities for the state to exert
administrative control over society. This has occurred in India, where, according to
Kamna Patel (2016), the legalisation of tenure rights can be a prelude to increasing
interactions with the state. Similarly, in Cambodia, titling has been accompanied by
other forms of state administration. The most important of these is tax collection. A
new land tax regime was implemented in 2011 and I found that in the PhD survey
population, 85 per cent of the 110 households with land title had paid land tax in
2013. None had paid tax prior to receiving titles. Households with land title are also
required to pay a transaction tax of four per cent each time ownership is transferred,
either through transaction, gift, inheritance or any other means. This increased
interaction between state and society through titling signifies a changing social
contract, where the government provides title recipients with legal tenure security,
and, in return, title recipients provide tax revenue to the government.
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Finally, it is important to emphasise the how LMAP titles are linked to Cambodia’s
political and economic development from a global perspective. As Cambodia has
integrated deeply into international circuits of aid and capital, maintaining and
developing new frameworks to facilitate increasingly important transnational
relationships have become a priority of government. LMAP titles and their
associated global-standard system of property exchange are emblematic of this
global outlook and, therefore, the government has placed emphasis on maintaining
the integrity of the system. As a prominent figure in the business community told
me, the government acknowledged the economic risks associated with undermining
the land title system – investor confidence in the Phnom Penh property market
would be severely compromised.127 Consequently, the government have been keen to
espouse the benefits of titles and reluctant to devalue them by appropriating titled
property. As a measure of the importance that the government attaches to the
intervention, land titling and its relationship to investment and economic
development was the subject the subject of a master’s thesis by Hun Manet – the
son of Prime Minister Hun Sen – completed at New York University, which is now
archived in the CDRI library. In addition to encouraging transnational investment,
supporting the titling framework is related to the government’s dependence on
international aid (see Chapter 6). Fulfilling donor loan conditionality by upholding
land titles is requisite to secure future funding, which, in turn, is crucial to the
functioning of the Cambodian state: 50 per cent of the government’s public spending
budget comes from donors (Hughes, 2009).
9.6.2 LMAP titles and tenure security among recipient households
Survey data suggests the macro-level aspects of the LMAP on Cambodian culture
and society have had important impacts at the household level. The survey results
suggest that land titling has not constituted merely a cosmetic, bureaucratic reform.
In many cases, the receipt of a land title has had a positive impact on households’
perceptions of their tenure security. Among all title recipients,128 84 per cent of
respondents stated that receiving an LMAP title had increased their tenure security,
with the remaining 16 per cent unsure about the impact. No households reported that
127 Interview, former CEO of ANZ Royal Bank March 2013, Phnom Penh
128 Out of the 204 households surveyed, a total of 110 received titles in Sites 1 and 2 – no titles were
distributed in Site 3.
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receiving an LMAP title had a negative effect on their tenure security. The positive
perception of title was more pronounced in Site 2, which was an unplanned and
formerly unauthorized settlement. There, 96 per cent of recipients reported that titles
increased their tenure security, highlighting the important role titling can play in
increasing the tenure security for those living in unplanned areas in particular.
As the literature suggests (e.g. Brickell, 2014), tenure security is a complex concept
with many dimensions. To explore this complexity of security, my survey took the
form of open ended questions: I asked what impact respondents felt titles had on
their tenure security, made detailed notes of their responses and then later coded
them. This strategy enabled me to identify the broad trends describe above but also
to explore in detail the reasons behind these trends. On analysing responses, the first
thing that immediately struck me was that people identified land titles as
‘bankamasut LMAP’, literally ‘LMAP land title’. This surprised as me as I had not
experienced this level of knowledge about a project before during my years as a
development professional. It was testament to the media and cultural impact of the
intervention that the project name ‘LMAP’ had been married to the word for land
title ‘bankamasut’, suggesting that project had effectively constructed a new reality
of land ownership. In this new reality ‘bankamasut LMAP’ constituted the gold-
standard of tenure.
When reflecting on the impact of LMAP title on their tenure, respondent’s responses
fell into two broad camps. The first related to the idea that the LMAP enabled them
to legally own their property for the first time. That many households emphasised
the idea of ‘legality’ and tenure security speaks to the fact that land titles have
changed their relationship with the state. Prior to the implementation of land titling,
the vast majority of households in both Site 1 and Site 2 did not possess ownership
documents that constituted full legal ownership. ‘Legal ownership’ was often tied to
the idea of ‘exact’ ownership or ‘real’ ownership– a phrase often heard during
interviews was ‘land titles show my exact legal ownership’. This fits into the
discursive formations that have been utilized by government and donors as the
LMAP providing a framework that definitively proves the ownership of a parcel of
land – of creating a new reality of land ownership. These sentiments, however, are
also rooted in the tangible facets of land titles: the idea of ‘exact ownership’ was
often made in reference to the diagrammatical representations of a parcel’s
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boundaries. Documents available under pre-2001 tenure regimes did not show plot
boundaries, where as post-2001 land titles include an excerpt from a digital cadastral
map, showing a plot’s boundaries in relation to surrounding plots (See Chapters 5
and 6 for examples of pre-2001 and other tenure documents and LMAP title).
Another route through which land titles increased tenure security in the survey
population was through affecting the ontological dimensions of security. Many
respondents felt that receiving a land title contributed to an emotional feeling of
security and wellbeing. Respondents often used the term ‘teuk chet’, meaning
literally ‘secure heart’, or referred to a feeling of emotional warmth, ‘aram kadow’,
meaning literally ‘warm feeling’, when asked to describe the affect that land titles
had made to them. In contrast, respondents that had been excluded were under
immense psychological pressure because of the insecurity they suffered. In the
excluded Site 3, respondents often mentioned that they felt scared about the future –
they saw land titles as an important indicator of government recognition of their
tenure rights and were very vocal about their desire to acquire a title. Only one out of
48 households thought that receiving one would not increase their tenure security.
The reasoning of this respondent was that it was inevitable that the area was going to
be redeveloped – no action could prevent this reality. These strong and contrasting
statements from recipients and non-recipients tie into observations made by
Katherine Brickell (2014) in relation to the psychological importance of home and
land ownership in Cambodia.
9.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the various mechanisms through which titles may
potentially displace low-income populations by encouraging more ‘productive’
urban practices. I have argued that titles can contribute to changes in urban areas in a
number of ways. This chapter has presented evidence that by excluding low-income
communities from titling and granting titles, instead, to elite groups, the government
has fomented an inequitable urban transition in Phnom Penh. Low-income
communities have been relocated to the urban periphery, while the central locations
that communities once inhabited have become sites of global capitalism. However,
titling is not the only framework through which this transition has occurred – long
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leasing state land to developers has provided another route to the same result.
Therefore, rather than titling being a cause of dispossession per se, it is one of a
number of mechanisms the government has used to restructure space in a manner
that accords with its interests.
This chapter has found limited evidence to support the case that populations that
receive titles experienced rapid market-induced displacement. There is little evidence
that titles have caused significant increases in property prices or stimulated property
transactions. On the contrary, titles may have insulated low-income communities
from predatory developers by splitting the ownership rights of parcels across
multiple individuals. In addition, titles have coincided with an increase in low-cost
rental accommodation. There is evidence that titles have increased the availability of
rental accommodation by providing the collateral to obtain loans for housing
investment. In the longer term, however, such loans could become a source of
insecurity should property prices crash or the economic situation of borrowers
change.
The findings suggest that customary or communal tenure systems provide less
security to households than titles. This is because in Cambodia there is significant
political capital associated with guaranteeing the integrity of titles. In comparison,
mechanisms designed specifically to support vulnerable groups can easily be
violated by government without incurring the same political cost.
Finally, this chapter highlights the important social and cultural dimensions of the
LMAP. By deeply integrating into the everyday processes of Cambodian life, the
LMAP title has come to be considered the gold-standard of tenure security in Phnom
Penh.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
10.1 Introduction
In this thesis I hope to have contributed to debates on city-wide titling and urban
transition in cities of the global south by presenting a case study of the LMAP in
Phnom Penh. I have conducted a city-wide and household-level analysis of the titling
programme, drawing on archival research, key informant interviews and over 200
household questionnaires in three survey sites. In this conclusion, I draw out the
principal findings of the thesis and explore the contribution of these findings to key
debates in the literature. I then consider the policy implications of the study and
suggest future areas for research.
10.2 Principal Findings
The roots of tenure insecurity date from before the LMAP
Tenure insecurity did not begin with the LMAP; Pre-LMAP tenure systems were
associated with high levels of tenure insecurity in Phnom Penh’s unplanned
settlements. Tenure insecurity emerged as a key threat facing low-income urban
groups in 1989, when land was privatised by the government after fifteen years of
socialism. Privatisation was enacted in such a way that those in unplanned areas
were excluded from acquiring ownership documents. Instead, ownership rights to
large parcels of urban real-estate were distributed to senior officials to cement
political networks. In turn, officials enriched themselves by selling desirable plots to
prominent tycoons. Low-income groups living on these plots were frequently evicted
as a result of these land transactions. This transfer of urban land rights from poor to
rich served the interests of the ruling elite in several ways. First, by preventing those
in unplanned areas becoming property owners the state denied urban citizenship to a
group they considered illegitimate. Second, important connections were strengthened
among the political and economic elite through the transfer of valuable assets. Third,
land in prime urban areas was transferred to tycoons who could redevelop the city
into the modern metropolis for which the Cambodian political elite yearned.
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Access to titles in unplanned settlements has been uneven under the LMAP
The LMAP and associated reforms provided a legal framework for those in
unplanned areas to convert their possession claims into formal ownership. In
practice, however, the implementation of the law has been uneven. This thesis
identified three modes of LMAP implementation in relation to unplanned
settlements. First, in many cases the government circumvented the LMAP land
registration processes and illegally excluded those in unplanned areas from obtaining
titles until such time as it was politically expedient to evict them and transfer their
rights to representatives of elite groups. Second, in some cases unplanned areas once
considered illegal received titles as a result of the LMAP. Site 2 is a good example of
such a case. Titles were granted to residents as the final act of increasing official
recognition that included the extension of service infrastructure and other acts of
cooperation between local authorities and residents. Third, although the LMAP
frequently failed to secure the rights of those in unplanned areas through the
intended mechanisms – that is, by systematically adjudicating their property rights –
the project did provide additional policy spaces in which residents have asserted their
rights. I have highlighted the use of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel by civil
society organisations as an example of such a policy space.
I also suggest that Cambodia’s changing socioeconomic and political context has
affected how the LMAP has been implemented in unplanned areas. Industrialisation
has resulted in the historical view of the urban poor in unplanned areas as an
‘illegitimate’ social group becoming less entrenched as the need for a class of urban
workers becomes increasingly evident. As the urban poor have become an
established social group, the incentive to garner their support through the promotion
of inclusive policies has increased. In this changed context, I argue, it is more likely
that the government would provide such groups with titles than in comparison with
the late 1980s and 1990s.
Titling has been associated with increased household investment for some
In general, I found titles to be associated with increased investment in housing and/or
on-site income-generating activity. Residents living in areas that had been subject to
systematic titling invested more than those that did not; in areas subject to titling,
those that received title invested more than those that had not and reported greater
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frequency of investments after titling. Patterns of investment and titling suggest that
the LMAP contributed to increased investment in sections of the population that
received titles, but failed to reach the most marginalised. Those with the lowest
tenure security were those who were also excluded from titling. In the areas where
they lived investment in housing and income-generating activity was lowest, and
housing and living conditions were worst.
Aside from the distribution of titles, I identified a number of other factors that
influenced respondents’ investment behaviour. These included factors linked to
tenure security, such as respondents’ relationship with authorities and the likelihood
they would be evicted. There were also factors not directly linked to tenure security;
respondents reported consolidating structures to provide protection from crime and
environmental hazards. Lack of capital resources to finance upgrading was also
identified as a key constraint to investments.
The effects of titles on borrowing varied
A high proportion of respondents across all the survey sites reported accessing loans,
the overwhelming majority of which were obtained from formal-sector lenders –
either banks or microfinance institutions. In this context of borrowing, the impact of
titles varied. Titles were important for some respondents, who used them as
collateral to access larger sums lent at competitive rates of interest from well-known
banks. For others, however, smaller microfinance loans could be obtained without
title collateral, because lenders relied on local authorities to enforce loan contracts in
such circumstances. While microfinance could easily be accessed without titles,
such loans were comparatively small and liable to high interest rate charges.
For those seeking larger, lower-interest bank loans collateral was not the only
requisite. Potential borrowers were subject to more rigorous financial assessments,
including scrutiny of their ability to service the loan. Because of this, larger, lower-
interest bank loans tended to be restricted to a relatively small section of the
population: better-off households who also had tiles. For these richer households,
titles were important in accessing larger loans that had previously been inaccessible
to them because of their lack of collateral. Lower-income borrowers tended to access
smaller microfinance loans irrespective of whether they had titles or not. There was
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evidence, however, that those who had used title as collateral obtained larger
microfinance loans at lower rates of interest than those who had not.
Larger title-facilitated loans were often used by better-off households to enhance
their income-generating activities. Strikingly, the biggest loans reported were taken
by women heads of household in planned Site 1, who used them to build rental
accommodation or to support other home-based economic activity. In doing so,
better-off women-headed households appear to combine capital generating activity
with other roles in the household. By contrast, the smaller microfinance loans
appeared to be used to plug short-falls in household income, rather than enhancing
respondents’ livelihoods.
Titling has contributed to an uneven process of urban change
I have argued that the LMAP has been associated with profound changes in Phnom
Penh’s social fabric. At the city scale, the most palpable contributor to urban change
was the exclusion of residents in unplanned areas from titling and the transfer of
their property to developers. Distributing titles in this way meant that low-income
groups have been removed from the city, while large-scale redevelopment has
proliferated. As well as transferring assets to elites, the LMAP has encouraged
investment by providing increased security for foreign investors. Titles have also
provided foreign and domestic investors access to credit from Cambodian banks to
fund redevelopment projects.
While titling has been important in securing some large-scale investments, many
such investments appear to have been made in the absence of property titles. In some
cases the government has concessioned land to companies and then evicted residents.
Such practices, which are frequently condemned as illegal by observers, do not
involve the transfer of title deed. Given investment still flows into Cambodia’s land
sector through extra-legal channels, it seems probable that had the LMAP not
occurred, corrupt officials would have used different mechanisms to transfer the
resources of low-income groups to elites just as they had done in the pre-LMAP
period.
While exclusion from titling has resulted in a transfer of resources to elites, inclusion
of residents in titling has not produced the same effect. At the household level, I
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found no evidence of rapid social change in survey sites where residents received
titles – either in unplanned or in planned areas. There were no spikes in property
transactions – which could have indicated a process of gentrification or downward
raiding – around the periods that titling was implemented. There was evidence,
however, that titling was associated with an increase in renters as landlords were able
to expand accommodation using title-collateral loans.
I also looked at strategies promoted by government and some civil society groups to
secure the tenure of residents in unplanned areas using alternatives to titling. I drew
on the example of Dey Krahorm, where the government (with the support of civil
society) provided the community with a Social Land Concession rather than titles to
individual households, although residents in the area were thought eligible for titles
according to many commentators. I noted that the intervention was unsuccessful in
securing residents tenure: the plot was acquired by developers and residents were
evicted. I argue that residents in areas that have received titles are far more protected
from having their property appropriated in this way.
10.3 Theoretical contributions
Titling and the political economy of development
Earlier in this thesis I noted that an important strand of the titling and tenure security
literature centres on a theoretical discussion about the merits of titling vis á vis local
tenure systems (Porter, 2011; Roy, 2005). Advocates for titling view tenure
insecurity as the result of inefficient local institutions that limit access to formal
ownership; building institutions that can distribute titles efficiently to secure tenure
is their policy response (Brandao and Feder, 1995; De Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003).
Critics argue the opposite: that titling replaces local institutions with global-standard
systems that privilege the global capitalist elite and dispossess the marginalised
(Cousins, 2008; Goldman, 2011). This discussion reflects a wider debate in the
geography and development studies literature about the spread of best-practice,
globally replicated development policies and their impacts on populations in the
global south (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2005; Mosse, 2008). It also points to the central
question of this thesis: has Cambodia’s donor-funded titling project resulted in
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increased tenure security for the most vulnerable, or a more exclusionary neoliberal
system that has weakened traditional tenure and further marginalised the poor?
The World Bank’s LMAP Project Appraisal Document follows a global/good
local/bad conception of tenure that is rooted in the theoretical framework of
institutional economics. The document paints tenure insecurity in Cambodia as the
unintentional outcome of low-capacity bureaucracy unable to register land rights
efficiently (World Bank, 2002a). The LMAP aimed to replace local tenure with
global-standard institutions capable of issuing land titles efficiently to secure tenure
across Cambodia. I posit, however, that the bank’s focus on institutional capacity
masked the underlying dynamics of tenure insecurity. Pre-LMAP laws were
promulgated and implemented in a way to exclude the poor as part of a calculated
political act to further the interests of elites (see Chapter 5). Tenure insecurity,
resulted, then, from the concentration of power in the hands of the economic and
political elite in a context of rapid privatisation, not low-capacity institutions unable
to meet the technical demands of land registration. The Bank’s institutions-focused
analysis justified an institution-building response which failed to address these
underlying causes of tenure insecurity and contributed to the project’s limited
success in titling unplanned areas and its failure to prevent many residents in such
areas from being evicted.
Taking the opposite view of the World Bank, some scholars have suggested that the
LMAP replaces local tenure arrangements that serve the interests of the marginalised
with a global system that increases their tenure insecurity (Durand-Lasserve, 2007;
Springer, 2013). In Phnom Penh, my assessment of LMAP and traditional tenure
differed from the global/bad local/good dichotomy. I argue that the types of local
tenure found in unplanned settlements often equated to insecurity (see Chapters 5
and 7). The tenure categories commonly found in unplanned areas were perpetuated
by those in power to deny residents a stake in the city. They were not an organic
system of rights that evolved independently from notions of formal ownership
according to the needs of the population. Indeed, I found that residents did not feel
such ‘local’ tenure suited their interests and often tried to obtain formal ownership
documents but were barred from doing so by authorities. I suggest that the ‘global’
LMAP and associated did not undermine ‘local’ tenure present in unplanned
settlements, but provided greater legal protection to them than existed prior to the
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project and in some cases provided residents avenues to convert their claims into
legal ownership. I also found little evidence that titling caused market-related
insecurity by unleashing a tide of gentrification in formalised areas as posited by
others (Durand-Lasserve, 2007; Gravios, 2005).
I hope also that my findings provide new insights into land titling as a globally
replicated international development intervention through exploring the concept of
policy mobility. First, I have suggested that the LMAP’s policy mobility has worked
at an institutional level (e.g. Peck, 2010). In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that although
the LMAP is clearly a product of best-practice thinking on land reform, it has been
presented by the World Bank as an intervention that responds to bottom-up, rather
than top-down, pressure. I posit that the Bank’s emphasis on local demand was a
strategy used to justify and action deep governance reforms in Cambodia’s land
sector. In reality, the LMAP was one of a number of top-down, coordinated
interventions by donors to restructure land governance along the lines of orthodox
theories of land markets, which the Cambodian government were contractually
obliged to implement in the manner detailed in project documents. In this way, the
LMAP was able to restructure the institutional arrangements around land
administration according to global-standard, best-practice neoliberal theories.
Second, the LMAP’s policy mobility worked at social and cultural level (e.g. Li,
2005). In Chapter 9, I explored how LMAP titles were integrated into a variety of
cultural and social practices, including karaoke songs, title-giving ceremonies and art
exhibitions. As a result, LMAP titles have become highly valued, associated with the
concept of ‘real’ land ownership and, in turn, appear to have had a significant effect
on residents’ perceptions of tenure security in a variety of ways. Moreover, the
tenure security associated with LMAP titles is not only perceived: the project has
provided the government with strong cultural, social, economic and political
incentives not to undermine titles.
The diverse experiences of the LMAP for Phnom Penh’s residents suggest that
titling projects cannot be theorised as inherently good or inherently bad in terms of
their impacts on the lives of city dwellers. In Phnom Penh, the impacts of titling have
been complex and in some cases contradictory. On the one hand, many residents of
unplanned areas were excluded from the project, and so did not experience the
benefits extended to those who received titles. On the other hand, the LMAP did
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provide some people the opportunity to increase their tenure security using strategies
that were not available to them prior to the project. On balance, and despite the
project’s shortcomings, this thesis argues that the LMAP has improved tenure
security for low-income groups by providing them better access to legal ownership
than previous tenure systems. In addition, those who have received an LMAP title
are now in possession of a document that confers a very strong level of tenure
security and other benefits, such as access to credit on better terms.
Given the voluminous literature in geography and other disciplines asserting the
exclusionary nature of neoliberalism as a globally-replicated policy paradigm,
highlighting the potential of positive outcomes of such programmes may be viewed
as legitimising processes of exclusion. In this thesis, I have argued that strategies
deployed by marginalised groups means that they can benefit from such policies
even if the policies emerge from exclusionary capitalist principles; as Ananya Roy
(2005: 155) suggests, ‘the master’s tools cannot dismantle the master’s house, but
perhaps when strategically used, they can allow those on the outside to occupy the
master’s house’. My policy-oriented approach to analysis of development does not
deny that neoliberalism is an exclusionary regime globally, but proposes that these
frameworks can be leveraged in some cases to benefit low-income groups.
Titling and credit
Through my analysis of titling and borrowing in Cambodia, I hope to have
contributed to a greater understanding of emerging credit markets in the global
south. In this regard, I provide an example of titling in a context of the dramatic
expansion of microfinance, which has not received attention in the titling literature
so far. I have argued that microfinance lending challenges the binary assumptions on
which theories of titling and credit have been built. The orthodox view sees
borrowing through the lens of the formal/informal binary, where formal credit
providers include banks and other well-regulated lenders, and informal lenders
comprise moneylenders and pawnbrokers or friends and relatives (Feder and Nishio,
1998; Payne et al., 2009). Within this binary system proponents argue that titles
enable recipients to access formal credit by providing a secure form of collateral (De
Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003). Critics argue that even with titles, the poor cannot
access formal credit because of other barriers to entry, including difficulties
244
convincing lenders of their ability to meet repayments and banks general reluctance
to lend to low-income borrowers (Payne, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al., 2009).
The relationship between titling and microfinance in the survey populations differed
from such orthodox representations. Microfinance in Cambodia includes a variety of
lenders, embodying both ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ lending practices. Microfinance
companies are ostensibly ‘formal’ lenders insofar as they are licensed by the
government to lend money at interest. Despite this, some microfinance companies
engage in practices usually ascribed to informal lenders: they may charge usurious
rates of interest and rely on ‘informal’ mechanisms of debt enforcement. They often
do not require title as collateral to disburse loans. Instead, local authorities, rather
than the judiciary, can put pressure on borrowers to sell their property to meet
payments at the behest of microfinance institutions.
The experiences of titling and credit presented in this thesis suggest that the
formal/informal categorisation masks the myriad ways in which titles intersect with
credit-seeking activity. It calls for a revised conceptualisation of credit markets in the
global south as existing on a spectrum of lending from moneylenders to banks, and
embodying a variety of informal and formal procedures.
As well as exploring the attributes of credit markets, this thesis has presented title-
facilitated lending as a factor in urban change. Previous household-level studies -
typically focusing on unplanned areas – have found little evidence that title-
facilitated loans are used for housing investments (Field 2005; Fernandes
2011;Varley, 1987). This thesis found that while titles appeared to be relatively
unimportant for low-income borrowers in this regard, better-off title recipients
(usually in planned areas) used titles to access larger bank loans to upgrade their
property. These investments had an interesting impact on the social fabric of some
areas where the project had been active. In planned Site 1 residents often used title-
collateral loans to build rental accommodation to house the rapidly increasing
number of low-income tenants in the area. The relationship between titling and an
increase in low-income tenants differs from the common arguments that titling prices
out low-income renters (Payne, 2001; MacFarlane, 2012), again highlighting the
unexpected ways through which titling can contribute to urban change.
245
At the city scale, titling-facilitated credit also contributed to large-scale
redevelopment: titles were used by foreign and domestic developers to access large
loans from Cambodian banks, contributing to a rapid process urban redevelopment.
The role of titles in large-scale development is often discussed in the land
formalisation literature (Jones and Ward, 1994; MacFarlane, 2012), and specifically
with regards to Cambodia (Durand-Lasserve, 2007; Simone, 2008; Springer 2009).
The emphasis has been on the establishment of institutional frameworks that provide
conditions amenable for foreign investment to flow into urban economies. The
contribution made by this thesis is to highlight the role of title-facilitated credit in
providing capital that has been invested in large-scale development projects. This
finding is important because it identifies the spill-over effects of titling to other parts
of the economy, in this case the practices of Cambodia’s banking sector.
Titling and housing investment
This thesis has provided a novel example of city-wide titling to contribute to the
literature on titling and housing investment, which typically has focused on titling
targeted at unplanned settlements (Varley, 1987; Gilbert, 2002). In general, the
findings of the thesis support other studies reporting that titles have increased
investment in housing and capital-generating activities (Field, 2005; Van Gelder and
Luciano, 2015). As a city-wide project, however, the LMAP may have affected
investment behaviour through different mechanisms than identified in targeted titling
studies. Studies of titling targeted at unplanned settlements – penned by both
proponents and critics – agree that titling aims to provide recipients de jure security.
Proponents argue that de jure security is the primary basis on which households
assess their tenure security and so titles encourage recipients to invest more than
non-recipients (Van Gelder, 2010). In contrast, critics argue that de jure security is
not the primary indicator of tenure security. Other factors, such as a community’s
relationship with local authorities, the extension of service infrastructure to their
area, contribute to de facto security and provide more important incentives to invest
in housing (Gilbert 2002; 2012).
The LMAP, like other targeted titling schemes, provides households with a de jure
guarantee from the government that recipients will not be evicted. In addition to the
provision of de jure security, there are aspects of the LMAP that also provide de
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facto security to recipients. As a city-wide project the LMAP has a political
significance greater than a project that is targeted at poor residents exclusively for
one key reason: undermining an institution which has been designed to secure the
assets for global investors, the Cambodian elite and middle classes would incur a
much higher political cost that violating a framework designed to empower the urban
poor. Thus while the government has allowed alternative legal mechanisms designed
specifically to secure the poor’s rights to be violated (see Chapter 9 analysis of the
Social Land Concession at Dey Krahorm ), there has not been one reported case of a
resident with title having their property appropriated in Phnom Penh. As a result,
titles are viewed as the gold standard of tenure security in Phnom Penh by NGOs and
communities facing eviction alike, and many communities have fought to gain titles
to increase their tenure security under the project.
10.4 Policy implications
Titles provide tenure security to recipients in Phnom Penh
This thesis asserts the importance of titles as important indicators of tenure security
for residents in Phnom Penh, particularly when they are issued in areas that had low
de facto security. Tens of thousands of households without ownership documents
have been evicted across Phnom Penh, both before and after the LMAP was
initiated, but there has not been one documented case of a household in Phnom Penh
having their LMAP-titled property appropriated by the state. Instead, exclusion from
titling is the primary mechanism through which low-income communities are
removed from central urban areas. It was clear during my fieldwork that
communities threatened with eviction viewed receiving titles to their plots as the best
outcome to secure their tenure. The logical policy response to this finding is that
advocates working on behalf of low-income groups should try to obtain titles for
them in the first instance.
The position that titles may provide benefits to low-income groups is at odds with
literature that suggests informal or customary tenure protects communities from
predatory neoliberal elites better and should therefore be used as the basis for
alternative approaches to formalisation (Fernandes, 2011; Payne, 2005). While this
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strategy may work in other contexts, the reality in Phnom Penh is that alternative
tenure systems leaves communities more vulnerable to the power of a predatory
neoliberal state than providing them with titles, as I have illustrated with the case of
Dey Krahorm.
While the experience of Dey Krahorm and other Social Land Concessions suggest
that alternative tenure mechanisms have not been able to secure tenure for low-
income settlement, in many cases titling such settlements is not a viable alternative
in the current political climate: the government seems unwilling to provide titles to
unplanned settlements that it sees as undesirable. In addition, in some unplanned
communities not all residents are eligible for titles under the law as it currently
stands. For example, in riverside settlements, some households may be living on land
classed as ‘riverbank’, which is considered state public property and therefore cannot
legally be owned by an individual. Titling such an area would mean some people
being recognised as legal owners while others were classed as illegal occupants of
state public property (the ‘riverbank’), potentially causing conflicts within the
community.
A potential solution that is currently being advocated for by NGOs to secure tenure
in untitled unplanned areas involves the on-site construction of modern housing and
providing residents with titles of co-ownership to the communal parcel on which the
structure is built. In a situation where only a portion of a community’s parcel is
eligible for a title, for example if some of the land is classed as ‘riverbank’, then the
entire community would be rehoused in a structure built on the portion of the plot
that can be legally owned, and be provided with a title of co-ownership for the
parcel. This solution has the benefit of securing the community’s tenure using a title
(rather than a social land concession) and securing the individual rights of
community members by vesting co-ownership of the titled plot in them. By
providing modern housing, the approach also appeals to officials seeking to
modernise the city.
The rights of co-owners of a land parcel are clearly articulated in the Law. The Sub-
Decree on the Management and Use of Co-owned Buildings (2009) makes the
following provisions for co-ownership:
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A co-owned Land Parcel refers to a land parcel of a co-owned building
with a specific location, or to a parcel of land large enough for
construction of a co-owned building where the location and construction
plan has been approved. The land parcel of a co-owned building shall be
under the common management and use of all co-owners. (Article 4)
Each co-owner has private ownership right to his or her private unit,
unless specifically restricted by laws or other legal provisions. (Article
10)
The Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction
(MLMUPC) has the authority to register and give certificates recording
the ownership of private units of a co-owned building to all co-owners
(Article 16)
These provisions provide – in principal – a communal solution to tenure insecurity
that incorporates the security offered by titles.
An onsite redevelopment project using the co-ownership approach is currently being
implemented in Charang Chamres in the commune of Russei Keo (People in Need,
2015). Charang Chamres is a community of 1,250 people located on a strip of land
between the Tonle Sap river and National Highway 5 – one of the major routes out
of Phnom Penh to northern Cambodia. The community has been threatened with
eviction as part of riverside-beautification and road-widening plans. In addition, GIS
mapping of the area shows that many residents are living illegally on state-owned
land, either within a ‘road corridor’ or ‘riverbank’. They are therefore not eligible for
title under the law or even entitled to compensation if evicted. However, a portion of
the land is not state public land and can therefore be legally owned (Figure 10.1).
Providing a title of co-ownership and an onsite redevelopment to house the entire
community on this smaller site potentially provides secure tenure to the community
and a housing solution that is aesthetically acceptable to the government.
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Figure 10.1: Map of Charang Chamres
Source: Collective Studio, 2014
There are, however, a number of issues that need to be resolved if tenure security is
to be achieved through this mechanism. The first concerns funding of the alternative
accommodation for the community on the portion of their parcel that can be titled.
Should the community sell part of the land to developers to fund construction? This
is certainly an option given that the plot could be worth in excess of 40 million USD,
according to real-estate agents (VTRUST, 2014). Another option would be a
mortgage secured against the title for the plot; the community would be jointly liable
for the debt incurred. The likely cost has been compared with average incomes in the
area, suggesting that the mortgage option would be feasible, and banks have agreed
to provide a mortgage should the community receive title. However, a credit-driven
development presents problems in terms of the ethics of enforcement if households
do not keep up repayments.
A second issue concerns how and by whom such a complex project could be
managed and overseen. Would the community elect a body to manage the project or
would an NGO or a bespoke government committee be more suited to the role? The
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scope for community representatives to betray the interests of members is
considerably diminished in the case of a co-owned plot because of the legal
protection enjoyed by co-owners. However, this risk can never be eliminated given
endemic corruption – particularly if a well-connected developer becomes involved.
The third issue is how the varied interests of such a large group could be negotiated.
Is it possible to secure a consensus about key aspects of the project – such as the
timeline, arrangements for alternative accommodation during construction etc. –
among 1,250 people? What if those with stronger claims do not want to accept the
plan and would rather wait and try to obtain an individual title? How would the
different sizes of households’ properties and the relative strength of their ownership
claim translate into the types of co-owned units they would receive? What will
happen to renters?
Resolving the issues tied up in such a major undertaking will inevitably create some
winners and losers in the community. However, the alternative scenario is that the
community is evicted and – as is typical in such cases – everybody in the community
loses.
City-wide titling projects should plan for difficulties in unplanned areas
The LMAP has not succeeded in its stated objective of increasing tenure security
across Phnom Penh because it did not extend rights to all the eligible populations. So
what lessons for donors concerning city-wide titling projects emerge from this
analysis? The most important implication is that planners acknowledge the context-
specific factors that may hinder the extension of a city-wide titling project to
marginalised populations and address them in project planning.
A key weakness of the LMAP was that it did not make any provision for
implementing the project in unplanned settlements; planners did not anticipate that
titling such areas would present different challenges from those involved in titling
planned areas. It was simply assumed that the project would be implemented evenly
across urban spaces and government would convert all legal possession claims into
ownership free from political interference. An analysis of pre-LMAP systems as
presented in Chapter 5, however, would have revealed a history of land laws being
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systematically applied by government in such a way as to exclude low-income
groups from ownership.
Exclusions are a key issue for titling projects more generally, not just for the LMAP,
because they present a political rather than a technical problem that is beyond the
scope of the good-governance interventions promoted by the Bank. This thesis has
shown, however, that while titling is a technical intervention on paper its
implementation becomes highly politicised. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, for
example, access to titles was controlled by government in order to consolidate
important high-level political networks, leading to the exclusion of many low-
income communities. The LMAP’s few successes titles unplanned areas were also
related to political processes. In Chapter 6 I suggested that the cooperative
relationship between the community and local authorities in Site 2, as evidenced by
joint investments in local infrastructure, was linked to successful titling in the area.
The Bank itself has also been involved in political negotiations with the government
in the Boeung Kak case, which led it to withdraw all lending to Cambodia in protest
at the actions of officials not providing titles to residents in unplanned settlements.
Bearing the importance of political engagement in mind, it is crucial that donors
implementing titling projects work closely with civil society groups during project
implementation and ask such groups to facilitate titling in unplanned areas. These
groups have a much greater understanding of the political intricacies of titling at the
local level than do donor organisations. At the national level, perhaps the most
effective mechanism to ensure such areas receive titles is by tying lending directly to
titling in unplanned areas. The LMAP did not do this and so provided a limited
counter balance to the vested interests in the state that opposed such activities.
Legal reforms are needed to secure tenure for the marginalised
This thesis has identified a number of quasi-legal mechanisms that the Cambodian
government has used to exclude low-income urban groups from having their
property rights adjudicated by cadastral officials and eventually to evict them and
allocate their land to elite beneficiaries. In this regard there are two semi-formal
legal processes used by the government to deny those in unplanned areas titles. The
first relates to the arbitrary classification of parcels of state land. In many cases the
government has claimed that communities are living on state public land, evicted
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residents, then reclassified the land as state private land and long-leased it to
developers. This well-worn mechanism has been used to provide a cloak of legal
legitimacy to the eviction of tens of thousands of people. To address this legal
failing, civil society and donors should advocate for more stringent criteria and
procedures for the reclassification of state land and for the protection of the rights of
those living in such areas. The second quasi-legal mechanism deployed by the state
is ‘provisionally’ excluding low-income groups from titling in adjudication areas.
Donors in the land sector should ensure that provisional exclusions end as a
condition of future funding.
There is also the crucial issue of tenure security for those who do have their property
rights adjudicated but are for found not to be eligible for titles under the law as it
currently stands. Key in this regard is the situation of those who are determined to be
living on state public land. The Cambodian government’s Circular 03 provides
tenure options for those living in such areas, ranging from the provision of titles on-
site to resettlement off-site. However, as a circular the document has limited legal
clout and since it was published in 2010 there have been no signs of its being
implemented in Phnom Penh. Civil society organisations should call for the
circular’s implementation in areas where land has been classified as state public land
and where residents consequently face eviction.
A further issue is that there are few laws that define how state public land is
classified and demarcated in urban areas. Instead, there are national guidelines that
apply the same criteria to both rural and urban settings. For example, the road
corridors of national highways are 60 metres irrespective of whether the highways
are in a rural or urban setting. In urban areas, such a corridor may not be necessary
from a public infrastructure perspective, but all households living within it will be
classified as illegal occupants of state land. Such laws need to be revised to reflect
the different rural and urban contexts.
Finally, though laws exist to promote socially responsible large-scale investment,
these are weak and have not prevented evictions. For example, developers are legally
required to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments for all large redevelopment
projects that may have negative social and environmental consequences, including
population displacements. However, assessments are conducted by private
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companies and are paid for by the redeveloper, and they have so far proved
ineffective in stopping or even curtailing the worst aspects of large-scale
developments. Therefore, the process of conducting and enforcing impact
assessments should be strengthened to provide more protection to populations who
may be adversely affected.
A multi-pronged strategy of advocacy and consensus building
As I hope to have demonstrated, the Cambodian state has consistently implemented
laws unevenly to the benefit of elites. In this context, simply advocating that new
laws should be promulgated and expecting them to achieve their stated outcome is
perhaps naïve. However, the existence of such laws can provide a platform for civil
society organisations to assert the rights of marginalised groups. Therefore, it is
important that civil society organisations develop strategies to pressure government
if laws are to be implemented in a way that benefits low-income communities.
Globally, the role of civil society and communities in scale jumping and linking
marginalised groups to global governance mechanisms in order to apply pressure to
national governments is increasingly recognised in the literature (Ferguson, 2004;
Roy, 2005). In Boeung Kak Lake, for example, communities threatened with
eviction engaged human rights lawyers who complained to the World Bank’s
Inspection Panel. If a company is involved in the development – particularly a
reputable transnational corporation – it may be useful to ascertain whether the
company’s due diligence mechanisms have been followed and explore ways of
pressuring companies to withdraw their investment if the redevelopment seems
likely to heighten tenure insecurity.
I have also highlighted the importance of strengthening community links with local
authorities as a strategy to increase tenure security and obtain titles. My results
suggest that titles were the end of an incremental process of increasing state
recognition, where the provision of public services and cooperation with local
authorities were important intermediary steps, as was noted in relation to Site 2 in
Chapter 6. Civil society organisations have important roles to play in facilitating this
kind of cooperation.
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A prerequisite to effective advocacy and/or cooperation is successful community
mobilisation, which in Phnom Penh is often centred on savings groups or other
forms of social organisation. In other contexts, including neighbouring Thailand,
such organisations have also been important in mobilising communities in unplanned
areas (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2013). In Phnom Penh, such organisations (including
UPWD and CDF) have used a number of mechanisms to enable marginalised
communities to better organise and more effectively assert their tenure rights,
including participatory community mapping and collating evidence relating to the
possession claims of residents. Donor organisations should provide financial support
to groups conducting such activities.
Titling should be coupled with better-regulated credit markets
The growth in microfinance in Cambodia has not been accompanied by appropriate
regulation, leaving borrowers vulnerable to repossession, or more commonly, to
pressure from local authorities to sell their assets to meet repayments. In this context,
titling potentially increases market-based vulnerability by enabling recipient
households to access larger loans. The lending activities of banks and microfinance
institutions should therefore be better regulated to protect vulnerable households
from losing their property. There should be stricter requirements to carry out
comprehensive checks on the financial histories of borrowers, limits should be set on
interest rate charges, and borrowers should be made aware of the consequences of
default and the extent of their rights should they be unable to meet debt obligations.
10.5 Further research
The issues raised in this thesis suggest several different lines of possible future
research. At the broadest level, I hope I have emphasised the usefulness of policy-
oriented critiques of international development interventions. As ever-larger
segments of the global population are living under neoliberal development policies,
so there is an increasing need to engage with them to forward the interests of
marginalised groups (Robinson, 2011). Indeed, local policy debates among
researchers in developing countries frequently centre on the impacts of neoliberal
policies at the local level, not the mechanics of their dissemination at the global
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level. From my own experience working with Cambodian researchers, it is clear that
the majority of local research is geared towards the effects of such policies on the
lives of Cambodians – both positive and negative. This point has been made in
recent urban studies literature, which seeks to engage in debates of researchers in the
global south who are directly experiencing such neoliberal frameworks (Parnell and
Robinson, 2012). It is crucial therefore, that theoretical debates about international
development in the academic literature engage with local policy problems to bring
new perspectives to key issues facing marginalised urban populations.
With regard to titling projects, this thesis suggests that city-wide titling in urban
areas is an understudied topic. There has been little analysis of how such projects
operate at the household level, particularly in planned districts, where residents may
fall into lower income categories but remain invisible to research that engages only
unplanned settlements. The limited evidence on the outcomes of titling projects are
implemented in planned areas precludes critiques that could influence how they are
implemented in the future.
Within Cambodia, more research on the land tenure situation of low-income urban
groups across Phnom Penh and beyond is needed to develop a fuller picture of the
situation in the country. This research (like many other academic studies) has
focused on central areas of Phnom Penh. As I have noted previously, I focused on
these areas because that was where the LMAP had been implemented at the time of
fieldwork. However, in Phnom Penh the vast majority of the 250,000 ‘urban poor’
households reside in peri-urban districts (Phnom Penh Municipality, 2012). It is in
these peri-urban districts that the bulk of the city’s population growth and land use
change has also occurred. Future research could assess the tenure situation and
pressures in such areas.
In terms of advocacy-focused research, further investigation of the strategies adopted
by vulnerable communities to assert their rights would be valuable to our
understanding of the political economy of development and would also support
local-level advocacy strategies. There are already some examples of this kind of
research occurring in Cambodia’s land sector. Katherine Brickell (2014), for
example, has identified the strategies used by women in Boeung Kak to assert their
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land rights by linking their personal experiences with national and global activist
networks.
Finally, the thesis brings credit into view as a key driver of investment and urban
transition in the global south, and a topic in need of further research. The current
titling and credit literature is conducted in reference to an outdated formal/informal
binary of lenders. As this thesis has suggested, the structure of local credit markets
can be complex and the role of titles in accessing different forms of credit is varied.
Further research on titles and the emerging forms of credit in the global south would
provide a picture of what seems to be a significant driver of household investment
and potentially a significant cause of vulnerability through increasing indebtedness.
At the city scale, this thesis has suggested that title-secured credit has funded large-
scale developments and is an important driver of urban land use change. Title-
facilitated credit was also linked to increased investment in and availability of rental
units, thus contributing to the emergence of an urban class of low-income tenants.
Titles and credit, therefore, may be an interesting lens through which to view urban
transition at multiple scales in the cities of the global south..
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Appendix 1 – Key informant interviews
Stakeholder Details of interviews
LMAP government
officials
- Chief of District Cadastral Office Tuol Kork, Phnom Penh , 18
March 2013
- Chief of District Cadastral Office Chamkarmon , 21 March
2013
Donor officials
(interviewees both
asked that their
organisation was not
identified)
- Employee at donor organisation 1, Washington D.C. (via
skype), 11 December 2013
- Employee at donor organisation 2, Phnom Penh, 7 November
2013
Sub-national
(commune) officials
- Commune Chief, Commune Tonle Bassac, District
Chamkarmon, Phnom Penh, 4 February 2013
- Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Muoy, District Tuol
Kork, Phnom Penh, 6 February 2013
- Commune Chief, Commune Tuek Laark Bai, District Tuol
Kork, Phnom Penh, 6 February 2013
Local (Village)
officials
- Chiefs of Villages 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,
Commune Tonle Bassac, (16 interviews) Phnom Penh Various
dates February-April 2013
- Chiefs of Villages 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,
Commune Tuek Laark Muoy (16 interviews), Phnom Penh,
Various dates in February-April 2013
- Chiefs of Villages 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 Commune
Chief Tuek Laark Bai, (16 interviews), Phnom Penh, Various
dates in February-April 2013
- Chief of Village Sen Sok (relocation site), District Sen Sok, 18
June 2013
Community
representatives
- Representative of Sen Sok relocation site Community (formerly
Sambok Chab),District Sen Sok, 18 June 2013
- Representative of Charang Chamres Community, District
Russei Keo, Phnom Penh 11 February 2015
- Representative of Borei Deomsrol Community, District Russei
Keo, Phnom Penh, 13 February 2015
- Representative of Chamrouen Community, District Chbar
Ampov, Phnom Penh 16 February 2015
- Representative of Vealsbov Community, District Chbar
Ampov, Phnom Penh 12 February 2015
- Representative of 42 Knong Community, Kampong Cham, 24
February 2015
Civil society - GIS officer, Sahakum Teang Tnaut (STT), Phnom Penh, 23
May 2013
- Programme manager, Sahakum Teang Tnaut (STT), Phnom
Penh, 9 September 2013
- Advisor, Community Managed Development Partners (CMDP),
Phnom Penh, 27 May 2013
- Advisor, Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR),
Phnom Penh, 10 September 2013
- Former legal officer, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
(COHRE), Phnom Penh, 21 March 2013
- Former legal officer, Bridges Across Borders South East Asia
(BABSEA), 8 April 2013
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- Programme Coordinator (Economics unit), Cambodia
Development Resource Instituted (CDRI), Phnom Penh, 8 July
2013
- Advisor, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI),
Phnom Penh, 23 November 2013
- Research fellow (Social Development unit), Cambodia
Development Resource Instituted (CDRI), Phnom Penh, 20
February 2014
Private sector - Former CEO, ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 19 July 2015
- Head of Mortgages ANZ Royal Bank, Phnom Penh, 25 June
2015
- Vice-President and Head of Mortgages ACLEDA, Phnom
Penh, 5 September 2013
- Branch Manager, Y.C.P. Microfinance, Phnom Penh, 3
September 2013
- Country Manager, Hong Kong Land, Phnom Penh, 25 October
2013
Residents in survey
sites (Extended
questionnaire
responses cited in the
thesis)
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 23, Phnom Penh, 11
June 2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 15, Phnom Penh, 6 June
2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 14, Phnom Penh, 6 June
2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 62, Phnom Penh, 30
June 2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 3, Phnom Penh, 21 May
2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 70, Phnom Penh, 7 July
2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 19, Phnom Penh, 8 June
2013
- Resident Site 1, Questionnaire number 54, Phnom Penh, 27
June 2013
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 103, Phnom Penh, 21
July 2013
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 122, Phnom Penh, 22
September
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 192, Phnom Penh, 1
November 2013
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 145, Phnom Penh, 3
October 2013
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 84, Phnom Penh, 13
July 2013
- Resident Site 2, Questionnaire number 90, Phnom Penh, 16
July 2013
- Resident Site 3, Questionnaire number 164, Phnom Penh, 15
October 2013
- Resident Site 3, Questionnaire number 141, Phnom Penh, 3
October 2013
- Resident Site 3, Questionnaire number 89, Phnom Penh, 14
July 2013
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Appendix 2 – Questionnaire
Questionnaire for households in receipt of LMAP title
Date of Interview…………….. Ordinal Number of
Questionnaire…………..
Interview time: Started at Ended at Total Time: minutes
Village: .
Sangkat/commune:
Relationship of interviewee to property owner:
1.Household/plot characteristics
1.1 What type of property? 1= villa
2= shop-house (1960s)
3=shop-house (new build)
3= apartment in shop-house
4=apartment in large complex
(1960s)
5=apartment in modern
complex
6=wooden traditional house
7=unplanned structure
(please specify)
8=other (please specify)
1.2 What is the
approximate size of the
property ? (M2)
1.3 How many floors does
the property have?
1.4 How many households
live (excluding renters)
in this property?
1.4a
Who is the owner of
the property?
1.4b Age(s)
of owner (s):
1.4c
Job
1.4d
Education
1.5d
Date property
Acquired
1 =male - single
2=female – single
3= male – married
4=female - married
5=couple
6=owners are from
more than one
household (please give
details)
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1.5a Please list
other members of
household (s) by
gender
1.5b Relationship
to owner
1.5c age 1.5d occupation 1.5e level of
education
1.6 How does this
household use their
plot?
1 = Owner residential only (go to 1.8)
2 = Owner residential and commercial (specify
commercial activity) [go to 1.8]
4 = Owner residential and renting to tenants (go
to 1.7)
1.7a
Number of
tenants
1.7b
occupation
of tenants
1.7c Total
number of
rooms
1.7d Total
income per
month
(KHR)
1.7e
What year
did you
start
renting to
tenants?
1.7g
have rents
increased
since then?
(please
state when
and why)
1.7h
Have you
modified
your rental
accommod
ation to
increase
rent?)
1.8 Is the household
connected to municipal
water and electricity
services?
1=connected to both
2=water only
3=electricity only
4=none
1.9 In what year did the
household start living in
the property?
1.10 How did the household
acquire this property?
1=from the state
2=purchased
3=inherit
4=other (please specify)
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2. Tenure characteristics
2.1 How did the household
receive LMAP title?
1=from the state –
systematic titling (go to
2.3)
2=from the state -
sporadic titling (apply
yourself) (go to 2.2)
3=acquired through
purchase (go to 2.8)
4=inherited (go to 2.8)
5=other (please specify)
2.2 Why did you decide to
apply for title?
2.3 Did you attend a public
meeting where officials
explained about land
titling (please provide
details of experience)?
2.4 How/where did you
collect your land title?
2.5 How much did you pay
for your land title?
2.6 Overall, how would
you describe the
experience of obtaining
land title? (go to 2.9)
2.7 If you
purchased/inherited a
property with LMAP
title, where did you
document the
transaction and specify
fee (if any) ?
1=at the land ministry
2=at the village office
3=at the commune office
4=at the municipality
4=other (please specify)
2.8 Whose name is on the
title?
1 =male - single
2=female – single
3= male – married
4=female - married
5=couple
6=other (please specify)
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2.9 What are the main
advantages of having a
title?
2.10 Does possession of
land title have any
impact on inheritance?
2.11 Do you feel that land
title has had any impact
on the value of your
property and why?
2.12 Do you feel that land
titling has resulted in
any changes in the area
(for example new
people moving in, new
development), if so
what?
2.13 Do you plan to stay
here for a long time or
move in the future?
2.14 Do you think land
titling has any impacts
if you sell your
property in the future?
2.15 Has LMAP title
increased your tenure
security? (please give
details why)
1=yes
2=no difference
3=weakened tenure status
3=not sure
2.16 Do you feel title has
made any difference to
women’s tenure
security in the
household?
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3. Credit
3.1 Have you obtained
any form of cash loan
since you moved to
this house?
1=looked for and received
(go to 3.2)
2=looked for but refused
(go to 3.8)
3=did not look for (3.12)
3.1
Date of
loan
3.2
What was
the source
of the
loan?
3.3
How much
was
borrowed?
(KHR)
3.4
What is the
av.
monthly
interest?
(%)
3.5
What was
the
purpose of
the loan?
3.6
Did you
use LMAP
title as
guarantee?
1=yes
2=no
3.7
Have you
had any
problems
paying
back?
Loan 1(a)
Loan 2(b)
Loan 3(c)
Loan 4(d)
3.8 Source of
refused loan
3.9
Reason for
refusal
3.10
Purpose of loan
3.11
Amount sought
(KHR)
Loan 1(a)
Loan 2(b)
Loan 3(c)
Loan 4(d)
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3.12 Do you plan to use land title
in the future to get credit and
if so what for?
4. Investment
4.1 Have you invested improved
your home/business/rental
accommodation?
1=yes (go to 4.2)
2=no (go to 4.8)
4.2
What was
the
investment
made?
4.3
Year of
investmen
t
4.4
What was
the cost?
(USD)
4.5
What was the
main reason
you
invested?
4.6
Would you
have
invested
without
land title?
4.7
Did LMAP
title impact
how you paid
for the
investment?
Investment
1 (a)
Investment
2 (b)
Investment
3 (c)
Investment
4 (d)
4.8 If you have not
invested, what is the
main reason why have
you have not?
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5. Boundary conflicts
5.1 Have you ever been in
a dispute over this
plot?
1=yes
2=no (Go to 6)
5.2 What was the nature
of the dispute and why
did it occur?
5.3 How did you attempt
to resolve the conflict?
(please detail all
stages)
5.4 What was the
outcome?
5.5 Were you satisfied
with the outcome?
6. Tax, services and other costs
6.1 How much land tax do you pay (per
year) for this property?
6.2 Has title increased your land tax
payments, if so by how much (per
year)?
6.3 Has land title affected any other
living costs living costs, and if so
how?
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Questionnaire for households NOT in receipt of LMAP title
Date of Interview…………….. Ordinal Number of Questionnaire …………..
Interview time: Started at Ended at Total Time: minutes
Village: .
Sangkat/commune:
Relationship of interviewee to property owner:
1.Household/plot characteristics
1.1 What type of property? 1= villa
2= shop-house (1960s)
3=shop-house (new build)
3= apartment in shop-house
4=apartment in large complex
(1960s)
5=apartment in modern
complex
6=wooden traditional house
7=unplanned structure
(please specify)
8=other (please specify)
1.2 What is the
approximate size of the
property ? (M2)
1.3 How many floors does
the property have?
1.4 How many households
live (excluding renters)
in this property?
1.4a
Who is the owner of
the property?
1.4b Age(s)
of owner (s):
1.4c
Job
1.4d
Education
1.5d
Date property
Acquired
1 =male - single
2=female – single
3= male – married
4=female - married
5=couple
6=owners are from
more than one
household (please give
details)
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1.5a Please list
other members of
household (s) by
gender
1.5b Relationship
to owner
1.5c age 1.5d occupation 1.5e level of
education
1.6 How does this
household use their
plot?
1 = Owner residential only (go to 1.8)
2 = Owner residential and commercial (specify
commercial activity) [go to 1.8]
4 = Owner residential and renting to tenants (go
to 1.7)
1.7a
Number of
tenants
1.7b
occupation
of tenants
1.7c Total
number of
rooms
1.7d Total
income per
month
(KHR)
1.7e
What year
did you
start
renting to
tenants?
1.7g
have rents
increased
since then?
(please
state when
and why)
1.7h
Have you
modified
your rental
accommod
ation to
increase
rent?)
1.8 Is the household
connected to municipal
water and electricity
services?
1=connected to both
2=water only
3=electricity only
4=none
1.9 In what year did the
household start living in
the property?
1.10 How did the household
acquire this property?
1=from the state
2=purchased
3=inherit
4=other (please specify)
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2. Tenure characteristics
2.1 What ownership
document do you
have?
1=application receipt
(1992 land law)
2=survey paper (1992
land law)
3=certificate (1992 land
law)
4=letter of agreement
between buyer and seller
5=sale letter from
village
6=sale letter from
commune
7=no document
2.2 Why do you not have
LMAP title?
2.3 Do you feel secure in
your ownership with
current documentation?
2.4 Do you want an LMAP
title? (please provide
details of reason why)
2.5 Do you think you will
receive a land title in
the future – how much
do you expect it to
cost?
2.6 What was your
experience of
systematic land titling
in this commune?
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3. Credit
3.1 Have you obtained
any form of cash loan
since you moved to
this house?
1=looked for and received
(go to 3.2)
2=looked for but refused
(go to 3.8)
3=did not look for (3.12)
3.1
Date of
loan
3.2
What was
the source
of the
loan?
3.3
How much
was
borrowed?
(KHR)
3.4
What is the
av.
monthly
interest?
(%)
3.5
What was
the
purpose of
the loan?
3.6
Did you
use tenure
doc as
guarantee?
1=yes
2=no
3.7
Have you
had any
problems
paying
back?
Loan 1(a)
Loan 2(b)
Loan 3(c)
Loan 4(d)
3.8 Source of
refused loan
3.9
Reason for
refusal
3.10
Purpose of loan
3.11
Amount sought
(KHR)
Loan 1(a)
Loan 2(b)
Loan 3(c)
Loan 4(d)
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4. Investment
4.1 Have you invested improved
your home/business/rental
accommodation?
1=yes (go to 4.2)
2=no (go to 4.8)
4.2
What was the
investment
made?
4.3
Year of
investment
4.4
What was the
cost?
(USD)
4.5
What was the
main reason
you invested?
4.6
How did you
fund
investment?
Investment 1
(a)
Investment 2
(b)
Investment 3
(c)
Investment 4
(d)
4.7 If you have not
invested, what is the
main reason why have
you have not?
5. Boundary conflicts
5.1 Have you ever been in
a dispute over this
plot?
1=yes
2=no (Go to 6)
5.2 What was the nature
of the dispute and why
did it occur?
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5.3 How did you attempt
to resolve the conflict?
(please detail all
stages)
5.4 What was the
outcome?
5.5 Were you satisfied
with the outcome?
6. Tax, services and other costs
6.1 How much land tax do you pay (per
year) for this property?
6.2 Has your land tax payments
increased overtime, if so by how
much (per year) and when?
6.3 Has systematic land titling in the
area affected any other living costs
living costs, and if so how?
